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Abstract
Korea has experienced remarkable economic growth during the last four decades due to its
trade-oriented development policy. Since the international trade of Korea is carried
predominantly by sea transport, its ports play a pivotal role in national economic
development. This impressive development in a short period of time has resulted in rapidly
increasing seaborne cargoes. All the parties involved in port activities have made a
significant effort to keep pace with the ever-growing export and import cargoes. Korean
ports, however, still have a number of problems including insufficient port and terminal
capacity, inefficient management and operation, and bureaucratic administration, all of
which weaken the competitiveness of the country's products by adding heavy logistics
costs.
Th deal appropriately with these problems, the newly established public port authority, the
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, has launched a new port and terminal
development plan to attract private capital into both existing and new facilities. As a
consequence, this scheme has introduced new competition into the Korean port industry
combined with some degree of privatisation.
The motives for privatisation are complex and varied, but one key claim made is that the
transformation of ownership from public to private improves economic efficiency.
Economic theories and existing empirical studies, however, fail to establish clear-cut
evidence supporting this claim. This phenomenon may reflect, to some extent, a paucity of
performance indicators systematically applicable across enterprises and industries. It is
essential, therefore, to have a systematic and pragmatic analytical framework to assess the
process of privatisation and its results.
With this context in mind, this thesis aims to critically review the characteristics of
international port privatisation together with the economic theory of privatisation, to apply
a new econometric technique for efficiency measurement to a port: the frontier model, and
to assess the policy implications for the Korean government and port authority, paying
particular reference to the privatisation strategy and its implementation within the nation's
seaports and terminals.
This research makes an original contribution to knowledge in three respects: firstly, port
privatisation, in particular the Korean case has, for the first time, been scientifically
investigated on the basis of the economic theory of privatisation; secondly, the industry
was analysed through the application of a recently developed econometric efficiency
measurement method based on the estimation of two frontier models (i.e. cross-sectional
and panel models); and finally, the results of the research undoubtedly provide
government, port authority and other interested parties with information and guidelines for
implementing the policy of port privatisation.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND
The Republic of Korea (South Korea, hereafter referred to as just 'Korea') has achieved
remarkable economic growth over the last four decades: from a poor developing country
with a small manufacturing sector and heavily dependent on foreign aid in the 1960s to a
fully industrialised country currently ranked as the world 11th largest trading nation 1 . This
impressive development within a short period of time is largely thanks to the adoption of
outward-oriented and export-led economic policies.
This inspiring economic growth has resulted in a rapid increase in export and import
cargoes and this trend has recently been accelerated by the better trade relations with the
Chinese economy: the fastest growing economy in the world. Since the foreign trade of
Korea is carried predominantly by sea transport (approximately 99.8 % in terms of
volume), its ports play a crucial role in the process of economic development; any Korean
port can, therefore, be regarded as a 'trade facilitator'.
The recent development and operation of Korean ports has kept pace with the ever-growing
seaborne cargoes. However, they still have a number of problems including, among others,
insufficient port and terminal capacity, inefficient managerial and operational behaviour,
(1) At the time when this thesis was being finalised, the current Asian financial turmoil has seriously
affected the Korean economy. The country's inherent economic structure (e.g. the government's heavy
intervention into business activities and inflexible bureaucratic system) is one of the main sources
which force the nation to be in trouble. This economic crisis is discussed in a section of Chapter 2 from
the perspective of rationalisation opportunity.
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and bureaucratic administration. As a consequence, Korean ports suffer from serious port
congestion. This problem is particularly acute in the port of Pusan, the country's main
seaport and the fifth largest container port in the world. By adding to the logistics costs of
manufactured products, the delays caused by this congestion seriously undermine their
competitiveness in world markets and detract from Korea's further development capability.
Until recently the development and operation of ports and terminals was entirely dependent
upon government funds. This system caused problems due to the inflexibility of the budget
and the bureaucratic procedures for obtaining the necessary funds. Fortunately, under the
new ongoing economic policy allowing more freedom to businesses, the government and
the public port authority regard private sector participation in an industry whose activities
used to be dominated by the public sector as an important means of reducing their
administrative and financial burden. This new tendency has resulted in massive private
sector participation in several projects, including new container terminal developments.
In the past, all ports and terminals were controlled and administered by the Korea Maritime
and Port Administration (K.MPA), which was a public port authority. In 1996, by merging
three maritime-related organisations, the Korean government established a new
government organisation, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (IVIMAF), with a
mission to administer and manage its seaports and other maritime-related activities and to
improve management efficiency in the maritime area.
Just as the 1970s and the 1980s were known for enormous capital investments into the port
industry, it can be asserted that the late 1980s through the 1990s will become known for
2
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port sector reorganisation. In an attempt to improve efficiency and performance and to
reduce the government's financial burden in supporting a very capital intensive industry, a
number of countries have considered or have already undertaken some form of institutional
reform of their port industry (e.g. commercialisation and privatisation).
Parallel with the general privatisation and liberalisation policies of the government and
following the dominant current trend in the world's port industry, Korea's new port
authority MMAF has launched several new port and terminal development schemes as a
means of solving problems related to port congestion and other sources of inefficiency. As
the MMAF implements its plan to attract private capital into both existing and new port
facilities by seeking some degree of privatisation where the costs and returns to port
businesses can be shared between public and private sectors. Competition has also been
introduced into the Korean port industry. This is an environment which the country's port
industry is totally unused to.
The motives for privatisation are complex and varied, but one key claim made is that the
transfer from public to private ownership improves economic efficiency and, hence,
ultimately financial and operational performance. Economic theories and existing empirical
studies, however, fail to establish any clear-cut evidence of private enterprises performing
better than their public counterparts. This phenomenon may reflect, to some extent, a
paucity of performance indicators which can be systematically applied across enterprises
and industries to allow a comparative analysis of performance to be undertaken. It is
essential, therefore, to have a system for evaluating the impact of privatisation which can
3
Chapter 1	 Introduction
be widely applied and to provide a systematic and pragmatic analytical framework to
assess the process of privatisation and its results.
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
In light of the above context, this thesis aims to critically review the characteristics of
international port privatisation along with the economic theory of privatisation; to
introduce a novel method for efficiency measurement which is applicable to the port
industry; and to assess policy implications for the Korean government and port authority,
paying particular attention to the privatisation strategy and its implementation within the
nation's seaports and terminals.
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To achieve the objectives, the current research employs a recently developed econometric
method for efficiency measurement known as the 'frontier production function model' as
an analytical tool to determine whether or not port privatisation has improved the
efficiency of Korea's port industry. Under the hypothesis that the productive efficiency of
terminal operators improves as their ownership transforms from public to private sectors,
the frontier model is divided into two types: the cross-sectional and panel models. The
former is concerned with calculating an average efficiency level of terminal operators
during each sample period, while the latter deals with the time-invariant terminal operator-
specific efficiency over the period of analysis.
The data necessary for empirical investigation are taken from the annual reports and
financial accounts published by each container terminal. The time span is from 1978 to
4
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1996 inclusive. For an international comparison with a country where port privatisation
policies have had more time to work, the main container terminals in the UK are also
included in the analysis. The UK terminals sampled for inclusion account for a significant
proportion of the UK container traffic and have different ownership attributes not only
among themselves but, most importantly, as compared to their Korean counterparts.
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE
The thesis consists of eight chapters. Following the introductory Chapter 1, Chapter 2
reviews the Korean national economy with an emphasis on trade promotion strategy and its
effects on foreign trade, the role of the public sector in the process of economic
development, and the newly adopted economic policies of privatisation and deregulation.
Chapter 2 is completed by a brief examination of the current economic crisis which is
severely influencing the nation's economy in terms of restructuring opportunities. Chapter
3 details the importance of Korean ports to the national economy and discusses increasing
container traffic due to the trade-oriented development policy, port and terminal congestion
as a result of the aforerrientioned policy, and new port and terminal development plans. The
administrative system which controls the port industry and the increasing participation of
the private sector in port activities are also examined in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, economic
theories and empirical evidence relating to privatisation are critically assessed. The
principles applicable to, and the practice of port privatisation are evaluated in Chapter 5.
After a review of the basic concepts related to production functions and economic
efficiency, Chapter 6 justifies the application of two types of frontier model (i.e. the cross-
sectional and panel models) for the empirical analysis. Chapter 7 applies the analytical tool
developed in the previous chapter to the selected container terminals in Korea as well as
5
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the UK and provides the results of the application. Finally, Chapter 8 presents the
interpretation of the findings and their implications for port privatisation in Korea with an
objective assessment of the contribution to knowledge of this research, its limitations and
ideas for further research areas. The flow chart illustrating the structure of the research is
shown in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1. 1 Research Flow Chart
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CHAPTER TWO
AN OVERVIEW OF THE KOREAN NATIONAL ECONOMY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Strategically located in the north-eastern part of the Asian continent, the Korean Peninsula
thrusts to a southerly direction for about 1,000 kilometres. To the north lie regions of China
and Russia, while the Chinese mainland lies directly to the west. To the east, the peninsula
faces the islands of Japan. The shortest distance from the west coast of Korea to China's
Shantung Peninsula is about 190 kilometres. The shortest distance from the southern port
of Pusan to the Japanese island of Honshu is about 180 kilometres. The total area of Korea
is 221,607 square kilometres (about 85,563 square miles). At present, the land is divided
into two parts: the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the People's Republic of Korea
(North Korea). Due to this political situation, Korea is engaged in foreign trade as an island
nation like Britain and Japan, thus forcing the country to actively participate in the
maritime industry for effectively carrying its own trade. The administrative area of the
country is 99,237 square kilometres or about 45 % of the Korean Peninsula, which is
slightly larger than Hungary or Portugal, and a little smaller than Iceland (see Figure 2.1).
With 44.6 million inhabitants at the end of 1994, Korea is one of the most densely-
populated countries in Asia and also has one of the smallest land areas per capita in the
world. Moreover, its terrain is very hilly, with only one-fifth of the land being arable. It is
not, however, well endowed with natural resources. Morita (1987) remarks on Japan's
natural resource poverty, that the land provides almost no raw materials except water, and
that less than a quarter of the land is usable. This statement describes Korea's situation
7
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almost exactly as well. Therefore, like Japan, Korea has to rely on foreign countries for
most mineral resources such as oil, iron ore, copper, gold, silver, etc., which are crucial for
industrialisation. This poverty in natural resources has forced the country to pursue an
outward-oriented economic policy.
Figure 2. 1 Geographical Location of Korea
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2.2 NATIONAL ECONOMY
In 1960, Korea was a poor developing country with a small manufacturing sector and
heavily dependent upon foreign aid. It had seemingly few prospects for increasing and
sustaining economic growth. Over the last three decades, however, Korea has achieved
what is widely acclaimed as 'the economic miracle of the Han River'(World Bank, 1993).
Since Korea embarked on an economic development plan in 1962, its economy has grown
at one of the fastest rates in the world. This remarkable success can be largely attributed to
the outward-oriented and export-centred economic policies implemented by the Korean
government and to the determination of the Korean people. As a result, Korea has
successfully transformed itself from a largely agrarian based economy in the 1 960s to a
fully industrialised one today, and is currently ranked as one of the largest trading nations
in the world.
The importance of ports for national economic development is widely recognised, for
example, by Nagorski (1972), Faust (1978), Hoyle (1983), and UNCTAD (1985). There is
a close relationship between ports and the prospects for economic development. The port is
not only a determinant of economic development, but also a decisive factor in it. Moreover,
ports not only have an influence on economic development but, at the same time, are also
directly affected by economic development. The influence of a port on the economy
extends beyond its boundaries into the industrial, commercial and business sectors of the
nation at regional and national levels (Frankel, 1987).
The impact of the port industry on economic development can be discussed in the context
of the process of Korean economic development over the last three decades. A useful
9
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starting point before proceeding into an analysis of Korea's ports industry is to look at the
overall growth of the economy, its reliance upon foreign trade, the roles of the public sector
in the process of development and finally, at the new economic policies oriented towards
privatisation and deregulation. This overview provides the context within which this
process of economic growth has emerged.
2.2.1 Economic Growth
A large infusion of economic aid during the period 1953-1958, following the Korean War,
enabled the country to reconstruct its war-damaged production facilities and to achieve a
moderate level of economic growth, although with a very high rate of inflation. During the
period 1959-1962, the rate of inflation eased, but so did the pace of economic expansion
with the annual growth of national output per capita declining to nearly zero in the early
1960s. Following this period of moderate growth and then near stagnation, a rapid
economic expansion began in 1963. Supported by a rapid and sustained expansion in its
exports, the country's gross national product (GNP) grew rapidly during the course of six
successive Five-Year Economic Development Plans (hereafter referred to as 'FYP'). Rapid
increases in output, income and exports were accompanied by rising investment, savings,
exports and imports. These became more important for the national economy and were
achieved by a fundamental change of economic structure, away from agriculture and
towards manufacturing.
The rate of GNP growth, however, has slowed considerably in recent years. After
recovering from the recession of 1989 and reaching a rate of GNP growth of 9.1 % in 1991,
it slowed to 5.0 % and 5.6 %, respectively, in 1992 and 1993. However, helped by such
0
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favourable international factors as stable petroleum prices, the strong Japanese yen, and a
relatively robust world economy (in particular, the performance of the US economy), the
growth rate recovered in 1994, rising to 8.3 %. In that year, Korea's real GNP was 303,773
billion won (US$ 378,086 million'), compared with 265,518 billion won (US$ 330,793
million) in 1993. These figures made Korea one of the largest economies in the world.
Table 2.1 shows some major economic indicators of Korean economic development over
the last three decades. The growth of Korea's GNP since 1962 shows a truly remarkable
performance: from 356 billion won (US$ 2,738 million) in 1962 to 348,284 billion won
(US$ 451,572 million) in 1995, resulting in an economy which has grown by one-hundred-
and-sixty-five times over 33 years.
Table 2. 1 Major Indicators of Korean Economic Growth (1962-1995)
Year Population'	 GNP2	 GNP per	 Exports4 Imports5	Government	 Private
______ ____________ _________	 Capita3 	 _________ __________ Consumption 6 Consumption6
1962	 26.15	 356	 87	 18	 55	 50	 294
1965	 28.33	 806	 105	 69	 123	 75	 672
1970	 32.24	 2,736	 243	 382	 616	 265	 2,041
1975	 35.28	 10,065	 591	 2,855	 3,521	 1,121	 5,323
1980	 38.12	 36,672	 1,589	 12,765	 13,541	 4,268	 24,786
1985	 40.80	 72,850	 2,150	 27,327	 27,089	 7,893	 44,126
1990	 42.87	 178,262	 5,659	 65,016	 69,844	 18,187	 96,388
1995	 45.09	 348,284	 10,037	 125,058	 135,119	 36,387	 185,899
Notes: (1) Millions (mid-year estimates); (2) Actual Prices (Billions of Won); (3) US$ (in Actual Prices);
(4) F.O.B. (Billions of Won); (5) C.1.F. (Billions of Won); and (6) Billions of Won
Sources: International Monetary Fund (1989, 1996), and Song (1994)
Rapid economic development since 1963 can partly be explained by the country's strategy
of maximising growth by pursuing outward-orientated, export-centred economic policies
(1) Throughout the chapter, US$ equivalents are calculated by corresponding exchange rates based on each
period average.
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(Chung, 1996). This strategy was adopted in 1962, when the First Five-Year Economic
Development Plan was introduced, replacing the policy of import-substitution which was
in effect up until that time. Effective formal economic planning in Korea started with the
First FYP (1962-1966). The country has now completed six five-year planning cycles.
The objectives of the successive FYPs, shown in Table 2.2, have changed over time with
rising income, shifts in economic structure, and changes in economic issues and priorities.
The changes in the objectives of the government 's economic policy can be examined in
relation to four major government economic functions (Song, 1990, p. 129):
• Creating the economic and legal framework: i.e., the constitution,
the rules of the economic game, and economic laws;
• Ensuring stability - macroeconomic functions;
• Promoting efficiency - microeconomic functions (industrial
policy, trade policy, agricultural policy, and social infrastructure
policy); and
• Promoting equity (personal, regional, and industrial equity).
Table 2.2 An Overview of Korea's Five-Year Economic Development Plans
Plan	 Period Growth	 Objectives	 Major Poiicy Directions
_________ _________ Rate ____________________________ ______________________________________________
First	 1962-66	 7.1	 . Breaking the vicious 	 • Securing energy supply sources
FYP	 (79)**	 circle of poverty	 • Correcting structural Imbalances
Establishing the	 • Expanding basic industries and infrastructure
foundations for self-
	 • Effective mobilisation of idle resources
sustaining economic	 • Improving the balance of payments
_______ _______ _______	 development	 • Promoting technology
Second	 1967-7 I	 7.0	 • Modernising of industrial • Self-sufficiency in food, development of
FYP	 (9.7)	 structure	 fisheries and forestry industries
• Promotion of self- 	 • Laying the foundation for industrialisaiion
sustaining economic	 • Improving balance of payments
development	 • Employment creation, family planning and
population control
• Raising farm household income
• Improving technology and productivity
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Table 2.2_(continued)	 ___________________ _______________________________
Third	 1972-76	 8.6	 • 1-larmonising growth,	 • Self-sufficiency in food staples
FYP	 (10.2)	 stability, and equity	 • Improving the living environment in rural
Realising a self-reliant	 areas
economy	 • Promotion of heavy and chemical industries
Comprehensive national	 • Improving sciences, technology, and human
land development and	 resources
balanced regional	 • Development of national land resources and
development	 efficient spatial distribution of industries
Improving the living environment and
national welfare
Fourth	 1977-81	 9.2	 • Achievement of self-	 • Self-sufficiency in investment capital
FYP	 (5.7)	 sustaining economy	 • Achieving balance payments equilibrium
• Promoting equity through • Industrial restructuring and promoting
social development	 international competitiveness
• Promoting technology	 • Industrial restructuring and enhancing
and improving efficiency	 intentional competitiveness
• Employment expansion and manpower
development
• Improving living environment
• Expanding investment for science and
technology
• Improving economic management and
__________ ___________ __________ 	 institutions
Fifth	 1982-86	 7.5	 • Establishing foundations	 • Eradicating inflation-oriented economic
FYP	 (8.7)	 for price stability and
	 behaviour
self-sustaining economy	 • Increasing competitiveness in heavy
• Technology improvement	 industries
• Improving quality of life 	 • Improving agricultural policy
• Restructuring	 • Overcoming energy constraints
government's economic	 • Improving financial institutions
functions	 • Readjusting government functions and
rationalising fiscal management
• Solidiing competitive system and
promoting open-door policy
• Manpower development and promotion of
science and technology
• Establishing new labour relations
• Expanding social development
Sixth	 1987-91	 7.3	 • Establishing socio-	 • Expanding employment ojportunities.
FYP	 (10.0)	 economic system;	 • SolidiJing foundation for price stability
Promoting creative	 • Reatising balance of payments surplus and
potential and initiative	 reducing foreign debt
• Industrial restructuring 	 • Industrial restructuring and technology
and improvement of
	
improvement
technology	 • Balanced regional and rural development
• Improving national 	 • Improving national welfare through improved
welfare through balanced	 social equity
regional development and • Promoting market economic system and
income distribution	 readjusting government functions
New	 1993-97	 6.9	 • Revitalisation of the 	 • Stimulation of small and medium-sized firms
FYP	 national economy	 • Reform of tax system, government
• Promotion of technology	 expenditure, financial sector, and
• Promotion of the role of	 administration regulations
private sectors	 • Boosting investment
• Enhancing the quality of	 • Deregulation and liberalisation of the
life	 economy
• Expanding the social 	 • Employment and price stabilisation
overhead capital	 • Increasing productivity
Notes: (*) Planned Growth Rate: and (*9 Achieved Growth Rate.
Sources: Song (1990) and Korean Overseas Information Service (1993)
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As shown in Figure 2.2, prior to the Fourth FYP, the forecast rate of economic growth
increased gradually with successive plans, and, without exception, was always exceeded.
The planned average annual rates of growth for GNP (and actual performance) for the first
three FYP were: 7.1 % (7.9 %), 7.0 % (9.7 %) and 8.6 % (10.2 %), respectively. In
contrast, the planned average GNP growth rate of 9.2 % per year during the Fourth FYP
was not achieved, owing to the world economic recession of 1979-1980. The actual rate
achieved during the Fourth FYP period was only 5.7 %. The average annual rates of
economic growth, however, envisaged during the Fifth and Sixth Plans (7.5 % and 7.3 %,
respectively) were in fact exceeded, with actual growth rates achieved of 8.7 % and 10.0
%, respectively.
Figure 2.2 Planned and Actual GNP Growth Rates (First FYP to Sixth FYP)
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Source: Derived from Table 22.
2.2.2 The Five-Year Economic Development Plans
The main objectives of the First FYP (1962-1966) were to break the vicious circle of
poverty and to build a foundation for self-sustaining growth. In addition to export
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expansion, which consistently received priority in all the subsequent plans, the First FYP
emphasised the expansion of infrastructural capital in electric power, railways, ports and
communications, with the aim of overcoming the impediments to development.
During the Second FYP (1967-1971), special attention was paid to the microeconomic
functions of the government: namely, promoting efficient allocation of resources through
agricultural, industrial, trade and social infrastructure policies. The objectives of the
Second FYP aimed at the development of electronic and petrochemical industries, and to
increasing income in the agricultural sector by maintaining high prices for rice, the staple
crop.
The rapid growth of the economy caused increasing disparity between income classes,
export and domestic industries, firms of different sizes, and regions. As a result, the Third
FYP (1972-1976) implemented policies for the promotion of equity. Priority was given to
the development of heavy and chemical industries and this materialised during the period,
with the construction, of integrated steelworks, the expansion and construction of
petrochemical plants, and the expansion of shipyard capacity.
The Fourth FYP (1977-198 1) placed its emphasis on the industries making intensive use of
technology and skilled labour and focused on machinery, electronics and shipbuilding. The
Fourth FYP gave an even higher priority to social development as a means to promoting a
more equitable distribution of income. For this purpose, government spending on
education, housing, public health and medical care was increased substantially over what
had been present in previous plans. From the Fourth FYP the government's key goals
15
Chapter 2
	 An Ovcrview of the Koieai Naiionaq Eamy
shifted from the quantitative aspects of economic growth to the qualitative aspects of life.
As a consequence, the Fourth FYP was even officially named the Five-Year 'Socio-
economic' Development Plan.
As its rural-agricultural economy began to change into an industry-oriented one, the
Korean economy became increasingly complex and subject to business fluctuations and
inflation. In these circumstances, economic stability emerged as a new policy issue. The
Fifth FYP (1982-1986) specified achieving economic stability as its major policy objective.
Because the principal source of instability in a mainly agricultural economy was the
weather, rather than business conditions, maintaining economic stability had not been
considered a very important government function until the first oil crisis in 1973. The
strategy of export-led growth was to be maintained, and the policy of liberalising the
domestic market was to be actively implemented. The Fifth FYP envisaged a moderate
reduction of both the trade deficit and the deficit on the current account of the balance of
payments. The manufacturing sector, with its high potential for competing in the world
market, was to receive priority. The Fifth Plan also envisaged a more balanced
development of the regions and industrial sectors, an enhancement of the private sector and
a further increase in economic efficiency.
The relative importance of the government and private sectors has changed substantially
since the First FYP. During the early planning periods, the public sector played a dominant
role as the market system was not well developed. It was only as the urban-industrial sector
expanded that market activities and the function of the market system began to modernise.
In consequence, the private sector expanded greatly relative to that of the public sector.
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Since the Fifth FYP, particular emphasis has been given to enhancing free competition. In
addition, as of 1986, the Korean economy experienced high economic growth, stable prices
and a trade surplus, and thus faced a new phase of growth. The broad policy direction of
the Sixth FYP (1987-1991) was to enhance the efficiency, and strengthen the international
competitiveness, of its economy in general through refonning the free enterprise market
system. The principal contents of policy reforms included the simultaneous drastic
reduction of various government regulations constraining growth of enterprises, together
with extensive liberalisation of financing, imports and foreign exchange. Song (1990)
highlights the major changes in economic policy including the gradual reduction of various
fiscal subsidies, the privatisation of public enterprises, the shift from direct to indirect
monetary controls, the reduction of foreign borrowing and the improvement of exchange
rate management.
The Seventh FYP (1992-1996) was replaced in 1993 by the Five-Year Plan for the New
Economy (1993-1997) in an unprecedented move by the newly-elected government. The
main aim of the New FYP with an envisaged average annual growth rate in GNP of 6.9 %
was to raise the Korean economy to the ranks of the advanced nations and to lay the
economic foundations for an eventual Korean unification. The elimination of official
corruption was emphasised, as was the introduction of reforms in the economic structure,
including government regulations, public financing and the deregulation of financial
markets. One of the ways of measuring national economic progress is that, on 11 October
1996, Korea became a member state of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD).
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In the light of the fact that the new administration considered revitalisaition of ii1h ecinanny
as its most important task, the following short term measures were tak (]Koircann Owerseas
Information Service, 1993, p. 374):
• Boosting investment;
• Structural improvement of small and medium-sized firms;
• Promotion of technology development; and
• Deregulation of the economy.
In an effort to promote private initiatives in the business sector, the government eliminated
a variety of regulations and removed obstacles to fair competition. In 1993 alone, of the
1,079 business restrictions reviewed, the government decided to ease or abolish 757 of
them. Moreover, ad hoc committees continue to review other cases in order to further case
the restrictions on business activities.
The ultimate objective of the economic policy of the New FYP is to enhance the quality of
life through employment stabilisation and higher real incomes. Real income can be
increased through price stability and increases in productivity, which can be made possible
by enhancing the quality of labour and increasing investments. The achievement of these
goals, however, also requires the evolution of supporting institutions; the reform and
advancement of such institutions will guarantee the free activity of companies and the
equitable distribution of economic rewards.
With regards to port development under the New FYP, the government released an overall
plan for expanding the social overhead capital in order to build up an efficient transport
system throughout the country, and thus to properly distribute import and export goods in
18
Chapter 2
	
An Overview of the Korean National Economy
an effort to accelerate economic growth. Port development was one element of this plan. A
problem raised in the process of developing a port is how to finance the project, as a huge
amount of funds are normally required. The government has taken the participation of the
private sector into consideration as an alternative method of reducing its financial burden,
and has encouraged the private sector to take part in investment projects. The port industry
is no exception.
In short, as noted by Collins (1990), the main reasons for the success of Korea's economic
growth are that (i) stable and sensible economic policies have provided a solid platform for
adjusting to internal and external economic shocks like the oil crisis in the 1 970s; and (ii)
investment in both physical and human capital has been recognised as a key to economic
growth. This rapid development, however, has resulted in negative consequences. Since
national security and economic development, among others, were the most important
objectives of the past authoritarian regime, a centralised system of rule over the economy
was strengthened while business autonomy and market-driven activities remained
relatively inactive (Ro, 1996). This system has hampered the proper development of the
nation's economic policy.
2.3 TRADE PROMOTION STRATEGY AND FOREIGN TRADE
As has already been mentioned, initially the Korean government attempted an economic
policy of import substitution as a means of domestic economic growth. The national
economy relied heavily on foreign aid to finance domestic sectors and imports of
manufactured goods were virtually prohibited by the import substitution policy which
revolved around high tariffs, quotas and a variety of non-tariff barriers. This policy,
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however, was ineffective in generating national wea]ltih dwriimg 1t1lie 1J9. Lmea swdk
its national economic policy from import substitution tu exptt- gjlfi1a antoia 13,,
which is known as the 'switching point' (Ranis. 1989). At that th, the
embarked on an export-led and an outward-orientated policy (ththilnk,, W43. With 1t1h
adoption of an export-oriented industrialisation strategy and the suhseqtuiemk iekintmi ef
various trade and economic policy measures, exports from Korea have iiniwreased rapl!y
since 1963. Because trade-oriented Industrialisation has been the basic girodb strategy i
Korea since the early 1 960s, increases in the foreign trade of Korea are inseparable fiieeni its
industrialisation.
Figure 2.3 Growth of Exports and Imports (1962-1995)
140000
w 120000 
-•-_ Exports (FOB)
i00000
CD CD 0 C.1	 CO CO	 ('I	 CO CO(0 CD (0 (0 N- N- N- N- F- CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO
0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0 CO 0) 0) 0)
.- .- 1 S- 1- r .- r .- - - r	 r - T
Year
Source: International Monetary Fund (1989, 1996)
Figure 2.3 illustrates the ever-increasing volume of Korea's exports and imports since the
First FYP was launched in 1962, when the total value of Korean exports and imports
amounted to only 18 billion won (US$ 138 million) and 55 billion won (US$ 423 million).
By 1995, however, the real value of exports and imports (in 1980 prices) had increased to
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125,058 billion won (US$ 162,146 million) and 135,119 billion won (USS 175,190
million), respectively. This rapid expansion of exports and imports is closely related to
Korea's growth strategy. In particular, the rate of increase in the l980s is considerable
though is followed by even sharper growth in the 1990s. Figure 2.3 also shows the balance
of trade where the value of exports was lower than that of imports from 1962 to 1975.
Since then and until 1989, the value of exports has been higher than the import value. In
the 1 990s, the value of imports has again been higher than exports.
Growth strategies must be compatible with the country's resource endowment, population
size, economic system and other characteristics (Song, 1990). The adoption of an
appropriate growth strategy appears to be crucial to initiating as well as maintaining
economic growth and is a necessary pre-condition to development. Korea's sustained
growth since the early 1 960s is largely credited to the identification of, and adherence to, a
growth strategy that was right for the country, i.e., an outward-, industry- and growth-
oriented (OIG-oriented) strategy. Again, Song (1990) argues that these OIG-oriented
strategies are mere and the only choice available to Korea for economic development, and
that this has become even more true with the increasing globalisation of national
economies.
The most important choice for nations wishing to develop their economies is between an
internal policy emphasising the efficient mobilisation of, and reliance on, domestic
resources, and an external policy stressing the promotion of foreign trade. In resource-rich
countries, economic development tends to be based on their resources and starts from
resource-based activities. In contrast, resource-poor countries like Korea do not have the
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opportunity to opt for a primary sector-oriented growth strategy. By necessity, their
economies have to be developed by focusing on manufacturing industries.
On the basis of the choice between inward- and outward-oriented policies, resource
endowment and population size, Chenery and Syrquin (1986, pp. 91-94) classified
development strategies into four types:
• Outward- and primary-oriented economies;
• Inward-oriented economies;
• Neutral economies; and
• Outward- and industry-oriented economies.
Under the Chenery and Syrquin taxonomy, Korea falls into the outward- and industry-
oriented categorisation of economies. This policy could be regarded as the key to Korea's
rapid economic growth.
Korea's industrialisation depends mainly upon the import of raw materials and the export
of processed and finished products. Since the beginning of its rapid ecopomic growth,
Korea has adopted this economic strategy based on export expansion plans. The national
economy, as a consequence, has developed remarkably with substantial increases in
exports. In particular, manufacturing industries have led this growth. The export expansion
policy has brought about a rapid increase in the volume of exports and imports and,
therefore, has a direct impact on the development of the port industry, because seaborne
trade through ports accounts for almost 99 % of Korean trade.
'22
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Krause (19l) classifies the export promotion strategies of the Asiiani
countries (NJCs) according to the degree of government intervenituiomi, 	 Ia Ta&lle
2.3. Depending on the pattern of government trade promotion. 1h s1ina1
interventionism or laissez faire according to the degree of government iai rveimtIani.. T!h
second dimension Krause uses concerns the trade pattern: either free trade or a devIatien
from free trade. Deviations can be divided into right-wing and lefk-wing deviations.. Right-
wing deviations, resulting from excessive export subsidies or tariffs on imports, are trade-
promoting. Left-wing deviations, however, entailing excessive restrictions on exports or
imports are trade-reducing.
Table 2.3 Types of Trade Promotion Strategy relative to Government Intervention
Type	 Free Trade	 Deviation
Interventionism	 Singapore	 Taiwan, Korea
Laissez Fafre	 Hong Kong	 -
Source: Krause (1981)
In the context of the Krause framework, Korea, like Taiwan, follows a right-wing
deviationist and interventionist strategy. There is, therefore, great scope for Korea to lessen
the degree of government intervention still further and move closer to a free trade position.
As a result of the adoption of an export-oriented trade policy, Korea's industrialisation has
greatly depended upon imports of raw materials for the manufacturing industries, and the
export of processed and finished products. Comparing their ratios of foreign trade (exports
and imports) to national product whatever their stage of development, Arnsden (1989) and
Wade (1990) show that none of the countries in Europe, USA, Canada or Japan have ever
23
Chapter 2
	 An Overview of the Korean National Economy
had anywhere near as high a dependence upon foreign trade as Korea. Table 2.4 and Figure
2.4 show the very high dependence of Korea's economy on foreign trade (exports and
imports); up to 74.7 % in 1995 after a peak in 1988 of 85.6 %.
Table 2. 4 Dependence of Korean Economy on Foreign Trade
______ ___________ ______________ ___________ ___________	 (Unit: Billions of Won, %)
Year	 GNP	 Total	 Exports	 Imports	 Dependence (%)
Foreign Trade
(A)	 (B)	 (C)	 (D)	 (B/A)	 (CIA)	 (fl/A)
1962	 356	 73	 18	 55	 20.5	 5.1	 15.4
1965	 806	 192	 69	 123	 23.8	 8.6	 15.3
1970	 2,736	 998	 382	 616	 36.5	 14.0	 22.5
1975	 10,065	 6,376	 2,855	 3,521	 63.3	 28.4	 35.0
1980	 36,672	 26,306	 12,765	 13,541	 71.7	 34.8	 36.9
1985	 72,850	 54,416	 27,327	 27,089	 74.7	 37.5	 37.2
1990	 178,262	 134,860	 65,016	 69,844	 75.7	 36.5	 39.2
1991	 214,240	 153,395	 71,870	 81,525	 71.6	 33.5	 38.1
1992	 238,705	 158,407	 76,632	 81,775	 66.4	 32.1	 34.3
1993	 265,518	 166,036	 82,236	 83,800	 62.5	 31.0	 31.6
1994	 303,773	 198,361	 96,013	 102,348	 65.3	 31.6	 33.7
1995	 348,284	 260,177	 125,058	 135,119	 74.7	 35.9	 38.8
sources: International Monetary Fund (199, 1996)
Figure 2. 4 Ratio of Total Foreign Trade to GNP
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2.4 THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
In the rapid industrialisation of the Korean economy, the active role of the government has
often been cited as a major source of strength. The government has been involved in the
process by developing industrial policies and fostering close relationships with priority and
related industries. Its interventions were justified on the grounds that the Korean
government wanted to catch up with the advanced industrialised nations within the shortest
possible time. Porter (1990, p. 474) describes the role of the Korean government in the
process of industrialisation as follows:
"The Korean government has played a relatively heavy and important
role in the economy. Governments have enjoyed unusual power and
continuity in Korea and have been blessed with a national consensus
for decades about the importance of economic growth. This has
provided a capacity to carry out sustained programmes in slow-to-
change areas such as education. . .. Some aspects of the role of the
Korean government have been unqualified successes. Most
significant were a series of actions that laid the foundation for
upgrading. Substantial investments in education and infrastructure,
efforts to promote exports, and the elevation of international
competitive success to the level of a national priority have been
important stimuli to Korean industry."
A primary role of government is to provide the legal framework within which all economic
transactions occur (Stiglitz, 1986). Beyond that, the activities of government can be
divided into three categories: (i) production of (public or/and private) goods and services,
and regulation and subsidisation of private producers; (ii) purchase of goods and services;
and (iii) redistribution of income by making payments to particular groups of individuals to
enable them to spend more than they otherwise could, for example, through welfare
payments and social insurance.
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Begg et a!. (1991) suggest reasons why governments may wish to intervene and/or
nationalise their industries. These include the natural monopoly problem, externalities, and
equity distribution. The first reason is concerned with large economies of scale; meaning
that marginal cost lies below average cost. Social efficiency requires that prices be close to
marginal cost, but this will imply smaller profits or even losses for the natural monopolist.
Therefore, public subsidy may possibly be needed. The public commitment to pick up the
bills, however, requires public monitoring to ensure that the monopolist continues to
minimise production-related costs and to produce efficiently. Public ownership may be an
obvious solution because private shareholders cannot be expected to subsidise the goals of
society as a whole.
The second is regarding externalities, which exist when the production or consumption of a
good directly affects businesses or consumers not involved in purchasing and selling it, and
when those spillover effects are not fully reflected in market prices (Begg et a!., 1991).
Whenever there are externalities, the resource allocation provided by the market may not
be efficient. Since individuals do not bear the full cost of the negative externalities they
generate, they will engage in an excessive amount of such activities. On the other hand,
since individuals do not enjoy the full benefits of activities generating positive
externalities, they will engage in too little of these. Thus, there needs to be some kind of
government intervention.
The third reason is involved with important judgements of equity distribution. Where
goods or services are crucial in contributing to the welfare of citizens but are not attracting
production possibilities to the profit-seeking private sector, society faces two options;
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either it can order a private supplier to provide these goods or services with some kind of
subsidy, or it can directly take over production to run the industry in the interests of the
nation as a whole.
In addition to these three sources of market failure as a rationale for government
intervention, Cullis and Jones (1989) add one more problem: uncertainty. Whatever the
reasons, the fact that risk is not filly insurable in a market economy may give rise to a case
for government involvement.
Several observers like Pack and Westphal (1986) and Kuznets (1988) have documented an
active government role beyond correcting market failures. The role of government,
however, differs country by country. Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) point out that the
governments of Taiwan and Korea had clear industrial priorities and did not hesitate to
intervene, through subsidies, trade restrictions, administrative guidance, etc., to reshape
comparative advantage in the desired direction. From a different perspective, Park (1990)
argues that the government of Taiwan has been supportive rather than interventionist,
whereas its Korean counterpart has been collaborative and even coercive in relations with
the private sector. Furthermore, Chen (1995, p.151) suggests in relation to Japan and
Korea:
"However, the existence of intimate government-industry relations in
Japan and Korea does not testify to a 'Japan Inc.' or 'Korea Inc.'
conspiracy. Japanese and Korean businessmen are not motivated
much differently from their Western counterparts, despite their
differing interests. Their willingness to collaborate with government
is not because they are exceptionally patriotic, or culturally devoted.
Rather, it is because they have known through their experience that
such collaboration can bring material benefit. It is also true that
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industrial policy is not unique to these two countries. Close
governmental relationships with priority industries and related big
businesses are also quite commonly seen elsewhere in the world. For
many developing countries, these phenomena are more sources of
trouble than of strength. This is because they contributed to
widespread favouritism, corruption and suffocation of competition.
Nevertheless, in Japan and Korea, the result seems to have been quite
remarkable and the channel seems to have been fairly effective."
In short, Japan and Korea have shared a similar historical legacy of heavy government
involvement in economic activities which was justified on the grounds that, in order to
catch up with the advanced countries, the government should assume responsibility for
defining industrial policies and for using whatever means available to achieve its identified
goals. With this economic philosophy, it is understandable why public enterprises in Korea
have played an important role in its economic development.
A public enterprise can be broadly defined as a productive entity which is owned and/or
controlled by public authorities and whose output is marketed (Jones, 1975). In Korea,
public or nationalised enterprises are defined as independent organisations producing
goods or services for the benefits of the public under direct or indirect ontrol of the
government (Economic Planning Board, 1988). The motivation for establishing public
enterprises in Korea is to attain economic development objectives through providing basic
materials for industrialisation in the early stage of a national economic development plan
when private counterparts have no concept of how to manage and operate a business
activity. This ideology is further confirmed by the notes of the former president:
c Private ownership of production should be unconditionally
encouraged except in instances where it necessary to control it to
stimulate national development and protect the interests of the
people." (Park, 1970, p. 218)
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Thus, public ownership in Korea can be viewed as a necessary evil. Jones (1975) named
this motivation as 'developmental motives'. This motivation can, therefore, be considered
different from conventional reasons for establishing nationalised or public enterprises.
When the First FYP began, there were 52 public enterprises. The number had increased to
143 by 1993. If local public enterprises are included, the total number of public enterprises
rises to 345 which, as can be seen in Table 2.5, comprises of 4 government enterprises, 23
government invested enterprises (GIE5), 8 subsidiary companies of GIEs, 108 government-
backed enterprises and 202 local public enterprises.
Table 2. 5 Status of Public Enterprises in Korea (1993)
Type of Public Enterprise
Government Enterprises
Government-Invested Enterprises
Subsidiary Companies of GIEs
Other Government-Backed Enterprises
Local Public Enterprises
Total
Number	 Employm
	
4	 72.2
	
23	 177.4
	
8	 42.4
	
108	 69.5
	
202	 -
345	 361.5
Budget
3.8
44.7
10.9
9.0
68.4
Notes: (1) In thousands; and (2) Trillion Won
Source: Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1995)
According to the Economic Planning Board (1988), these categories of public enterprise in
Korea can be defined as follows. Government enterprises are those staffed and operated by
government officials and take the form of government offices; a government-invested
enterprise (GIE) is when the government owns more than 50 % of the shares of an
enterprise; subsidiary companies of GIEs are those only indirectly invested in by the
government but where the activities of these companies are closely related to those of the
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GIEs; local public enterprises provide local services related to water, health and other local
utilities and are financially supported by the local or municipal government. There were
only 7 local public enterprises in 1969, but this had increased sharply to 202 by 1993
thanks to a rise in the standard of living in Korea and the government's decentralisation
policy.
Public enterprises in Korea increased in number and expanded with the burgeoning of rapid
economic growth in the early 1 960s. In terms of the share in total investment, the public
enterprises reached their peak in the mid-1970s (See Table 2.6). Investment in public
enterprises began to accelerate with the initiation of the Development Plan for Heavy and
Chemical Industries (1972-1981). Since the mid-1970s, the share of total investment in
public enterprises appears to have declined. This declining trend accelerated somewhat in
the 1 980s with the development of a privatisation policy which was one of the key policy
directions of the Fifth FYP (1982-1986).
Table 2. 6 The Public Enterprise Sector in Korea
1963	 1970	 1975	 1980	 1987
NumberofEnterprises	 52	 119	 116	 111	 107
Sectoral Value-added
Billions of Won	 31.8	 262.1	 848.5	 6,680	 6,859
Percentage of GDP	 7.0	 9.2	 8.3	 8.3	 9.1
Sectoral Employment
In thousands	 -	 -	 -	 280	 341.9
Percentage of Total Employment 	 -	 -	 -	 1.9	 2.0
Sectoral Investment
Billions of Won	 21.6	 216.3	 918.6	 3,253.7	 3,897.3
Percentage of Total Investment	 31.7	 18.9	 33.2	 27.6	 15.6
Note: Local public enterprises excluded.
Source: Derived from Song (1986) and Kang (1988)
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The public enterprises in Korea before 1960 were largely confined to the public utilities
and to basic necessities such as salt as well at to monopolies selling high-value consumer
products such as ginseng, cigarettes and banking. With the beginning of the Five-Year
Economic Development Plans in the 1960s, these boundaries for public enterprises were
dissolved and the government established public enterprises in any industries they
considered appropriate. From the 1980s, many public enterprises took the form of
development corporations, such as the Agriculture and Fisheries Development
Corporation, the Korea Land Promotion Corporation, the Industrial Sites and Water
Resource Development Corporation, the Petroleum Development Corporation, the Korea
Trade Promotion Corporation, the Overseas Development Corporation and the Korea
Development Bank.
In the 1960s and 1970s, government policy was aimed at establishing public enterprises in
any area considered essential to expanding the country's export capacity and, at the same
time, could not be properly handled by private enterprise. The government established
public enterprises, therefore, even to handle such items as iron, steel, petroleum, chemicals
and tourism that in some countries are generally regarded as traditional areas for private
sector business. In the 1 980s, government policy towards the public enterprises changed
greatly and attempts were made to privatise the public enterprises as much as possible. The
main reason for this action was simply that the private sector was perceived as being
capable of operating such enterprises at least as efficiently as the public organisation.
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2.5 TOWARDS A NEW ECONOMY:
PRIVATISATION AND DEREGULATION POLICIES
In the 1 960s, Korea had to cope with a formidable array of structural and institutional
problems. The low savings rate and chronic current account deficits required a continuous
inflow of foreign lending unavailable without government guarantees. It was believed that
the financial system could not direct resources to export-led industries and that there was a
shortage of entrepreneurs and managers to undertake the development of export-oriented
industries. The industrialist class that had been nurtured during the import substitution
period had little knowledge of foreign markets and international marketing, and, therefore,
was unprepared to take the high risks associated with selling abroad. In many cases, greater
efficiency required the adoption of increasing return technologies. This conflicted with the
country's limited resources, and hence forced the government to support a few, selected
large producers in targeted industries. During the 1 960s, these large firms became
successful exporters and, with the growth of the economy, also developed into industrial
groups (referred to as chaebol) which dominated the manufacturing sector.
Park (1990) argues that, with the exception of the 1970s, Korea's export-oriented industries
could have sustained rapid growth without government support. However, instead of
deregulating state-controlled sectors, the Korean government tightened its grip over
manufacturing industries and financial intermediaries. The confidence the government
gained from its success in the 1960s encouraged a large, but unsuccessful, import
substitution of capital and technology-intensive products in the 1 970s.
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Government involvement and support for industrial groups created its own problems and
moral hazards. By the early 1970s, the industrial groups were highly leveraged (or geared)
with loan guarantees through the banks owned by the government. Park (1990) describes
the situation as one where the government had literally become a partner responsible for
their failure as well as success.
Problems were at their most serious during the 1 970s when the government attempted to
develop a number of heavy and chemical industries simultaneously. The development was
deemed necessary to take advantage both of complementarity on the demand side and
forward and backward linkages among these industries. This approach, however, resulted
in excessive investment and duplication. In order to export with the benefits of scale
economies and minimum efficient size, the industrial groups were encouraged to build
large plants from the earliest stage of their development. Park (1990) also notes that
because of the lack of marketing, quality and technology, export earnings were low and
losses heavy and that, furthermore, complementarity as well as the forward and backward
linkages made the situation much worse. This setback motivated the economic
liberalisation which took place at the end of the 1970s.
Currently, Korean industry is on the brink of a transformation as the trade barriers and
financial protectionism that have supported its economy over a period of impressive
growth are dismantled. The central issue is whether or not Korean companies can
successfully move from the safety of state protection to an environment driven by market
forces (Financial Times, 1995). In order to provide business with greater freedom and to
cope with the ever changing world economic environment, the Korean government have
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several times attempted to launch privatisation and deregulation programmes. These
programmes, however, have not yet proved successful. The country's ambitious
privatisation programme is faltering and frustrated by the slow pace of privatisation, the
country's President has urged that the reform of state-run industry be accelerated (Financial
Times, 1996). Resistance to the programmes is strong in the country's bureaucracy and
amongst public sector workers. This implies that privatisation will slow down not only
because it represents a big political problem for the government, but also because
Ministries are reluctant to relinquish control of the empires they command. At the same
time, public sector workers are worried about losing their jobs due to privatisation.
Programmes for privatising government-run enterprises in Korea go back to 1968, with
ensuing programmes taking place in 1981, 1987 and 1993. The main characteristics of each
privatisation programme are described as follows (Korea Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, 1995; Maekyung Business, 1997).
• The First Privatisation Programme (1968-1973)
The first programme took place during the period 1968 to 1973, with the purpose being the
rationalisation of the management of inefficiently-run or insolvent public enterprises. At
the time, privatisation was mainly carried out through the public sale of government owned
shares and cash transactions via commercial banks. The enterprises which were privatised
through these methods were the Korea Machinery Corporation, the Korea Shipping
Corporation and the Korea Shipbuilding Corporation in 1968; with Inchon Heavy Industry
and Korean Airlines being privatised during the period 1968 to 1970.
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• The Second Privatisation Programme (1981-1983)
In early 1980 the second programme was instigated by the government. The main objective
of the second privatisation programme was to deregulate and liberalise domestic financial
markets, with the expectation of improving and developing the market. One distinguishing
characteristic of this programme was the imposition of strict rules to limit share holdings to
prevent majority stockholders from dominating companies. The chosen method of
privatisation involved placing half of the state owned shares with corporations and selling
the other half to individuals through public sales.
• The Third Privatisation Programme (1987-1989)
The third programme was carried out more systematically than the previous programmes
through the establishment of the 'Privatisation Committee of Public Enterprises' in 1987.
The aim of the third privatisation programme was to help meet the challenge of a changing
economic environment which was confronted by a national economy enjoying a high
growth rate, the upgrading and advancement of economic market structures and the
business know-how which the private sector had accumulated since the First FYP had been
launched in 1962.
Furthermore, the central issue was how to transfer a domestic economic system driven by
government or the public sector to one driven by the private sector, a situation that was in
line with the open economic policy that bad resulted in the growth of the domestic
economy. Among the enterprises privatised during the third programme were the Pohang
Iron and Steel Corporation (POSCO), the Korea Energy Power Corporation and the Korea
Foreign Exchange Bank. Some of the government-owned shares of these public
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enterprises, valued at about 5 billion won (US$ 6.1 million), were distributed as public
shares with the aim of public welfare improvement. Thirty-four per cent of the
government-owned shares of POSCO were sold to the public in October 1988, and 21 % of
Korea Energy Power Corporation in 1989. The third privatisation, however, was not
successfully carried out due to political and social problems and finally ended in 1990. The
major reasons for the failure of the third programme were a dull stock market and labour
disputes at the public enterprises to be privatised.
. The Fourth Privatisation Programme (1993-1997)
In December 1993, the government announced a large scale privatisation programme
which was the biggest in the history of the nation. The public enterprises to be privatised
were 8 out of the 23 government-invested enterprises (GIEs), 2 out of the 8 subsidiary
companies of the GIEs, and 61 out of the 108 other government-backed enterprises. Thus,
more than 50 % of state-run or owned enterprises are included in this huge privatisation
scheme.
In the fourth programme, government policies toward privatisation were changed in the
following two main areas (Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1995). First, the
privatisation policy was carried out in a much clearer way than under previous
programmes. This means the government played a more active part in transferring the
public owned companies to the private sector and, in discarding completely its role, thus
truly leaving management and control of the enterprises in the hands of the private sector.
Secondly, the aim of privatisation was made more definite by the government: that is, to
obtain an improvement in efficiency.
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Although these two points have significant meaning in the light of policy makers'
intentions for implementing the programme, there still remained a lack of detail as to how
the privatisation policy was to be implemented in reality. The World Bank (1995, p. 10)
suggests three necessary conditions for the successful reform of state owned enterprises as
follows:
• Reform must be politically desirable to the leadership and its
constituencies. Reform becomes desirable to the leadership and its
supporters when the political benefits outweigh the political costs.
This usually happens with a change in regime or coalition shift in
which those favouring the status quo lose power. It may also
happen when an economic crisis makes subsidies to state owned
enterprises so costly that reform becomes preferable to the status
quo;
• Reform must be politically feasible. Leaders must have the means
to implement change and to withstand opposition to reform; and
• Promises central to the reform of state owned enterprises must be
credible. Investors must believe that the government will not
renationalise privatised firms; the employees of state owned
enterprises, and others who fear that they may lose out in reform,
must believe that the government will deliver on any promises of
future compensation.
Reforms such as privatisation invariably undermines a government's support base. This is
because they almost always involve eliminating jobs and cutting long established subsidies
and other forms of protection. Politicians, naturally, prefer policies that benefit their
constituents and help them remain in power over policies that undermine support and may
cause them to be turned out of office. How countries that want to successfully reform
public enterprises actually overcome these political obstacles is dependent on the existence
of these three conditions (i.e. political desirability, political feasibility, and credibility).
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The fact that the Korean economy now faces changes in both the international and
domestic environment requires industry to make structural adjustments in order to maintain
healthy economic growth and advance into the ranks of the industrialised economies. In
addition, Korea's desire to be a part of the OECD fostered these changes in the direction of
greater liberalisation. For these reasons, the government should plan to strengthen private
sector initiatives by supporting an increasing role for market forces and competition as a
means of improving efficiency. Moreover, the government must strive to continue the
major policy measures it has already implemented to liberalise foreign trade and
investment regimes (Koo, 1991). Ro (1996) stresses the point that Korea is no longer a
country that aims merely for economic development under a centralised and authoritative
regime, while acknowledging many positive changes experienced over the past three
decades, such as the development of the national economy, were made possible through the
contribution of the bureaucratic elite in charge of public administration. The Korean
government should not ignore the recommendation of Porter (1990, p. 690):
"Direct intervention in individual industries, reliance on the chaebol
[industrial conglomerate] as a prime development tool, widespread
protection, and directing capital through government decisions were
appropriate in earlier stages.....But such policies must give way to
a new set of priorities if Korean industry is to progress further.
Moving to the next stage requires that economic decision making be
decentralised into a growing number of private sector hands. The
prime role of government must shift from direct intervention to
providing the resource foundations for upgrading and creating a more
challenging environment in which firms compete. Rule setting and
signalling need to replace a direct role in decisions. Efforts to
stimulate investment in advanced and specialised factors, institute
world-class product and environment standards....., deconcentrate
economic power are prime government roles in moving to the
innovation-driven stage......It is hard for any government
accustomed to an activist role to make these changes. The capacity of
the Korean government to do so is yet to be determined. It must be
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said, however, that Korean government policy has been evolving,
which bodes well for the nation's future."
This piece of advice should be kept in mind so as to successfully carry out the
transformation of economic policy, i.e. from a nation-state economy with centralised
planning to a free and spontaneous economy by reducing regulations and implementing a
market-driven policy. Aoki et a!. (1996) also suggest that the market-enhancing view be
taken into account when governments on the stage of transformation like Korea make a
master plan for their national economies.
2.6 CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS:
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR RESTRUCTURING
The fundamental economic structures which have built Korea into the world's 11th largest
economy in less than four decades appear to be drastically in need of reform and recent
financial turmoil highlights the urgent need for change. As part of the Asian economic
crisis (Financial Times, 1998), Korea's national economy has recently suffered near
financial catastrophe, i.e. the national currency has depreciated sharply against the US
dollar, almost 40 % over only a few months in late 1997 and early 1998. A symptom of
this crisis was first revealed in the middle of 1997, when several companies including some
industrial conglomerates (chaebol) became insolvent due to their adoption of high-risk
debt-ridden financial structures.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the accumulation of debts borrowed by Korean companies from
domestic and overseas financing sources, indicating that these have been continuously
increasing over the past few years. To make matters even worse, most of the debts shown
in Figure 2.5 are short-term (with less than 12 months maturity). As of June 1997, Korea's
39
Chapter 2
	 An Overview of the Korean National Economy
short-term debt was more than three times as big as its foreign reserves, which is a higher
ratio than any other country in Asia (Economist, 1998). Like other Asian countries in crisis
(i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand), Korea has suffered from too much borrowing,
coupled with its financial system which fails to allocate resources efficiently. The
Economist (1998) also points out that banks in the region did not properly assess credit
risks, lending largely on the basis of previously established personal relationships, and
taking on risks in the belief that the government would always bail them out. This kind of
lending behaviour can be regarded as 'politically driven lending' (Montagnon, 1997), not a
business oriented one.
Figure 2. 5 Total Corporate Debts in Korea
- -------
Since the early stage of development, the Korean government has treated banks and
financial industries, like other major sectors, as instruments of its industrial policy,
directing them to lend to favourable sectors of the economy at cheap rates, hence resulting
in the bank's reckless behaviour. Furthermore, cheap money from abroad encouraged the
debt-laden conglomerates to diversify their business activities into too many areas. At the
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end of 1996, the top 30 conglomerates had an average debt-equity ratio of 400 %, which is
seriously high relative to the 70 % for their US counterparts (Economist, 1998).
Unfortunately, these top 30 huge business groups have a central role in the nation's
economy; for instance, approximately 90 % of the nation's GNP can be attributed to them
in 1996 alone (Lee, 1998).
The cosy relationship between governments, banks and companies has isolated business
from market forces, consequently fostering excessive borrowing and a wasteful use of
resources. This financial instability combined with the economic structural reforms urged
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has already produced a change in government
and subsequently in economic policy and system. In this way, the country can deal with the
problems of inadequate bank regulation, too much government intervention, corruption and
a general lack of transparency in business affairs. In fact, the IMF' s bail-out package was
made in return for an agreement by the Korean government that it would provide the
following conditions (Lloyd's Shipping Economist, 1998, p. 16):
• opening its financial markets;
• revising banking structures; and
• lowering trade barriers
Under these circumstances, demanding more freedom for businesses and market-driven
decision making, the government has realised that public administration can no longer lead
the economy as it did in the past, and that the relaxation of regulation and greater
privatisation are inevitable policies that may stand a chance of returning its national
economy to the level previously enjoyed and to remain at a high level of growth into the
future.
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Recent research (Ryoo, 1997) mentions that the policy of privatisation is one of the most
likely options available to the country's policy makers for solving the current economic
and financial crisis. The claim is supported by another report (Baker, 1998) which
maintains that the current crisis has its roots not in improvidence but in economic
structures, indicating that:
"The problems that must be fixed are much more microeconomic
than macroeconomic, and involve the private sector more and the
public sector less."
In short, Korea went through many different stages over the past four decades in building
up the nation's economy. Since the first FYP commenced in the early 1960s, Korea has
been able to rapidly develop its economy thanks to the enthusiasm of political leaders and
commitment of its people. The developmental stage, however, seems to be over; now
Korea is at a turning point of moving into a new stage. The old ways of central government
planning, leading and guiding the people are to be altered with new policies such as
deregulation, decentralisation and privatisation now being implemented. This role change
is required under the condition that Korea is forced to open the market and be more global
in terms of its business activities.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE KOREAN PORT INDUSTRY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter was devoted to describing the remarkable progress Korea has made in
economic growth and in expanding the size of its economy over the last four decades. As
was shown, this economic development has resulted in a rapid increase of exports and
imports. Since the foreign trade of Korea is predominantly carried by sea transport, Korean
ports have played a crucial role in the process of economic growth and, therefore, in
dealing with the additional seabome cargoes that have resulted from the development of
the national economy. In particular, the ever-growing dependence of Korea's national
economy on foreign trade has underlined the importance of its ports to consumers and
producers. A widespread maritime connection with overseas countries is, as a consequence,
one of the essential prerequisites for national economic growth and development. Korea is
fortunate that the recent development and operation of its ports has kept pace with the ever-
growing seaborne cargoes that have stemmed mainly from the adoption of an economic
policy based on outward-oriented industrialisation. The ports, however, still have several
problems that will be discussed in the following sections.
In this chapter, the importance of ports and terminals to the Korean national economy will
be described, highlighting the sharply growing container traffic and insufficient port and
terminal capacity. After an explanation of the port administration structures containing a
discussion of some characteristics of port management and operation, this chapter will
move on to the new port and terminal development plans for coping with the future
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expected increased demand for port facilities, especially for container terminals, and the
prospects for greater private sector participation in ports.
3.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF KOREAN PORTS TO THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
Historically, ports have acted as the interface between national or regional economies and
the rest of the world (Haynes et al., 1997). A port provides direct access to world markets
and an excellent opportunity for access to the developing trade with a wide range of
countries; in other words, a port can be regarded as a gateway for international trade. There
is a close relationship between ports and the prospects for economic development. The port
is not only a determinant of economic development, but a decisive factor in it. The
influence of a port on the economy extends beyond its boundaries into the industrial,
commercial and business sectors of the nation at regional and national levels (Frankel,
1987). At the same time, ports are also directly affected by economic development.
Nagorski (1972) suggests that an important role of ports is to provide gates for global trade.
Without an efficient port, the cost of living becomes higher, industrial development more
difficult, and the export of domestic products unprofitable. Thus, the rate of economic
progress is drastically curtailed. Western Europe could never have achieved such
spectacular and rapid progress without Hamburg, Bremen, Rotterdam and Antwerp. Except
for a small proportion as air cargoes, in island countries such as the UK and Japan, a
formidable volume of imports and exports must, by necessity, be channelled by sea. Under
this circumstance, the major British ports have been veritable bastions of British prosperity
for centuries.
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UNCTAD (1992) categorises ports according to three criteria: (i) port development policy,
strategy and attitude; (ii) the scope and extension of port activities, especially in the area of
information; and (iii) the integration of port activities and organisation. In addition, as
service industries have replaced manufacturing as a dominant economic sector in the
1 980s, the role of ports and their economic impact on their adjacent cities has shifted
(Haynes et a!., 1997). The function of ports to their adjacent cities is substantial, offering a
wide range of logistical and telecommunication activities, which are the main features of
the third generation ports (UNCTAD, 1992). Whatever these activities may be, however,
maritime-related industries carry on their businesses in competitive markets. Under this
circumstance, a port is considered as merely one link in a chain of transport, trading
facilities and services involved in any given transaction. In this context, as Suykens (1989)
argues, any improvement in the economic efficiency of a port will enhance economic
welfare by increasing the producers' surplus for the originators of goods being exported
and consumers' surplus at the final destination of the goods being imported. Ports can no
longer expect to attract shipping lines simply because they are natural gateways to rich
hinterlands.
Turning to the Korean case, Hong (1995) listed three major factors affecting the country's
maritime policy, one of which is the geopolitical situation. Bounded on the north by North
Korea, on the south by the Korea Strait, on the west by the Yellow Sea and on the east by
the East Sea, Korea is in fact a geopolitical island and a landbridge connecting the Pacific
Ocean and mainland Asia. Sea transportation and ports, therefore, have played a strategic
and crucial role in the country's industrialisation and naval defence. As for the importance
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of Korean ports to the national economy, Raven (1982, P. 82) describes the economic role
of ports in developing countries as follows:
"Because ports play such a catalytic role in economic expansion, we
find that many developing countries, where ports are able to function
freely and efficiently, have made particularly rapid progress. Typical
examples are Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan."
To export-led economies, like Korea, the most important role of ports is linkage in the
transport chain for imports and exports. As shown in Table 2.4 in Chapter 2 and Table 3.1,
the Korean economy has been heavily and continuously dependent upon international trade
with almost 99.8 % (in volume terms) of imports and exports carried by sea transport. The
dependence of GNP on foreign trade amounted to 74.7 % in 1995. This phenomenon
explains the important role of Korean ports in national economic growth and development.
In other words, the port sector has been treated as a 'trade facilitator' (Haralambides and
Veenstra, 1996).
Table 3. 1 Exports and Imports carried by Sea and Air
(Units: Billions, %)
Year	 by Sea	 by Air	 by Sea	 by Air
Ton nes
	 %	 Tonnes	 Tonne-kms	 %	 Tonne-kms	 %
1985	 1,330	 99.8	 3.3	 0.2	 11,498	 99.8	 24	 0.2
1986	 1,538	 99.7	 3.9	 0.3	 12,888	 99.8	 28	 0.2
1987	 1,780	 99.7	 4.7	 0.3	 14,514	 99.8	 31	 0.2
1988	 1,985	 99.7	 5.1	 0.3	 16,354	 99.8	 35	 0.2
1989	 2,039	 99.7	 7.1	 0.3	 16,652	 99.7	 43	 0.3
1990	 2,198	 99.6	 7.8	 0.3	 18,337	 99.8	 46	 0.2
1991	 2,630	 99.7	 7.9	 0.3	 21,686	 99.8	 45	 0.2
1992	 2,856	 99.7	 8.4	 0.3	 24,571	 99.8	 50	 0.2
1993	 3,169	 99.7	 9.5	 0.3	 27,684	 99.8	 62	 0.2
1994	 3,534	 99.7	 11.1	 0.3	 28,817	 99.8	 70	 0.2
Source: Korean National Statistical Office (19%)
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Ports contribute much to the economy of a nation, and port economic impact analysis is the
major tool for assessing such contributions (De Salvo, 1994). Moon (1992) analyses the
impact of the port industry on the Korean economy and identifies the spreading effects of
port investment from a macroeconomic viewpoint. Using a standard input-output model,
his analysis reveals that the Korean port industry was responsible, directly and indirectly,
for gross sales within the economy of 375,241 million won (US$ 618 million 1 ) and the
creation of a 202,261 million won (US$ 333 million') contribution to GNP as well as for
28,760 jobs. His study also shows that the chain reactions initiated by the demand for port
operations gives the Korean port industry a multiplier effect of 1.68 and an employment
multiplier of 1.29. The former means that each unit of sales by the port produces 1.68 units
in sales throughout the economy, and the latter that ten million won worth of sales by the
port creates 1.29 jobs in all industries.
3.3 CONTAINER TRAFFIC IN KOREA
When analysing the characteristics of a port wishing to serve the transportation needs of
the future, Vogel (1994) has suggested that this really amounts to the container terminal of
the future. His argument suggests that the container terminal will play a considerably more
crucial role in international trade in the future. Several studies, for example, Gilman
(1983), UNCTAD (1985), Pearson (1988) and Containerisation International (1997),
classified the development of container ships into 'generations' as having characteristics
typical of certain stages in container development and container shipbuilding. Table 3.2
shows us that increases in size and cargo handling capacity are the main characteristics of
(1) US$ equivalents are computed on the basis of the 1980 average exchange rates.
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each generation of container ship. Baird (1996) and Cullinane and Khanna (1997) discuss
the on-going trend towards larger container ships and its impact on ports. Ports and
terminals will not work properly and productively unless infrastructure is provided, as the
container revolution increases momentum toward the year 2000 (Lloyd's List Maritime
Asia, 1995). With regard to this situation, it might be worth noting the following quote:
"In the highly competitive environment, ports have to make
significant investments without any degree of assurance that traffic
will increase. Their only guarantee is that unless there is a container
handling facility, there will be little or no container traffic." (Haynes
eta!., l99'7,p.99)
Table 3. 2 Physical Characteristics of Container Ships
Generations	 Year	 Maximum Capacity (TEU)
First	 Generation Container Ships	 1964	 1,000
Second Generation Container Ships 	 1972	 1,500
Third Generation Container Ships	 1980	 3,000
Fourth Generation Container Ships	 1984	 4,500
Fflh Generation Container Ships
	
1995 -	 over 6,000
Sources:Derived from Qilman (1983), UNCTAD (1985), Pearson (1988) and
Containerisation International (1997)
It is said that unitisation, particularly containerisation, has significantly altered trade
patterns as well as the port industry. Containerisation was, in fact, introduced to
international shipping in the late 1 960s as an attempt to cut the costs of maritime transport
by reducing cargo handling costs and the vessel's time in port. It has also allowed
economies of scale to be reaped, has increased efficiency and service speeds, and has
offered goods greater protection from loss and damage they would otherwise have
received. In international liner shipping, containerisation represented a radical
transformation of existing technologies which not only dramatically altered the processes
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in the ports and shipping industry, but also pervaded the entire socio-economic system
(Baird, 1996). The number of advantages of this transportation system over conventional,
labour-intensive cargo-handling techniques were of great significance and led to the
transformation and modernisation of cargo-handling systems.
Figure 3. 1 Development of World Container Traffic
1970	 1980	 1990	 1993	 1994
Year
Source: Containerisation International Yearbook (various years)
In consequence, it has increasingly gained favour in the carriage of international trade and
has become one of the most important means of transport. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
increasing volume of container traffic handled in world ports. In 1994, the recorded global
total was 125 million TEU; an increase of 11 million TEU (10.4%) over the 1993 figure.
This rate of growth is in line with the average annual increase of 10 % experienced over the
last decade and slightly above the 9 % figure for the last five years (Containerisation
International Yearbook, 1996). Container volume has increased 18 fold from
approximately 7 million TEU in 1970 to 125 million TEU in 1994. In the context of
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container ship and port generations, the container terminal looks set, therefore, to still be
playing a significant role in international trade in the future.
Parallel with the growth in world container traffic, the volume of containers handled in
Korea has also risen sharply since the 1970s as a result of the country's rapid economic
growth and development. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2. The latest rise has been fuelled
by the rapidly developing trade between Korea and China and gives a clear signal that the
Korean import and export economy, after a dip in the early 1990s, is back on course.
Figure 3. 2 Growth of Container Traffic in Korea
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Sources: Containerisation International Yearbook (various years); KMPA (1996)
Furthermore, the volume of container traffic is expected to increase in the future. A recent
report by the Korea Maritime and Port Administration (1992a) shows that container
volume in Korea is predicted to rise to 6.5 million TEU by 2001 and then 11.5 million
TEU by 2011. Additionally, the forecast of regional container traffic by Drewry Shipping
Consultants (1996) partly supports this expectation, arguing that Far East Asia (including
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Korea) will continue to outpace average global development, remaining the most dynamic
container zone in the world and capable of registering double digit growth rates for several
years to come (see Figure 3.3).
Figure 3. 3 Forecast of Regional Container Activity to 2000
------ I 	 LL	 -	 I-- - -,
Table 3. 3 The World's Top 10 Container Terminals
Rank	 Container Terminal 1995 (Million TEU) 1994 (Million TEU)
	
Changing Rate (%)
HongKong	 12.6	 11.1	 13.7
2	 Singapore	 11.9	 10.4	 13.9
3	 Kaohsiung	 5.1	 4.9	 3.1
4	 Rotterdam	 4.8	 4.5	 5.5
5	 Pusan	 4.5	 3.8	 17.6
6	 Hamburg	 2.9	 2.7	 6.3
7	 Long Beach	 2.8	 2.6	 7.7
8	 Yokohama	 2.7	 2.3	 16.6
9	 Los Angeles	 2.6	 2.5	 1.58
10	 Antwerp	 2.3	 2.2	 5.4
Source: Cargo Systems (1996)
As can be seen in Table 3.3, Pusan, the principal port of Korea, is ranked the fifth largest
container port after Hong Kong, Singapore, Kaohsiung and Rotterdam. One thing to be
noted in Table 3.3 is the fact that the fastest rate of growth in container throughput from
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1994 to 1995 occurs in Pusan with 17.6 %. In addition, Robinson (1998) speculates that the
port of Pusan will continue to play a crucial role in international trade, as the axis of
trading patterns moves to eastern ports.
Table 3. 4 Container Traffic through the Port of Pusan
Year	 Pusan	 Inchon	 Others*	 Total
________ TEU (000)	 (%)	 TEU (000)	 (%) TEU (000) (%) TEU (000)	 (%)
1983	 884	 91.8	 79	 8.2	 -	 0.0	 963	 100
1984	 1,054	 91.3	 100	 8.7	 1	 0.1	 1,155	 100
1985	 1,155	 91.7	 104	 8.3	 -	 0.0	 1,259	 100
1986	 1,491	 93.1	 101	 6.3	 10	 0.6	 1,602	 100
1987	 1,887	 94.5	 108	 5.4	 1	 0.1	 1,996	 100
1988	 2,135	 93.4	 150	 6.6	 2	 0.1	 2,287	 100
1989	 2,257	 94.9	 116	 4.9	 6	 0.3	 2,379	 100
1990	 2,348	 95.1	 112	 4.5	 9	 0.4	 2,469	 100
1991	 2,518	 95.5	 119	 4.5	 -	 0.0	 2,637	 100
1992	 2,673	 95.5	 118	 4.2	 8	 0.3	 2,799	 100
1993	 2,998	 95.7	 113	 3.6	 21	 0.7	 3,132	 100
1994	 3,575	 93.2	 227	 5.9	 34	 0.9	 3,836	 100
1995	 4,130	 92.0	 296	 6.6	 62	 1.4	 4,488	 100
Note: * Otners includes the ports of Ulsan and Masan.
Source: KMPA (1993, 1996)
One of the main problems the Korean port industry faces, however, is that almost all
container traffic, shown in Figure 3.2, is handled through the port of Pusan, which is
located on the south-eastern coast of the Korean peninsula. As can be seen in Table 3.4,
between 90 % and 95 % of total container volume is handled through Pusan almost every
year. Of this, transhipment cargo represents about 15 % of total container traffic, mainly
from China and Japan bound for Europe and south-east Asia. The portion of total container
volume that Pusan port handled reached its peak in 1993 with 95.7 % of the total. In 1995,
it handled 4.1 million TEU accounting for 92 % of the total container traffic of 4.5 million
56
Chapter 3
	
The Korean Port Industry
TEU. In contrast, the port of Inchon handled 0.3 million TEU accounting for only 6.6 %,
and the ports of Ulsan and Masan together handled only 1.4 % of Korea's total container
volume.
Park (1995, p. 11) gives the following explanation why a high volume of container traffic
has concentrated on the port of Pusan:
"Despite the fact that the port of Inchon has 1,160 metres of
container berths and about 40 % of the containerised cargoes
originates in and is destined for the Kyungin area (the province of
Kyunggi and the capital city), which is the major area of industrial
and population concentration in Korea, the port has not acted as a
load centre. The reason for this is that it is one sbipday away from the
main container trunk line and has restricted passage through a lock to
enter the port owing to its big tidal difference. As a result, the
containers have been concentrated on the port of Pusan."
Moreover, a recent report (Port Development International, 1995) gives several reasons for
congestion at Pusan. First, the country's industrial production grew at an average of 13.7 %
per aimum over the last few years and trade with China increased remarkably (in 1994,
imports from China were up by 39 % on 1993 to US$ 5.4 billion, exports we're up by US$
2 billion, a 20.4 % increase on 1993). Second, apart from the sheer volume of traffic using
the port, the consolidation of the operations of the Hanjin Shipping Company at Pusan's
Jasungdae container terminal has led to delays to the services of other lines.
The port of Pusan, as Fleming (1997) points out, serves the miracle-growth economy.
Pusan is favoured as a load centre by two major Korean container lines, Flanjin and
Hyundai, and additionally the transhipment segment of Pusan's container traffic has been
growing sharply recently. Pusan is cost-competitive in container handling, especially in
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comparison to Japanese load centres (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 1996). It has
consequently been selected to handle transhipments of Chinese cargo and, more
remarkably, Japanese cargo that would normally use load centres in Japan were the
container transfer and domestic transport costs not so high (Canna, 1995). Table 3.5
presents a comparison of costs incurred at the major terminals in the world and shows that
port costs in Japan are 2.5 times those of Singapore, 2.2 times those of Rotterdam and 2.1
times those of Pusan.
Table 3. 5 International Terminal Cost Comparison
Terminals	 Costs (USS per TEU)
Japan	 350
Hong Kong	 290
Los Angeles	 250
Hamburg	 230
New York	 220
Seattle	 200
Kaohsiung	 190
Pusan	 170
Rotterdam	 160
Singapore	 140
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants (1996, p. 127)
3.4 INSUFFICIENT TERMINAL CAPACITY AND CONGESTION
There are at the moment four operating container terminals in Korea; (i) the Jasungdae
Container Terminal which is run by the Busan Container Terminal Operation Corporation
(BCTOC), (ii) the Shinsundae Container Terminal which opened in 1991 and is operated
by the Pusan East Container Terminal Company (PECT), (iii) Inchon Pier 4, jointly
operated by the Hanjin Transportation Company and the Korea Express Company, and (iv)
the Uam Container Terminal (Phase One) which started operating in September 1996, and
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is operated by the Uam Terminal Company (UTC). Table 3.6 shows the container terminal
facilities in Korea as of 1996.
Table 3. 6 Container Terminals Facilities in Korea (as of 1996)
Jasungdae	 Shinsundae	 Inchon	 Uam
Terminal	 Terminal	 Pier 4	 Terminal
Cargo Handling Capacity' 	 900,000 TEU	 960,000 TEU	 250,000 TEU	 300,000 TEU
Berth Capacity	 4 ships x
	
3 ships x
	
1 ship x
	
I ship x 20,000 dwt
50,000 dwt	 50,000 dwt	 50,000 dwt	 2 ships x 5,000 dwt
Operator(s)	 BCTOC	 PECT	 Hanjin Co.	 UTC
Korea Express Co.
Operation Starting Year	 September 1978	 June 1991	 December 1973	 September 1996"
Notes: 'annual capactty; anU" partly operated
Source: Korea Container Terminal Authority (1996)
Table 3. 7 Container Terminal Capacity and Shortages in the Port of Pusan
_______________________ __________ __________ __________ ________	
(Unit: Million TEl.
Year	 1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994
Demand	 2.16	 2.27	 2.45	 2.60	 2.81	 3.23
Terminal Capacities	 1.26	 1.26	 2.22	 2.22	 2.22	 2.22
- Jasungdae Terminal
	 0.90	 0.90	 0.90	 0.90	 0.90	 0.90
- Shinsundae Terminal 	 -	 -	 0.96	 0.96	 0.96	 0.96
- Conventional Berths	 0.36	 0.36	 0.36	 0.36	 0.36	 0.36
(Shortage)	 (0.90)	 (1.01)	 (0.23)	 (0.38)	 (0.59)	 (1.01)
Note: Transhipment cargoes excluded.
Source: KMPA (1989, 1992b)
Due to the concentration of container traffic in the port of Pusan, the lack of cargo handling
capacity makes matters even more serious. According to two recent studies (KMPA, 1989
and 1 992b), the problem of insufficient terminal capacity will become worse in the future.
Table 3.7 shows the seriousness of the problem. The result has been that Pusan has been
asked to handle more than it can cope with at times. In fact, congestion at Pusan in early
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1995 was so considerable that it prompted the Far East Freight Conference to impose a port
congestion surcharge (Fairplay, 1995).
UNCTAD (1985, p. 1) points out the importance of port development to an export-oriented
economy, like Korea, as follows:
"The paramount importance of a far-sighted port development policy
does not appear to have been fully appreciated in the past by many
governments. As a result, ports have often been unable to keep up
with the rate of expansion of a country's overseas and coastal trade."
This argument could be applied to the Korean port industry, in spite of the considerable
amount invested in port development by the Korean government, sufficient capacity has
neither been planned nor constructed in time. This logic becomes even more convincing
when one considers that the total cargo handling capacity, in particular at the country's
main port of Pusan, has lagged chronically behind demand. Moon (1992) points out four
consequences of inadequate port development that are, to some considerable extent,
interlinked: port congestion, poor port performance, a negative impact on , the nation's
economy, and a negative influence on port users. Of these, port congestion most seriously
affects the country's overall economy, because almost all commodities for export and
import are carried through its seaports, in particular, container terminals.
Beth (1985) defines the concept of port congestion from the viewpoints of shippers and
shipowners, but focusing on the standpoint of shipowners, port congestion means that ships
are delayed spending more time in port than scheduled. The delay may occur either at berth
before berthing with the kind of delay depending on the cause. There is no doubt that the
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problem of congestion produces serious repercussions of all sorts, not only within the
countries concerned but also for the users of the ports. Imakita (1978, p. 19) explains some
consequences of port congestion by noting:
"During such periods [time of congestion], time losses and damage
or thefts and pilferage of cargo tend to occur more frequently than
would otherwise be the case. And the entry of too many ships for
anchorage within the mooring area of the port makes each one
increasingly subject to collision.....On the other hand, heavy
congestion may result in a substantial diversion of traffic in the long
run, or even stimulate the development of an alternative transport
route."
The country suffering from congestion may, as a result, receive no share of the growing
transport industry. Port congestion must thus be regarded as one of the foremost constraints
to the economic development of any country and region. In particular, to trade-oriented
nations.
Port congestion in Korea is widely recognised as being largely caused by the insufficiency
of terminal cargo handling capacity (Moon, 1995). The problem is most prevalent at the
container terminals in Pusan. Port costs constitute a significant proportion of total
distribution costs and thus, ultimately, have an important impact on the value of
commodities entering international trade. In order to obtain, therefore, increased benefits
from international trade, ports and terminals should be operated as efficiently as possible.
By adding to the logistics costs of Korea's manufactured products, however, the delay
caused by this congestion seriously undermines their competitiveness in the world market
and detracts from Korea's potential for further economic development. Chung (1995)
estimates that congestion costs at the port of Pusan totalled 29.3 billion won (US$ 36.5
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million) in 1994. In 1995, the situation became even worse, resulting in costs of more than
70 billion won (US$ 90.8 million). Furthermore, during the first quarter of 1995, some 15.7
% of all vessels calling at Pusan had to wait more than 12 hours for a berth. Delays varied
according to the terminals used, with ships having to wait an average of 29 hours for access
to the Shinsundae container terminal and 54 hours for the Jasungdae container terminal
(Containerisation International, 1996).
3.5 PORT ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES IN KOREA
In general, types of port administration differ very widely in terms of patterns of ownership
and administrative systems. Thomas (1976) points out that the management of most ports
in the world is vested in a port authority. The constitution and objectives of these bodies
differ quite considerably from country to country and indeed even within national
boundaries. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of port administration in the major ports
of the world are the diverse forms of ownership adopted and the numerous ways in which
responsibility for providing facilities and services have been delegated.
Goss (1990) classifies the activities of a port authority into two different roles: one is a
comprehensive role and the other a landlord role. The former involves providing all
facilities and services with independent operators either prohibited from undertaking work
within the port or permitted to perform only minor tasks (e.g. refuse collection). The
landlord role, however, limits the activities of the port authority simply to providing and
maintaining the basic infrastructure (e.g. breakwaters, quays, roadways) and essential
services (e.g. fire service, security, etc.) with independent private or public companies
allowed to provide all other facilities and services (e.g. cargo handling, towage, etc.). In
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this context, the administrative characteristics of Korean ports are discussed in the
following sections.
3.5.1 Port Management and Administration
The Korean government has traditionally been responsible for the central control of the
country's ports in such areas as port administration, management and development. In
Korea, prior to 1996, the KMPA played an important roie in the piann.ing and develonnent
of the country's maritime industry including its ports. Moon (1992) gives details of
Korea's port administration prior to the establishment of the KMPA. The turning point for
the Korean port industry came in 1976 when the government established the Korea Port
Authority (KPA) with the purpose of providing a central authority for port management
and development. The KPA was renamed the Korea Maritime and Port Administration
(KMPA) in 1977.
Prior to the creation of the KMPA in 1976, the fragmentation of authority and the lack of
co-ordination between the bodies concerned with port planning and operatiors caused the
development of the ports to proceed in a piecemeal and uncoordinated fashion. It also led
to the duplication of effort and facilities due to the competition between ports and between
the interested government agencies (Bang, 1984). The government, as a result, realised it
was necessary to integrate port operations and development in an effort to maximise
efficiency and to meet the rapidly increasing demand for port facilities. This is the reason
why the KPA, later named KMPA, was launched. Until early 1996, the KMPA was subject
to the supervision of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation. At this time,
however, it became administered by and operated under the auspices of the Ministry of
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Transportation. Until very recently, the KMPA acted in a 'comprehensive role' having
responsibility for and central control of the country's ports and terminals in such areas as
administration, management and operation. The organisation structure of each division of
the KMPA are illustrated in Figure 3.4. The KMPA was headed by an administrator who
was appointed directly by the Korean President, and was divided into eleven departments
administering all maritime affairs in the country through ten district authorities or District
Maritime and Port Administrations.
Figure 3. 4 Organisation Chart of the KMPA
ADMINISTRATOR
Public Information Office
Deputy Administrator
Planning & Management Division
Emergent Planning Division
General Affairs Division
Port Planning & Development Division
Financial Management Division
Audit & (nspection Division
Seafarer & Ship Division
Port Management & Operation Division
Maritime Transport Division
District Maritime & Port Administration
Source: Derived from KMPA (1979)
The main responsibilities of the KMPA were described as follows (KMPA, 1979):
• to control the planning, design, construction and maintenance of
all port facilities in the major ports within its jurisdiction;
• to establish an appropriate form and structure of administration,
organisation and management complying with government
regulations at the port level;
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• to ensure a sound financial system with public accounting
methods and a reasonable level of port dues;
• to co-operate in the development of the port cities and related
commercial services;
• to co-operate with other agencies, whether governmental or
private, in developing the national economy; and
• to achieve efficient port operations
In particular, the Divisions of 'Port Management and Operation' and 'Port Planning and
Development' played an important role in the country's port industry. The former was in
charge of aspects such as overall planning of port operations and management, traffic
policy on port facilities, the control of public waterways within the harbour, supervision of
companies associated with ports, and the maintenance of port statistics. The latter, on the
other hand, was in charge of activities such as overall planning for construction of ports
and inland navigational waterways, budgeting for port construction investment and
maintenance, general supervision of port construction, engineering research, and selection
and procurement of port equipment.
In early 1996, the Korean government announced it would merge three maritime-related
agencies into a new Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) to help the
country become a maritime superpower. The ministry was finally launched in August 1996
by merging the three existing maritime-related organisations; the KMPA, the Fisheries
Administration, and the Maritime Police Administration. The MMAF has a remit to control
and manage its seaports and other related activities and to improve management efficiency
in the maritime area. The KMPA now constitutes one branch of the MMAF under the
assistant minister of the shipping and ports division (see Appendix 1).
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As Hong (1995) points out, since the 1950s logical consolidation in Korea's maritime
administration has been supported by maritime interests but has received no political
propulsion. The major motive for establishing the MMAF comes from a change in the
administrative environment. This is an important issue in a country like Korea, where
traditions of centralised government are strong and where planning decisions are usually
made at the national level. The contemporary vision incorporates an integrated policy
aimed at putting in place a single, unif'ing concept to draw together the interests involved.
Underdal (1980, p. 167) explores the major option of creating a new institution as follows:
"This [creating a new institutioni could be done by merg,in two o
more existing institutions, creating a new agency to promote certain
values and policy perspectives through bargaining with other
agencies, or by establishing a new superagency to co-ordinate work
done by other specialised agencies.....The common denominator
for these measures is that they seek to achieve policy integration by
reorganising the institutional structure so that it better reflects the
policy perspective desires."
With a single government organisation responsible for maritime affairs, the case of France
may be a good example and provide object lessons for the Korean government. France
integrated the government organisations related to maritime and ocean industries under the
auspices of the Ministry of the Sea in order to more effectively operate maritime related
policies (Aquarone, 1988). There were arguments for and against the plan for establishing
the Ministry. In spite of several cons such as the costs of the integration effort, the main
motives for establishing a single government organisation responsible for maritime policy
and management were (i) an attractive and simple solution for increasing the importance of
the maritime sector, (ii) policy coherence and consistency, (iii) the avoidance of duplicated
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effort, (iv) consolidation of information, and (v) clarity of command (Aquarone, 1988).
These motivations are equally relevant to the Korean case.
3.5.2 Administration and Operation of the Container Terminals
As far as the administration of container terminals in Korea is concerned, the Korea
Container Terminal Authority (KCTA) has played a central role in the management and
operation of the country's container terminals. All the container terminals in Korea are
controlled, managed, operated, and supervised by the KCTA which is a public organisation
set up in 1990. Before the KCTA was established, the development and operation of ports
in Korea was entirely dependent upon government funds. This system caused problems
because of the inflexibility of the budget and the bureaucratic procedures for obtaining
funds necessary for port development and maintenance, thus resulting in a situation where
the required financing had not been provided at the right level or at the right time.
In order to avoid these delays in financing, the government launched the KCTA Act in
December 1989 and, finally, established the KCTA on the basis of the Act. One of the
main aims for creating the KCTA was that profits accruing from operation, management,
and development of a container terminal should be reinvested into the development and
maintenance of that container terminal, and that financial sources should be diversified to
efficiently develop and operate the terminal. The objectives of the KCTA can be described
as (i) the timely development, effective operation and management of the container
terminals in Korea; (ii) the promotion of a smooth flow of container cargo traffic; and (iii)
promoting national economic development. The duties can be defined as (i) the
development of new container terminals, their management and operation; (ii) the
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establishment and management of Inland Container Depots and approach roads to
container terminals; and (iii) the carrying on of terminal stevedoring services.
In order to carry out these tasks the KCTA can, if necessary, engage in such business as (i)
purchasing and selling land and any properties on it; (ii) investment in other businesses;
(iii) borrowing money from commercial banks including foreign loans; (iv) issuing the
Container Terminal Development Bonds; and (v) charging fees for using the container
terminal facilities.
The KCTA currently controls and supervises the Jasungdae, Shinsundae, Gamman and
Uam terminals in Pusan together with the Kwangyang terminal located in the country's
south west. These terminals are all leased without payment from the government in the
form of the MMAF (the KMPA prior to 1996). The KCTA then rents these terminals out to
each terminal operator in return for payment: the Jasungdae terminal to the BCTOC, the
Shinsundae terminal to the PECT, the Uam Terminal to the UTC, and the others to private
companies, mainly shipping and transportation companies. The locations of each container
terminal in the port of Pusan can be seen in Appendix 2.
As shown in Figure 3.5, the Jasungdae container terminal is operated by the BCTOC,
which was founded in March 1978 as a non-profit making public organisation and was the
first to introduce the idea of a container terminal into Korea. The aim of establishing the
BCTOC was to contribute to the national economy through the efficient operation and
modernisation of the container terminal, and thus to cope with customers' needs in the
rapidly changing environment of international trade.
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Figure 3. 5 Korea's Container Terminal Administration and Operation
MMAF
Real Owner of Container Terminals and Facilities
Rent out without Paynent
(based on Article IPoIthe KCTA Act)
KCTA
• Corporation without Capital
• Lessor of Container Terminals
Rest out will, Paynenl
(based on Article 20 of the KCTA Act)
• Partly opened
• Openedinl978	 •Openedinl99l	 in1996
Jasungdae Terminal
• Operator:
BCrOC
(Non-profit
Organisation)
Kwangyang
Operator:
Shipping Co.
• Partly opened
in 1997
Gamman Terminal
• Operator:
Shipping Co.
To be opened
in 1998
Source: Derived from the KCTA Act
On the other hand, a limited company (the PECT) operates the Shinsundae container
terminal, the construction of which was finished in June 1991. In setting up the PECT, the
total capital injected was 18 billion won, which had risen to 47 billion won as of 1995 after
continuously increasing the capital. The KCTA holds 25 % of the total shares, thus having
control over the PECT, and another 11 stevedoring companies hold the remaining 75 %
(Korea Maritime Institute, 1 996a).
Figure 3.5 shows that there are three different entities controlling the container terminals in
Korea; the terminal operators (i.e. BCTOC, PECT, UTC) and other private companies, are
subject to the supervision of the KCTA, and in turn the KCTA is under the control of the
MMAF (the KMPA prior to 1996). This hierarchy gives much power to the MMAF acting
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on behalf of the government, indicating that the government has heavily influenced the
processes of management, operation, and development of the container terminals in Korea.
3.6 NEW TERMINAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS
Korea, neatly positioned between Japan and China, should be the ideal place to tranship the
growing volume of container traffic emanating from the northern and central parts of
China, currently emerging as one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The
country continues to lose out, however, for want of sufficient port facilities. Although the
existing port infrastructure is far from undeveloped, it has been hard pressed in recent years
just to keep pace with the growing export and import traffic generated within the counby
itself.
The consensus is that the recent policy and actions of the state-controlled port industry has
done little to ease the problem (Fairplay, 1995). The governmental port authority,
embodied in the MMAF (the KMPA prior to 1996) could, on the surface, be applauded for
the way it has restructured its operation to allow a greater participation by the private sector
in the area of terminal funding and management. In reality, this process is proving very
tortuous and has markedly slowed the construction and opening of new terminal sites. It
could be argued that, because of its drive to shift the cost burden of port development away
from the government, and onto the commercial transport sector, the MMAF (the KMPA
prior to 1996) has singularly failed to match new container port development with that
required by the shipping lines, shippers and the national economy.
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In order to modernise and expand the country's port facilities as a means of solving the
problem of serious congestion at the port of Pusan and of meeting the expected increase in
container throughput into the next century, the public port authority has launched a 15-year
port development programme that could boost cargo handling capacity by more than 500
million tonnes per year. The KMPA has stated that the need for extra handling capacity
became essential as trade with China began to flourish and new routes were being planned
that would substantially increase the number of container shipments between the two
countries (Lloyd's List, 1995). The plan hopes to result in large-scale local port
development that is funded and managed by both foreign and domestic companies. To
alleviate Korea's port congestion and keep pace with ever-increasing container cargo, the
programme comprises the following new projects that are either under construction or
being considered.
3.6.1 Gamman Container Terminal (The Fourth Phase Development at Pusan)
As the existing container terminals are working to capacity, much attention has been paid
to Pusan's fourth phase development. To release the enormous burden on the port of Pusan,
the fourth phase development plan was launched near the existing Shinsundae terminal.
The planned facilities include a new 1,400 metre quay capable of accommodating four
post-P anamax containerships with a total handling capacity of 1.2 million TEU per year. It
is expected to cost US$ 500 million and 30 % of this total has been funded by private
companies. The rest will be funded by the government, which will raise the money through
bond issues which shipping companies such as Hyundai Merchant Marine, Hanjin and Cho
Yang are expected to subscribe to. The terminal is planned to be in operation by 1998.
(1) The terminal commenced operating in January 1998.
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Table 3.8 shows the forecast cargo handling capacity at the port of Pusan after the opening
of the fourth Phase terminal, which will be able to greatly solve the current congestion
problem.
Table 3. 8 Forecast of Cargo Handling Capacity at the Port of Pusan
(Unit: Million TEU)
Year	 1996	 2001	 2005	 2011
Estimated Container Traffic	 2.95	 3.20	 3.77	 4.47
Estimated Cargo Handling Capacity	 2.88	 3.62	 4.23	 4.52
Jasungdae Container Terminal 	 0.90	 0.90	 0.90	 0.90
Shinsundae Container Terminal	 0.96	 0.96	 0.96	 0.96
Conventional Berths 	 0.36	 -	 -	 -
4th Container Terminal 	 0.66	 1.20	 1.20	 1.20
Multipurpose Berths 	 -	 0.56	 1.17	 1.46
Surplus Capacity (Shortage)	 (0.07)	 0.42	 0.46	 0.05
Source: Urn and Shin (1993)
3.6.2 Uam Container Terminal
Even after the completion of the Gamman Container Terminal by 1998, there will still be a
long-term shortage of container handling capacity. The development plan for additional
container terminal capacity at Pusan includes the Uam terminal. The plans consist of four
phases which are expected to be completed by 1999. In the middle of 1996, the Phase One
terminal began partial operation. The terminal is managed and operated by the newly
established Uam Terminal Company (IJTC), whose shares are jointly held by two
transportation companies: the Korea Container Terminal Company and the Dongsung
Silup Company. The former company holds 60 % of the shares and the latter 40 %.
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3.6.3 Kwangyang Container Terminal
As a way of encouraging a two-port system in Korea and thus of dispersing the container
traffic currently concentrated in the port of Pusan, the government is keen to see the
development of a new container terminal at Kwangyang in the south-west of the country
(Nah, 1994). The development project consists of Phase One and Two as well as further
development plans. Four berths on 1,400 metres of quay are now being constructed under
Phase One of the plan. Each berth is capable of accommodating a 50,000 dwt container
ship with 350 metres of quay per berth and 14.5 metres of water depth. They are expected
to be in operation in 1998, and have a designed handling capacity of 960,000 TEU per
year, and a terminal area of 840,000 in2 with 600 metres of depth from the apron. The
terminal will also have a container railway yard for transporting containers from the
terminal to the hinterland. Phase Two is planned to be completed between 1996 and 2001,
creating six berths. Four 50,000 and two 20,000 dwt container ships can berth alongside
simultaneously when it is completed. The construction of the rest of the ten berths planned
will be carried out in the future. Table 3.9 shows the overall cargo handling capacity in
Korea after the completion of the Kwangyang terminal.
Table 3. 9 Forecast of Cargo Handling Capacity in Korea
Million TEU)
2011
11.46
10.02
Year
Estimated Container Traffic
Estimated Cargo Handling (
- Kwangyang Port
- Other Ports
Surplus Capacity (Shortage)
Source: Lim and Shin (1993)
1996	 2001
4.62	 6.48
4.23	 6.62
	
2.82	 3.62
	
0.96	 2.40
	
0.45	 0.60
(0.39)	 0.14
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3.6.4 Gaduk Island Container Terminal (New Pusan Port)
As can be seen in Table 3.9, even when the new facilities at Pusan and Kwangyang are
completed, the expected long-term demand for container port facilities in Korea will not be
met. For this reason, there are plans to develop the Gaduk Island terminal off the southern
tip of the country into a major port facility with container berths. After setting up a master
plan and carrying out a feasibility study in early 1996, the project is currently underway.
Plans are for a 25-berth port to form part of a larger redevelopment project to be completed
in 2011, and designed to have a mix of general cargo and container wharves, with an
annual capacity of approximately 4.6 million TEIJ (90 million tonnes). The Gaduk Island
scheme will also be built in two phases with the first stage due for completion by 2005 and
the second phase by 2011 (Fossey, 1997). The main infrastructure work will be carried out
by the government and includes a breakwater, railway systems, container depots and
marshalling yards. It is expected, however, that there will be a major involvement from the
private sector. The 'New Pusan Port Corporation' was recently established as a form of 29
member consortium to accelerate the process of constructing the terminal as planned (Lee,
1998).
All of the above development plans should be finished around 2011, at which time the port
of Pusan should have sufficient capacity for handling an ever-growing container traffic. As
a consequence, it is hoped that congestion will become a thing of the past. In addition, the
future of Pusan as a cargo hub depends on the successful implementation of these long
range development programmes.
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3.7 PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN PORTS
Under the New FYP, the government has released ambitious plans for expanding social
overhead capital in order to build up an efficient overall transport system throughout the
country. The ultimate objective is to promote the efficient distribution of export and import
goods in an effort to accelerate economic growth. Port development was one element of
this plan. Given the enormity of the capital requirement, a major problem hindering the
process of Korean port development was recognised to be the question of how such
projects should be financed. The government has regarded the participation of the private
sector as an important method of reducing its financial burden in all spheres of activity and
has encouraged private sector participation in numerous investment projects in all sectors.
The port industry is no exception.
As the government implements its plan to bring private capital into both existing and new
port facilities, new policies are opening up Korean ports to competition. In addition, a
degree of privatisation is sought whereby the costs and returns to port operation can be
shared between government and private sectors.
3.7.1 Building Dedicated Terminals by Private Shipping Companies
Private companies are already heavily involved in the port projects mentioned in the
previous section and their participation is increasing. Shipping lines themselves are setting
up dedicated facilities and thereby, for the first time, engaging in competition with the two
existing container terminals at Pusan. Hanjin Shipping Company, the biggest container
liner company in Korea, for example, is planning a dedicated terminal at Gamchun, close
to Pusan. A container yard and berthing for ships of up to 3,000 TEU will be built as part
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of its global strategy to develop its logistics and intermodal operations. At the new
Kwangyang terminal, the Cho Yang Shipping Company, the third biggest liner shipping
company in Korea, has set up a task force to evaluate the potential of building a private
berth of 210,000 m2 on a greenfield site with a 350 metre quay which, once the terminal is
in operation in 1998, will be capable of handling 300,000 TEU annually. Cho Yang
considers that a dedicated terminal will be cheaper than using public berths and will
improve their ships' ability to keep to schedule. The company is also planning a terminal
of similar capacity in Pusan, on a greenfield site occupying 148,750m2.
At present, Hanjin uses the Jasungdae terminal operated by the BCTOC. The Director of
BCTOC's operations department has commented that finding replacement business when
Hanjin moves away will be a new experience. Currently, existing container berths in Korea
are all operated on a common user basis and are publicly controlled. Some concessions,
however, on port facilities in Pusan and Inchon are due to be handed over in 1998, and
more than half of the investment necessary for port construction up to 2011 is expected to
come from the private sector (Lloyd's List, 1997). After 1998, therefore, korean port
operators will have to worry about the competition, and they are working towards that
(Fairplay, 1996). Obviously, this will be a new experience and terminal operators should
prepare for the fact that this business environment is changing.
3.7.2 Financing New Terminal Development from the Private Sector
The port industry, in general, requires huge amounts of capital for its development. In
particular, as Slack et a!. (1996) point out, recent technology changes in the shipping
industry and the trend towards larger ships has had a major impact on the ports in the
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world. Having already invested heavily in container facilities, ports are now being called
upon to provide extra facilities such as deeper channels, larger cranes, on-dock rail
connections, and more extensive storage facilities. Ports, therefore, are being compelled to
invest heavily, or lose their competitive edge. As a consequence, port financing has
become a major issue in many countries, and there are severe fmancial pressures on ports
everywhere.
The KCTA, which is in charge of the development, management and operation of Korean
container terminals, issues 'Container Terminal Development Bonds' in accordance with
the provision of Article 25 of the KCTA Act in order to partly provide funds required to
develop and modernise port facilities. The participants selected for taking part in this
financing scheme purchase the Bonds in accordance with specific procedures. As at the end
of 1996, the total amount of bonds either issued and about to be issued is 200 billion won
(US$ 258 million), with the KCTA issuing 50 billion won (US$ 65 million) of bonds each
year.
To encourage private participation in this funding scheme for the development of container
terminals, the KCTA gives exclusive use rights of the terminal to selected participants. The
period of exclusive use is ten years and may be renewed if agreed on between the KCTA
and the participants prior to the expiration of the period. This exclusivity of use has
currently been agreed on two berths: one from the Kwangyang first phase development
terminal and the other from the Pusan fourth phase development terminal (Gamman
Terminal). Details of the exclusive use rights are as follows (KCTA, 1993):
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• They are related to overall terminal operational rights such as the participants' vessels
berthing and leaving the quay, container loading and unloading, transit, storage, delivery
and receiving etc., in relation to the container ship operation.
The participants may entrust the whole operation of the terminals to a third party who
holds a stevedoring service license issued by the government in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Port Stevedoring Services Business Act.
The participants may handle the container cargoes of the other container liner operators
using the berths.
The participants shall co-operate by allowing other container liner operators to use the
berths upon the order from the Regional Maritime and Port Authority in cases where the
Authority decides it is necessary to allow other liners to use the berth for the efficient
management of the port concerned (in this case, the participants may collect use charges
from the other liner operators).
• The details of the exclusive use rights of the container terminals (berths) shall be
provided by the Agreement to be concluded between the KCTA and the participants,
and the Agreement shall be concluded three months prior to the starting bf the actual
operation of the terminals.
In addition, the government launched the 'Promotion Act of Private Capital Inducement' in
August 1994 for attracting private finance into social infrastructure investments including
roads, distribution centres and port facilities. The Act has encouraged the private sector to
take a financial stake in infrastructure development as a strategic option so that they are
able to reduce logistics-related costs (Yoo, 1997).
78
Chapter 3
	 The Korean Port Industry
To keep in step with this movement towards private sector participation in port
development and operation as a form of privatisation policy, Korea Maritime Institute
(1996b) conducted a feasibility study of privatising the BCTOC, the public sector operator
of the Jasungdae container terminal at Pusan. The study was carried out under the
assumption that the centralised and government-controlled port administration and
operation could not properly cope with the changing port industry environment which has
become a much more customer-oriented business, i.e., necessitating the provision of port
user services on time and with higher quality and thereby satisf ring their major needs.
In conclusion, the MMAF is keen to attract investment from domestic and overseas private
sectors for achieving its ambitious plan of making the national port the hub of Northeast
Asia in the 21st century (Sohn, 1998). The basic policy for achieving this objective is a
form of port privatisation whereby the MMAF owns national ports while private
companies are in charge of port operations. In other words, the Korean government pursues
the privatisation policy on ports of 'public ownership and private operation'.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PR! VATISATION THEORY AND EVIDENCE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Privatisation is a relatively new word. The word made no significant appearance in
political and economic literature before 1979, when the UK Conservative Party was
elected. Since then, the term 'privatisation' has rapidly become one of the most important
facts of the I 980s and 1 990s, with the concept spreading beyond boundaries of the UK to
be adopted throughout the world. The Financial Times (1986) states that if political ideas
could be copyrighted, Thatcher's government would be well on the way to achieving a
runaway international best-seller.
In simple terms, to privatise is to place a state activity or industry in the private sector, or
to transfer the ownership of an asset to private ownership. The privatisation programme of
the UK Conservative government has transferred a large number of public-owned
enterprises to the private sector, thereby withdrawing the government from the production
of goods and services. In the UK, it is an economic policy that has been pursued further
and faster than in any other country. Privatisation has also led to what amounts to a
political contradiction. Veljanovski (1987) mentions that whatever the final assessment of
UK's affair with privatisation, it is clear that the Conservative Party has altered not only
the nature of the state's role in the British economy but also the terms of the political
debate about industrial policy for the next decade.
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In this chapter, relevant issues and theories associated with privatisation will be discussed.
These include the economic and political background to privatisation, the objectives and
methods of privatisation, incentive structures under public and private ownership, and
performance comparison under the two different forms of ownership in order to find out
which factors are pivotal to the implementation of a successful privatisation policy.
4.2 THE PRIVATISATION CONTEXT
In the Wealth of Nations, Smith (1776) argued that:
"In every great monarchy in Europe the sale of the crown lands
would produce a very large sum of money, which, if applied to the
payment of the public debts, would deliver from mortgage a much
greater revenue than any which those lands have ever afforded to the
crown .....When the crown lands had become private property,
they would, in the course of a few years, become well improved and
well cultivated."
Adam Smith's perspective was that private ownership improves productivity and
efficiency, hence enhancing economic performance. While advocating only a limited role
for government, he attempted to show how competition and the profit motive would lead
individuals, in pursuing their own private interests, to serve the public interest. The profit
motive would lead individuals to supply the goods other individuals wanted. Through
competing against one another, only firms that produced what was wanted, and at as low a
price as possible, would survive. Smith (1776) argued that the economy was led, as if by an
invisible hand, to produce what was desired and in the best possible way.
This argument has not gone without a great debate. Several studies, e.g., Vickers and
Yarrow (1988), claim that in many contexts public management will do better in terms of
85
Chapter 4
	 Privatisation Theory and Evidence
economic efficiency than its private counterpart. Again, they maintain that it would be
wrong to conclude that the issue of ownership has occupied a central place in the
development of economic analysis, and that the economic theory has, in fact, tended to
bypass the issue. In other words, they suggest that there has been little or no discussion of
positive theories of public enterprises. This tendency may have resulted from the idea that
public policy on this particular issue is influenced much more by political philosophy and
convenience than by the rigours of economic analysis.
4.2.1 Privatisation Defined
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1993), 'privatisation' is taken to mean (i) to
assign a business, service, etc. to private as distinct from state control or ownership and (ii)
to transfer from ownership by the state into private ownership, which is synonymous with
'denationalisation'. The meaning of 'deregulation' is to free from regulations or control,
while that of 'liberalisation' is to remove restrictions imposed on businesses.
In the context of economics, 'privatisation', or 'denationalisation', is generally taken to
mean the sale of publicly owned assets, thus transferring their ownership from public to
private sectors. Definitions of the other two terms, however, are inconsistently used. For
example, Yarrow (1986) defines 'deregulation' as a removal of market restrictions and
'liberalisation' as a measure to increase competition. Bishop and Kay (1988), however,
define 'deregulation' and 'liberalisation' to mean the same, i.e., a removal of statutory
restrictions on competition. For Parker (1991), the privatisation programme has had two
main components: the sale of state assets (denationalisation) and the introduction of
competition into areas previously monopolised by state owned suppliers (liberalisation).
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Wiltshire (1988, P. 1) points out that there are no clear concepts or definitions of
privatisation as follows:
"In the world of government, it is often the policies that are
accompanied by the least public fuss and fanfare that have the
greatest and most lasting impact. This certainly holds true for
privatisation in the UK. There was no green paper, no white paper,
no definitive piece of legislation, no second-reading speech, and the
concept was not even contained in the manifesto . . . . Even today
there is no distinct policy document . . . defining and justifying
privatisation, outlining its objectives, or spelling out its future
applications."	 -
In the UK, a government-controlled or -owned firm is privatised if a large proportion of its
equity, usually in excess of 50 %, is sold (Veljanovski, 1987; Beesley and Littlechild,
1988). In this sense, the policy of privatisation is the opposite of nationalisation. Thus, it is
clear that official sources do not provide a definition of privatisation, but rather describe its
aims, scope, methods and results. It may be worth mentioning here how others have
defined it. The following are some of them:
"There are four principal strands in the policy of the Thatcher
government towards the institutions and enterprises of the public
sector as a whole: (i) to transfer them to private ownership, wherever
that is possible; (ii) to open up their activities to competition, which
has become known as liberalisation; (iii) to eliminate certain
functions carried out by the public sector altogether or to sub-contract
them to the private sector where this can be achieved at lower cost;
and (iv) to charge the public for public sector services currently
provided free" (Clementi, 1985, p. 171)
"The idea involves transferring the production of goods and services
from the public sector to the private sector. At its lowest common
denominator, it means having done privately that which was done
publicly .....it is not a policy but an approach. It is an approach
which recognises that the regulation which the market imposes on
economic activity is superior to any regulation which men can devise
and operate by law" (Pine, 1988, pp. 2-3)
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"By privatisation, I mean strictly the permanent transferring of
service or goods production activities previously carried out by
public service bureaucracies to private finns or to other firms of non-
public organisation, such as voluntary groups" (Dunleavy, 1986, p. 1)
"Privatisation is a term which is used to cover several distinct, and
possibly alternative, means of changing the relationships between the
government and the private sector. Among the most important of
these are denationalisation (the sale of publicly owned assets),
deregulation (the introduction of competition into statutory
monopolies) and contracting out (the franchising to private firms of
the production of state financed goods and services)" (Kay and
Tompson, 1986, p. 18)
From the above definitions, the following four separate elements can be drawn to provide
an all-encompassing definition of privatisation in its various guises: (i) 'privatisation' of
the financing of a service that continues to be produced by the public sector, (ii)
'privatisation' of the production of a service that continues to be financed by the public
sector (usually through taxation), (iii) 'liberalisation', meaning relaxation of any statutory
monopolies or licensing arrangements that prevent private sectors from entering markets
previously exclusively supplied by the public sector, and (iv) 'denationalisation' and 'load-
shedding', meaning selling of public enterprises and transfer of state functions to the
private sector, respectively.
4.2.2 Political Background to Privatisation
With most political transformations it is essential to know a little of their history to gain an
understanding of their meaning and impact. The historical origins of privatisation policy
comes from the UK, a country that initiated the concept and has been implementing it
faster and more comprehensively than any other country. A brief review of the UK policy
88
Chapter 4
	 Privatisation Theory and Evidence
of nationalisation as exercised in the early post-war period up to 1979 is a necessary
precursor, therefore, to the analysis of UK privatisation which follows it.
After World War II, the nationalisation of industry was much more prominent than ever
before. One of the momentous changes after the Second World War was the increasing
demand from both sides of the political spectrum, as well as the general public, for
government intervention in the economy. The ideology for nationalisation is based on the
concept of 'the common ownership of the means of production' (Dunkerley and Hare,
1991) and on the belief that under public, rather than private, ownership various large and
strategic industries would serve the public interest better because of their accountability to
the people through a board appointed by the government which would be accountable to
the minister and, in turn, to parliament ('Wiltshire, 1988). In addition, the fact that the
private sector had failed to invest sufficiently in the coal and rail industries in the period
prior to the Second World War also provided some impetus for nationalisation in the post-
war period, especially since it was felt that an enormous investment was necessary to allow
such capital-intensive industries to compete effectively with continental rivals. Since this
was not an attractive proposition for the private sector, nationalisation seemed to provide
the only feasible way forward.
In consequence, the public sector grew substantially after the mid-1940s and the
nationalised industries became responsible for a large part of economic growth. The impact
of public sector industry upon the economy was even further exaggerated since the coal,
gas, steel, transport and other nationalised infrastructure industries were in a position to
significantly affect the cost structure of other industries, even in the private sector. Table
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4.1 shows the share of the public sector in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and
employment over the period between the 1 940s and the 1 970s.
Table 4. 1 Public Sector Contribution to the UK Economy (1948-1979)
Year	 I 1948	 1951 f 1956 I 1961 I 1971	 1977	 1978	 1979
	
__________________ ________ Gross Domestic Product (fbillion)
	 ________ ________ _________
Public Sector (A)	 0.8	 1.2	 -	 2.4	 4.9	 14.5	 16.5	 18.1
Total Industry (B)	 10.3	 12.6	 -	 24.2	 49.4	 129.0	 148.1	 172.1
(A/B)	 7.8	 9.5	 -	 9.9	 9.9	 11.2	 11.1	 10.5
________________ _______	
Employment (thousands)	 _______ _______ ________
Public Sector (A)	 -	 -	 2084	 2196	 2009	 2089	 2061	 2065
Totallndustry(B)	 -	 24509	 25057	 24398	 24865	 25134	 25393
(A/B)	 -	 -	 8.5	 8.8	 8.2	 8.4	 8.2	 8.1
Source: Derived from Dunkerley and Hare (1991, p. 405)
In the 1 960s and 1 970s, when serious industrial disputes broke out in many of the
nationalised industries, their continued existence as national entities became seriously
compromised, especially since this was a period when the overall economic performance of
the UK was falling well below that of its Western counterparts. Successive governments
had to grapple with these problems. Conservative goverrunents had taken some limited
action, including the partial privatisation of the iron and steel industries between 1951 and
1955. Even Labour governments became involved in the same way by selling off and
contracting-out, including the sale of some British Petroleum shares.
The mixed economy, however, remained at the nucleus of the country's economic life in
spite of a lot of political rhetoric aimed at changing things. All post-war British
governments seem to have focused their attention on establishing appropriate methods of
control over various parts of the public sector. There were successive white papers, the net
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result of which was to generate greater direct government involvement in the affairs of
nationalised industries.
In the 1 970s there was considerable debate on public sector industries, with the main focus
being on their economic performance. With a few exceptions, on the basis of indicators
such as return on capital, growth and labour productivity, the nationalised or public sector
industries were compared unfavourably with the private sector (Wiltshire, 1988). Due to a
lack of surpluses earned and the continued enormous demand for capital, one factor very
relevant to government was the drain that the economic activities of nationalised industries
were having on the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR).
In 1979, when the Conservative Party was elected into government, the concept of
privatisation gradually made its appearance. Taylor (1983) states the reason for the
elements of privatisation being downplayed in the run up to the 1979 election was that the
Thatcher faction had to compromise their basic objectives in the interest of wider party
unity; a missionary zeal to privatise was not that widely shared in the shadow abinet of the
time. The 1979 Conservative election manifesto included, therefore, only a vague
declaration of faith in the long term aim to reduce the preponderance of state ownership
and to widen the basis of ownership in the country. This is the political background to the
origins of the privatisation policy, a policy that emerged and evolved incrementally rather
than being planned rationally as an element of political strategy (Brittan, 1984).
The following description of the British experience of privatisation policy is suggested by
Bishop and Kay (1988, p. 1):
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"Privatisation is a policy which was adopted almost by accident, but
has become politically central; a policy which has no clear-cut
objectives, but has become almost an end in itself, and which has
certainly acquired a momentum of its own; a policy which has at
once changed the agenda of British politics, but yet closed off
options for more radical reform; and a policy which has been
contemporaneous with significant improvements are no greater than
those in publicly owned companies which have not been privatised."
4.2.3 Economic Background to Privatisation
The question of which entity, the market or the government, should control economic
activities has been the subject of heated debate amongst economists for several decades.
An interesting asymmetry emerges when comparing the sources and types of support for
the pro-market (or anti-government intervention) views with the pro-government (or anti-
market) views. The argument between the pro-market and pro-government positions tends
to be unbalanced, because, as a counterpart to the existing theory of market failures, a
comprehensive theory of government or nonmarket failures is lacking. This asymmetry is
shown by the shaded rectangle in Table 4.2.
Table 4. 2 Markets Versus Governments: Sources of Support and Opposition
Markets	
1	
Governments (Nonmarket)
Pro Theory of competitive markets, supported	 Theory of planning and welfare economics,
by examples and country experience	 supported by examples and country experience
Anti Theory of market failures, supported by
examples and country experience 	 examples and country experience
Source: Wolf (1993, p. 5)
A more ftilly developed theory of government failure would help to provide better balance
in Table 4.2, as well as a better guide to public policy (Wolf, 1993). A brief discussion of
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each failure as a way of understanding the economic background to privatisation now
follows.
During the period between the 1930s and the 1960s, economists became aware of a large
number of ways in which the free-market economy seemed to fail to meet certain social
needs. In response to this failure, the government took a more active role in attempting to
stabilise the level of economic activity. Furthermore, whether or not competitive markets
do lead to economic efficiency has been a question at the heart of theoretical research in
economics during the last few decades. The principal results can be summarised by a
fundamental theorem of welfare economics; that is, under certain conditions, competitive
markets lead to an allocation of resources with the special property that there is no
rearrangement of resources, or no possible change in production and consumption, such
that someone can be made better off without, at the same time, making someone else worse
off. Resource allocations with this property are termed Pareto-efficient or Pareto-optimal
(Begg et a!., 1991), which is a concept based on the assumption of perfectly competitive
markets.
There are, however, several important circumstances under which the market is not Pareto
efficient. These are referred to as market failures, where the conditions necessary to
achieve the market-efficient solution fail to exist or are contravened in one way or another
(Brown and Jackson, 1990) and provide a justification for government involvement.
Several researchers, e.g., Stiglitz (1988), Cullis and Jones (1989) and Wolf (1993), point
out the following as factors which bring about the failures in achieving efficient outcomes:
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• externalities and public goods
• imperfect competition or increasing returns
• market imperfection or incomplete information
• distributional inequality
• uncertainty
• unemployment, inflation and disequilibrium
While market failures led to government intervention during the period between the 1930s
and the 1960s, in the 1 970s the shortcomings of government involvement led economists
to investigate government failures. The basic implication of government failure is that too
many public sector activities are provided. The literature centres on the inefficiencies
and/or inequities that can be traced to collective decision-making and public sector
provision (Cullis and Jones, 1989). The primary issue is that government intervention in an
economy introduces its own costs, which may outweigh the costs of simply living with an
imperfect market.
Stiglitz (1988) suggests four limitations as the major reasons for the systematic failures of
the government to achieve its objectives, i.e., limited information, limited control over
private market responses, limited control over bureaucracy, and limitations imposed by
political processes. In addition, Jackson and Price (1994) state that government failure
arises from the problems of securing appropriate incentives to pursue the public interest
and appropriate information to determine what it is. Brown and Jackson (1990, pp. 57-58)
identify the following as sources of government failure:
• Government intervention results in changes that are often
unpredictable;
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• It is often difficult to state clearly the ends of government policy.
Concepts such as serving the public interest are vague. Knowledge
about means and ends relationship in the policy sphere is often
weak or unknown;
• Implementation failures exist. Implementation often requires
complex systems and involves bargaining, both of which can
break down. Government often lacks adequate control over
agencies and processes that it uses to implement policies;
• Government intervention is not a free good. Government is served
by a bureaucracy that is expensive to administer; and
• The public choice literature draws attention to rent-seeking
behaviour on the part of politicians and bureaucrats. Individuals
seek to influence the state in order to transfer welfare to
themselves. Hence lobby groups will invest resources to influence
the form, structure and incidence of regulations, licensing laws,
tariffs and quotas.
Among these sources of government failure, a further discussion of rent-seeking behaviour
may be worthwhile. The rent-seeking approach studies the competition of groups for scarce
resources rather than through the market system. In return for their contribution to the
group's effort, individuals are entitled to a share of its expected rent (or profit). One issue
is whether or not such behaviour is efficient. Competition amongst rent-seekers will tend,
however, to reduce the expected utility of per-member rent to the individual's reserve level
of utility (Tullock, 1967; Posner, 1975). Suppose a situation exists where more than one
shipping line could serve a certain route but a single shipping line obtains the monopoly
right (rent) over the route by successfully inducing a governmental authority to grant this
right. In this case, the monopoly rent is a kind of prize to be awarded to the shipping line.
Other lines will invest their efforts and resources to increase the probability of achieving
the rent. These investments constitute a social cost of monopoly as well as a loss of
consumer surplus. Buchanan (1980, pp. 12-14) identifies the following three types of rent-
seeking expenditure as sources of government failure:
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• efforts and expenditures of the potential recipients of the
monopoly;
• efforts of the civil servants to obtain the expenditures; and
• third-party distortions induced by the monopoly itself or the
government as a consequence of the rent-seeking activity.
The theory of market failure provides a useful corrective to the basic tenet of the theory of
perfectly functioning markets that they lead to outcomes which are both efficient and
socially equitable. Equally, the theory of government failure provides a corrective to the
implicit theory of perfectly functioning governments also leading to efficient and equitable
outcomes, or at least to ones that are more efficient and equitable than market outcomes. In
fact, both markets and governments are prone to several shortcomings. It is, therefore,
extremely difficult to make a fair comparison between market and government alternatives.
Wolf (1993) argues that the reason for this difficulty is that there is no generally applicable
formula for choosing between them; the results of such a comparison often depend more
upon the predisposition of the evaluators than upon their objective analyses. Overall,
however, government failure can be seen as a motive for privatisation (Jasinski and
Yarrow, 1996).
4.3 PROBLEMS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
In general, the situation of government-controlled and -owned enterprises is quite different
from that of their private sector counterparts in the statutory monopoly power that many of
them have and in the fact that, as their owner, the government inevitably stands behind
their borrowing and makes up for any losses (Brittan, 1984). At the same time, however,
the public sector is itself plagued by a number of serious economic and institutional
problems which are mainly due to a difference from private enterprises in their underlying
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attributes. Pine (1988) identifies the following problem areas emerging from a study of the
public sector and its activities.
• Higher Production and Labour Costs
Private business has costs of production that are, on average, between 20 % and 40 %
lower than those of its public sector counterpart. It appears that market-driven pressures to
keep costs down and profits up provides greater discipline on the private sector than does
the desire for economy in the public sector. In addition, public sector activities are likely to
be more vulnerable to the pressures which increase labour costs. The main factor seems to
be the ability in the public sector, often because of the monopoly power enjoyed, to pass on
the results of wage agreements directly to the taxpayers who finance its activities. In the
private sector, in contrast, there is a greater tendency to negotiate wage agreements with
more concern for their effect on costs.
Lower Efficiency
Public businesses tend to employ a higher level of manpower for identical business
activities, thus making less effective use of their labour resource. The lower costs in private
operations have their basis in the more efficient utilisation of both labourers and
equipment. The implication seems to be that market competition and profit-seeking keep
private enterprises more efficient than their public counterparts. If a private enterprise fails
to keep up with the competition, it will be forced out of business; a public enterprise hardly
ever faces the same fate under similar circumstances.
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. Lower Capital Expenditure and the Poor Condition of Equipment
The level of capital investment in the public sector depends on the funds available to
government which, in turn, relies on the national economy, on the level of taxation, and on
the demands of the public. Political control over the activities of public sector businesses
has had an effect on their ability to raise the capital required for this operation and
production. In addition, capital spending tends to be cut in favour of expanding more
immediate current spending. This environment which surrounds publicly run businesses
frequently causes the public sector to make products with outmoded equipment and old
technology, thus losing the opportunity to reduce production costs by using more high
technology equipment. As a result, the supply of improved, innovative and added value
services is delayed and existing capital stock is made to last much longer than its plan for
lifetime. In addition, publicly owned equipment is not owned by one particular person and,
therefore, few people will treat it with the same care and consideration that they would give
to their own property.
. Lack of Consumer Input
In order to make profits through meeting customers' needs, products and services have to
be oriented towards inducing customer satisfaction. In fact, the consumer is able to exercise
a certain degree of control on private firms by deciding whether to shop with them or
elsewhere. In the case where the public has no choice but to pay and take what is provided,
as is usual in the public sector, this degree of control over the public enterprise is limited or
absent. In this context, the primary aim of a public sector business is sometimes shifted
from the production of goods for consumers to the provision of jobs for workers.
Ironically, therefore, in this way the general public tends to exert greater control over
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private businesses rather than the public ones which they nominally own. This is because
the former can be influenced directly by consumer decisions, while the latter can only be
influenced, if at all, by the ballot box and, thus, only in a very indirect and ad hoc manner.
Slower Innovation and Inflexibility
When a number of competing firms exist in the market, consumers are more keen to find
goods and services satisfying their individual needs. Private firms are constantly seeking
new products and ways to give them a competitive edge; they adapt swiftly to a changing
environment, with an apprehension that failure to do so may result in bankruptcy. On the
other hand, where goods and services are produced under government control, it is
necessary to deal with the problem of control, i.e., to solve a bureaucratic problem.
Consequently, the rate of innovation in public operations is much lower, and public
services appear to change relatively slowly over time. During a period of time when private
sector goods and services may change in an effort to satisfy the wants of customers, the
public sector is likely to make the same products year after year. A noticeable reason for
this is that the absence of rewards for entrepreneurial innovation makes the public sector
slow to adopt new ideas and technology and to be less adaptable to the changing
environment which surrounds them.
• Political, rather than Economic, Decision Making
As part of every day business, firms have to deal with the level of demand, given the price
and availability of capital, and with other relevant activities. Decisions on these economic
activities in the private sector are made on the basis of economic reasoning. Many of the
important decisions in the public sector, in contrast, are made on political grounds. In other
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words, private business exists in the economic world, while government business in the
political world and is influenced and controlled accordingly. Overall decision-making in
the public sector is separated from the realities of supply and demand, thus resulting in a
situation where the public sector does not operate with the same degree of efficiency
achieved by the more market-driven private business.
. More Vulnerable to Interruption of Service
Public sector products and services are usually supplied by a public monopoly with no
alternative source of supply permitted. This means that any interruption can shut down all
sources of supply to consumers. Whilst, in the private sector, a labour dispute in one firm
threatens only its own customers, a labour dispute in a public monopoly, on the other hand,
threatens the whole economy.
. Lack of Responsiveness to Cost Control
Costs incurred in the private sector are controlled competitively and are not, in any case,
financed out of taxation. If an increase in the costs of private goods or services is reflected
in a price rise, the consumer may decide to turn to cheaper alternatives, to take up
substitutes, or to spend less money. The public sector, in contrast, with a budget which is
nominally under the control of government, and thus heavily influenced by political
decisions, shows an immunity against cost controls. What matters is that costs in the public
sector are consisted of various factors, many of which are outside government control
through its legislative domain. In general, civil servants make little effort to reduce costs.
Furthermore, the savings realised by cutting costs hardly benefit those governmental
officers; those who ultimately pay for public programmes are neither as self-conscious nor
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as visible as those who benefit from them. All of these circumstances make costs incurred
in the public sector hard to control.
Not one of these problem areas of public sector activity is in any sense coincidental. All the
problems arise from the structure and organisation of the public sector itself and from the
pressures and forces that are brought to bear on it in the political realm. In response to
these problems, much attention has been paid to various ways in which their effect could
be reduced or eliminated. Several approaches, including privatisation, have been
implemented in order to impose outside controls upon the public sector to make it conform
to government requirements, or to set forces to work within it which can bring about an
improvement in its performance.
4.4 OBJECTIVES OF FRI VATISATION
In an important speech by the UK Minister John Moore (1986), it was stated that
privatisation was a key element in the UK government's economic strategy. It would lead
to a fundamental shift in the balance between the public and private sectors, bring about a
profound change in attitudes within the state industries, open up exciting possibilities for
the consumer, better pay and conditions for employees, and a new freedom for the
managers of the industries concerned.
However, several studies, e.g., Heald (1982), Yarrow (1986), Vickers and Yarrow (1988),
and Jasinski and Yarrow (1996), argue that the UK privatisation programme did not start
with a coherent set of objectives and that a comprehensive list of goals ranked by priority
or weight has never been defined. In fact, the objectives of privatisation programmes are as
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numerous and diverse as the agendas of politicians and bureaucrats and will tend to vary
over time and from country to country. The comprehensive and principal aims of
privatisation programmes can be summarised as follows (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988;
Jasinski and Yarrow, 1996).
• Improving Economic Efficiency
Privatisation improves economic efficiency if it provides incentives to cut costs and set
prices in line with costs, i.e., managing business according to economic disciplines. The
achievement of such efficiency improvement is, however, much dependent on the scheme
of competition and regulation in which the privatised company operates. This objective can
also be achieved by allowing firms to borrow freely from the capital markets without
having to obey the borrowing constraints faced in the public sector.
• Reducing the PSBR
Once a firm has been privatised and hence the firm is no longer a drain on the public sector
borrowing requirement (1SBR), the government is able to reduce the PSBR through
privatisation.
• Reducing Government Involvement
Privatisation is also a direct and immediate way of reducing government intervention in the
decision making of a company. As mentioned in the previous section, a major weakness in
operating nationalised enterprises is this vulnerability to political whim, whereas
privatisation provides a plausible method of giving management more independence to
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develop their business strategies based not on political decisions but on economic
decisions.
• Lessening Union Power
Privatisation can also be considered as a way of promoting government objectives
regarding the labour market: vis a vis the lessening union power. Nationalisation has
increased the monopoly power of unions if public sector managers and their supervising
ministers have weak incentives to cut labour costs and limited power to negotiate wage
settlements. Government can reduce, to some extent, the power of unions by privatisation.
• Widening Company Ownership
Privatisation presents an excellent vehicle for encouraging the wider ownership of
economic assets. Although the programme by itself does not necessarily facilitate this
objective, it gives a rare opportunity to offer shares to the general public at a discount and
with additional bonuses for the small shareholder.
• Encouraging Employee Share Ownership
As far as the UK Conservative party is concerned, its privatisation policy has yielded
important political benefits: millions of new small shareholders possess portfolios that are
typically made up of privatisation stocks, such as BT and British Gas.
• Gaining Political Advantage
This objective has been an implied one, but it has influenced several critical policy
decisions.
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In addition to these objectives of the privatisation programme, Veljanovski (1987) put
forward two more objectives: (i) creating an enterprise culture and (ii) replacing ownership
and financial controls with a more effective system of economic regulation designed to
ensure that the benefits accruing from greater efficiency are passed on to consumers.
From the above discussion, three common objectives can be identified. These are (i) to
increase economic efficiency at the level of individual firms and industries (efficiency
objectives), (ii) to raise revenue for government activities (fiscal objectives) and (iii) to
seek political advantage by means of income distribution (distributional objectives).
4.5 METHODS OF PRIVATISATION
Public enterprises must, ultimately, be disposed of one-by-one and each case must be
examined on its own merits in terms of deciding upon an appropriate method of
privatisation. Vuylsteke (1988) categorises seven methods of privatisation which are the
most commonly observed. These methods also constitute the main options tr alternative
approaches available to governments. Several of these methods can bring about total
denationalisation or can be implemented partially or gradually. Several combinations of
these methods exist as well.
4.5.1 Public Offering of Shares (Full or Partial)
Under this method, the state sells to the general public all or large blocks of stock it holds
in a wholly or partly owned public enterprise which, it is assumed, will be a going concern
as a public limited company. Technically, this transaction amounts to a secondary
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distribution of shares. When a government decides to sell only a portion of its holding, the
result is joint state and private ownership of the enterprise. The government may pursue
such an approach either as a deliberate policy to maintain its presence or as a first step
towards full privatisation. Where a private shareholding already exists, the transaction may
simply be a further privatisation.
Public offerings require that (i) the enterprise be a sizeable going concern with a reasonable
earning record or potential, or that it can be made ready to become so; (ii) a full body of
financial, management and other information is available or can be prepared for disclosure
to the investing market; (iii) there is discernible liquidity in the local market; and (iv) either
the equity markets are developed or there is some structured mechanism including a
regulatory body that can be made to function to reach, inform and attract as well as protect
the general investing public. This method conforms to the government objective of
encouraging widespread share ownership.
4.5.2 Private Sale of Shares (Full or Partial)
In this case, the state sells all or part of its shareholding in a wholly or partly owned public
enterprise to a pre-identified single purchaser or group of purchasers. It is assumed that the
public enterprise in question is a going concern in the form of a corp oration represented by
shares. The transaction can take various forms, such as a direct acquisition by another
corporate entity, or a private placement targeting a specific group, for example institutional
investors. The privatisation can be full or partial, the latter resulting in mixed ownership
enterprises. A private sale of shares may also be carried out before, or sometimes
simultaneously with, a public offering.
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Thanks to their flexibility, private sales are preferred for weakly performing public
enterprises or public enterprises in need of strong owners with relevant industrial, financial,
commercial and other experience and a high financial stake in the success of the firm. It
may also be the only feasible alternative in the absence of developed equity markets, where
no mechanism exists or is possible for reaching the general investing public, and where the
size of the enterprise may not justify a public offering.
One of the main advantages of the private sale of shares is that the prospective owner is
known in advance and can be evaluated, in terms of their ability to bring a number of
benefits such as management, technology, market access and so on. In many cases, the
future success of the operation may be as important to government as are the proceeds from
the sale. In some cases, a partial private sale may be a necessary first step to full
privatisation, as it brings in a leveraged party who is able to turn the company around so
that it becomes attractive to investors. The private sale also permits all the required
flexibility to conclude special arrangements with a suitable purchaser as dictated by the
condition of the public enterprise. For example, a public enterprise with a negative present
worth may be attractive to an investor with whom a special synergy exists, such as market
share, technology, etc.
4.5.3 Sale of Government or Public Enterprise Assets
Under the previous two methods of privatisation, the private sector purchased shares in a
public enterprise that was a going concern. This method, on the other hand, consists
basically of the sale of the assets, rather than shares, in a going concern. A government
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may sell the assets directly or the public enterprise may dispose of major assets. In general,
while the purpose may be to hive off separate assets representing distinct activities, the sale
of separate assets may be a means of selling the enterprise as a whole. Thus, the assets may
be sold individually or together as a new corporate entity. Assets can only be sold privately
unless the government embodies the assets and activities into a new company established
for the purpose of privatisation, in which case a public offering or private sale of shares is
possible.
By definition, a sale of assets involves a known party and, in that sense, it may have the
same advantages as a direct sale of shares. In addition, it offers the additional flexibility
that it may be more feasible to sell individual assets rather than the whole public enterprise,
or it may permit the sale of a public enterprise that might be extremely difficult to sell as a
going concern. It should be borne in mind, however, that often this approach may result in
residual liabilities for the government. In many cases of public enterprises that are not
saleable as going concerns, the sale of assets is the preferred method, if not the only
alternative. This method is possible because the enterprise's products and assets may be of
relevance to a buyer in the private sector. In such cases, the government may decide to
dissolve or dismantle the public enterprise and liquidate it by selling its assets and writing
off its uncovered liabilities. The entity can then emerge as a private company. This method
is also appropriate in some cases involving the privatisation of public enterprises that are
not set up under company law (unless a public offering is planned, in which case
conversion to a public limited company is necessary).
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4.5.4 Reorganisation into Component Parts (or Fragmentation)
This approach involves the breaking-up or reorganisation of a public enterprise into several
separate entities or into a holding company and several subsidiaries. In some sense, this
technique can be regarded simply as a form of restructuring prior to privatisation. This
method permits piecemeal privatisation, and further different methods of privatisation to be
applied to different component parts, thereby possibly facilitating the overall process. If a
public enterprise incorporates too many activities that, in the aggregate, are not attractive to
potential investors, whereas individual units would be, fragmentation is a possible
alternative. Sometimes, a state wishes to sell only certain components of the public
enterprise, while retaining others. Some port authorities that embody many different
operations (general port services, stevedoring, transit, towing etc.) have found that certain
activities are better handled by a private sector which may fmd them attractive, whereas the
global operation might not be. Another reason for the fragmentation of a public enterprise
may be that it is a monopoly and the government would like to be break up it into separate
enterprises to create competition, as in the case of British Rail.
4.5.5 New Private Investment in Public Enterprises
A government may wish to inject more capital into a public enterprise (mostly for
rehabilitation and for expansion) and to achieve this by opening equity ownership to the
private sector. The main characteristic of such a privatisation method is that the state is not
disposing of any of its existing equity in the public enterprise. Instead, it increases the
equity and causes a dilution of the government's equity position. This will result in joint
private and government ownership of the enterprise (ofien referred to as a joint venture). If
the public enterprises are not wholly state-owned, but majority-owned, then the new capital
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subscription will simply result in a further dilution of the government's interest, possibly
resulting in a private majority holding. In a large number of cases, the government has
brought in the assets of a public enterprise (with or without accompanying liabilities) as a
contribution in kind to the capital of a new corporation, while the cash contribution to the
capital of the new corporation by new private investors will permit necessary
rehabilitation, restoration of working capital, or an expansion of operations. Normally, a
new equity issue does not result in sales proceeds for the state.
In summary, this will be the preferred method if a government's objective is both to reduce
its proportionate shareholding or to change the state and private mix in the public
enterprise and if the enterprise is in need of capital.
4.5.6 Management and Employee Buyout
Generally, the term management buy-out (MBO) refers to the acquisition of a controlling
shareholding in a company by a small group of managers. It often also designates a similar
transaction where employees, or management and employees, acquire
	 controlling
interest. This approach focuses particularly on the acquisition by management and work
force. For simplicity, this transaction is referred to here as a management and employee
buy-out (MEBO)'. Wright and Coyne (1985) and Blackstone and Franks (1986) explain:
"The special characteristic of the financing arrangements for
management buy-outs is that the financiers provide the bulk of the
funds but take a disproportionately small proportion of equity; on the
(I) Reference is sometimes made to employee buy-outs (EBOs) and leveraged management buy-outs
(LMBOs). EBOs are buy-outs where, apart from the management team investing in shares in the buy-
out company, a significant number of employees also invest in shares. This arrangement carries
particular tax problems. LMBOs are leveraged (or geared) buy-outs where the management team has a
controlling number of shares. Generally they would, however, be termed MBOs (Krieger, 1990, p. 3).
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other hand, the buy-out team obtains a large share of the equity but
provides a small proportion of the funding. High gearing ratios,
where borrowings can be initially as much as five times the amount
of share capital in the company, are not unusual and in some cases
may even be higher than this. In such cases it is naturally important
that the projected cash flow is sufficient to allow for the payment of
large sums of interest and capital repayments without placing the
viability of the business in jeopardy"
Management and employee buy-outs can be a relevant means of transferring ownership to
management and employees with little wealth or knowledge of share ownership and may
be a solution for public enterprises not otherwise saleable. These methods also constitute
an enormous incentive to productivity. Clearly this can provide a solution to the
employment issue where the alternative is liquidation; the management and employee buy-
out should minimise lay-offs and other substantial costs of closing a public enterprise. This
method, however, requires the presence of competent and skilled management and a
committed and stable work force. A strong cash flow potential is usually a precondition for
obtaining credit to finance a buy-out.
4.5.7 Lease and Management Contract
Both leases and management contracts are arrangements whereby private sector
management, technology and/or skills are provided under contract to a public enterprise or,
in respect of state-owned assets, for an agreed period and compensation. While there is
normally no transfer of ownership and, therefore, no divestiture of state assets, these
arrangements can be used to privatise management and operations and, thereby, possibly
increase the efficiency and effective use of state assets. While there are many variations,
the basic difference between a lease and a management contract can be summarised as
follows.
110
Chapter 4	 Privatisation Theoiy and Evidence
Lease: The private operator leases assets or facilities owned by the state and uses them to
conduct business on its own account. The lease sets forth the terms and conditions under
which the lessee may operate these assets and facilities, the compensation that must be paid
to the state, and the respective responsibilities of the parties. The key feature of a lease
arrangement is that the lessee assumes the full commercial risk for operating the assets. In
addition to the lease payment, the lessee is normally obliged to maintain and repair the
assets in use or to share in that cost in accordance with an agreed schedule. Unlike the
management contractor, who assumes no financial responsibility for the enterprise's
operation, the lessee suffers from direct financial repercussions if it fails to use the leased
assets or facilities in an efficient manner and to ensure effective management.
Management Contract: The management contract involves assuming responsibility for
managing the enterprise for compensation. Unlike other arrangements providing for
management services or technical assistance, the management group is given full
management control and the authority to manage. The contractor derives its authority from
this control and must manage the operation within that confine. Whereas a lessee pays the
state for the use of assets or facilities, a management contractor is paid by the state for its
management or other skills. While the contractor might be given extensive management
powers and operational control, it has no financial exposure and receives its fee regardless
of the profitability of the enterprise. (Where performance or incentive payments are part of
the overall compensation package, these are forfeited if the level of performance or other
criteria are not met.) The public enterprise continues to bear the full commercial risk and is
responsible for all working capital and debt financing. To this extent, the state is not
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relieved of any financial burden and, in fact, takes on a higher short-term burden in the
form of the management fee. The advantage of this method, however, is that ownership is
retained, a defined degree of control is maintained, and a high level of management and
other skills is injected into the enterprise, thus enhancing its overall efficiency and
profitability.
Leases and management contracts are the principal method of privatisation of an activity in
situations where the privatisation of the ownership of the assets or public enterprise is not
appropriate. Both, however, offer advantages that may in certain cases make their
application preferable to other methods of privatisation. The lease may also be used as an
intermediate solution aimed at making a subsequent sale possible. Similarly, the
management contract may also be an intermediate solution in turning an enterprise around
for subsequent privatisation of ownership.
When selecting a method of privatisation, several factors should be normally taken into
consideration. These include the objectives of the privatisation programme, the size of the
public enterprise to be privatised, the share of the public sector in the national economy,
and the like. Vuylsteke (1988) lists seven factors influencing the methods and procedures
for privatisation: (i) the objectives of the government, (ii) the current organisational form
of the public enterprise, (iii) the financial condition and record of performance of the public
enterprise, (iv) the sector of activity of the public enterprise, (v) the ability to mobilise
private sector resources, (vi) the degree of development of the capital market, and (vii)
socio-political factors. In fact, no generalisation can be made as to the relative weight of
these elements in choosing how to privatise. Regarding this matter, UNCTAD (1995)
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recommends that given the strong links between privatisation objectives and the method of
privatisation, it is clear that a consensus on the objectives to be achieved must first be
reached and that this should have been done as part of developing a strategy to guide the
privatisation programme.
4.6 OWNERSHIP AND INCENTIVE STRUCTURES
The effect of privatisation is to substitute shareholder for governmental monitoring and
control of the firm's management and operation. Under private ownership, management is
directly responsible to shareholders, although it might be constrained in its actions by a
regulatory agency. Under public ownership, management is monitored by government
which, in turn, can be regarded as an agent of the voting population. As a result of the
change in property rights, there exists a different structure of incentives for management
and hence to changes in both managerial behaviour and company performance (Vickers
and Yarrow, 1988).
Hartley and Parker (1991) suggest a theoretical framework for analysing the effects of
privatisation with particular emphasis on the differences in incentives between public and
private organisations. Incentive problems arise as a result of a lesser ability of owners to
monitor managers. This is a problem that arises when the objectives of principal and agents
diverge. The property rights and public choice literature give insights into this problem.
According to property rights theory (Alchian, 1965; De Alessi, 1980; Barzel, 1989), an
organisation may be considered a team of factor suppliers with contracts established and
monitored by management. Where management prevents 'slacking' in the team, the result
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is higher productivity and lower costs. To perform this task well, however, management
requires an incentive. The main argument here is that private organisations, in wfiich rights
to profits are clearly defined, will perform better than public organisations, where the rights
are diffused and uncertain. In this theory the source of inefficiency in public firms lies in
the attenuation of property rights. In the archetypal capitalist firm the entrepreneur has a
direct interest in the most efficient use of the firm's resources because his or her income is
the residual after production costs are deducted from revenues.
This view is supported by public choice theory (Niskanen, 1971; Dunsire et aL, 1988;
Borooah, 1996), which is concerned with the nature of decision-making within
government. Politicians and government bureaucrats pursue their own self-interest rather
than the public interest or social welfare. Policies are arranged to maximise votes and
departmental budgets are expanded so that bureaucrats benefit from better jobs and higher
salaries. Since bureaucrats tend to have more information than taxpayers on the
consequences of budgetary changes, this asymmetry of information inhibits public
monitoring of spending and provides fertile ground for public sector trade unions to inflate
wage demands and protect over-manning.
Although there are different nuances to the property rights and public choice theories, they
obviously complement each other. A common element in property rights and public choice
literature is that, in the absence of the profit motive, government departments will tend to
pursue goals such as budget maximisation, risk aversion, over-manning and non-optimal
pricing, employment and investment (Hartley and Parker, 1991). In contrast to this
argument, Posner (1984) states that politicians and bureaucrats do indeed pursue the public
114
Chapter 4
	
Privatisation Theory arid Evidence
interest, and that, like their private sector counterparts, government employees may find
satisfaction 'in ajob well done'.
Although some distinctions can be drawn between private and public sector organisations
as in the above arguments, such a simple framework runs the risk of overlooking
significant differences between organisational forms of enterprises within each sector. It
could be important to highlight such differences when classifying enterprises for
performance comparison.
Discussion on the differences between public and private sectors can start simply with the
point that the objectives of the owners are different in the two cases. In private ownership,
it is generally assumed that owners are interested in the financial performance of the firm
such as profit maximisation. In respect of public ownership, in contrast, the appropriate
specification of objectives is less clear. The assumption generally made is that the objective
will be to maximise social welfare, but this assumption leads to the problem of how social
welfare should be defined and measured, but is usually represented as the sum of consumer
and producer surpluses.
In addition, except where the scale of operation is very small, typical commercial
enterprises, whether private or public, tend to be characterised by the delegation of
decisions to managers and other employees. Although privatisation changes the objectives
of owners, it does not in any immediate way alter the objectives of those to whom
decisions are delegated (Jasinski and Yarrow, 1996). The owners of both public and private
enterprises, therefore, face a similar agency problem: how managers and other employees
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can be encouraged to act in ways that contribute to the owners' objectives. This is the
problem of incentives or of monitoring.
4.6.1 Private Ownership and Incentives
The principal-agent problem arises wherever one person (the principal) hires another
person (the agent) to make decisions. Since the agent may make different decisions from
those of the principal, the motivation of this agent must be taken into account. The
principal (shareholders) then needs to provide incentives to the agent (managers) to ensure
that the agents do, in fact, act in the principal's interests. There are, however, two main
problems at this point (Yarrow, 1986). First, monitoring activities by one owner confer
external benefits on others, and thus there is a tendency towards sub-optimal levels of
monitoring, which gives rise to a free rider problem with regard to shareholder monitoring.
Second, the arrangement gives rise to asymmetric information, i.e., managers typically
know more about the firm's opportunities than owners. Although shareholders could
formulate and impose optimal profit-related incentive schemes, these are unlikely to
reward a manager with the full incremental benefits of extra effort.
Adam Smith (1776) understood the basic conflict between owners (principal) and
managers (agent) in his book the Wealth ofNation as follows:
"The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the
managers rather of other people's money than their own, it cannot
well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery
frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man,
they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their
master's honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from
having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail,
more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company"
116
Chapter 4	 Privatisation Theory and Evidence
By using the Royal African Company, the Hudson Bay Company, and the East India
Company as examples, Smith (1776) mentioned some of the consequences of management
by non-owners, which provide an important starting point for the principal-agent problem.
The incentive characteristics under two different ownership structures are suggested by
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) who developed two versions of the basic principal-agent
model. Bishop and Thompson (1992) explored this model further.
Let a and 0 be the agent's action, which may represent his level of effort, and the state of
the world, let x(a, 6) represent the outcome of the agent's action given 0, and let y and y(x)
be a function of the observed outcomes (the principal's action to the agent) and the
incentive scheme for the agent respectively. The principal cannot observe a or 0
individually, but he or she can observe the outcome x(a, 6), thus conducting his or her own
action accordingly, e.g., a remuneration to the agent as an incentive. In this circumstance, a
salient decision to be made by the principal is to choose y(x), which indicates the incentive
scheme for the agent. The principal, however, faces two constraints when choosing the
scheme: (i) the agent tends to behave in a self-interested way given the incentive scheme,
(ii) the incentive scheme must be an appealing reward for the agent to be willing to
participate in the project with the principal. The two different models are developed by the
distinction of whether the agent is able or unable to observe 6 at the time when he or she
chooses an action.
In the first model, where the agent cannot observe 6, thus selecting a to maximise his or
her expected utility given y(x). The agent's attitude toward risk is involved in decision
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making. If the agent is risk-neutral, the principal receives a flat amount from the agent
whatever happens. In other words, the agent bears all the risk, but being risk-neutral, he
does not mind that, incentives are perfect, and there is no monitoring problem. If the agent
has a risk aversion, an optimal condition will be achieved when the principal offers the
agent an insurance against adverse circumstances. This diminishes the incentives for the
agent, since he or she gains only part of the benefit which arises from his extra efforts.
Consequently, the asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent can cause
a surplus.
The second model imposes that the agent is able to observe 9 before making up his or her
mind on an action. The strategy available to the agent given the incentive scheme y(x) will
be a function a(9), since the most rewarding action will depend on 9. As is the case of the
first model, the principal must also guarantee that the incentive provision is attractive
enough to the agent to want to take part in a project.
Several applications of principal-agent theory can be made (e.g. Rees, 1985; Sappington,
1991). These include relationships between regulators and firm managers, employers and
employees, lenders and borrowers, landlords and tenants, insurers and the insured, and tax
authorities and households.
Aichian and Demsetz (1972) mention that changes in the number of principals and in the
distribution of shareholding can rapidly take place in a conventional large company. The
shares of the company are held by a number of shareholders, each of whom possesses a
relatively small portion of the total equity of the company. The shares are marketable as
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well, and thus the property right of a shareholder can be changed at any time by
transferring his shares to others, hence closing his relationship with the company. Under
these circumstances, the management of the company will be restricted by the following
three participants in capital markets (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, p. 11):
• the firm's shareholders;
• other investors or their agents (e.g. managers of other
companies); and
• the firm's creditors (including lenders at fixed interest)
These three groups have their impacts on managerial incentives: (i) the shareholders of a
firm are seeking contractual arrangements with the management to maximise their own
payoffs, which results in problems of shareholder monitoring, (ii) other investors purchase
the firm's shares as an overture to an effort for reshaping contractual arrangements in
existence, thus causing the threat of takeovers and (iii) the creditors want to change
managerial status in the case of threatened or actual default, which can create the threat of
bankruptcy.
In respect of private ownership, the threats of takeover and bankruptcy become obviously
crucial to management since these generate incentives for managers to act in the interests
of owners. By purchasing shares on the market, an individual or firm can quickly
concentrate ownership and wrest control of the target company from its incumbent
management. This possibility gives rise to a potentially powerful incentive effect. If the
performance of a management is poor then the share price of the firm will drop and the
returns from a takeover raid designed to introduce a new management will increase. The
threat of replacement, as a consequence, serves as a disciplining factor on incumbent
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managements. Unfortunately, however, there are strong grounds for believing that the
market for company control exhibits a number of significant imperfections. The
marketability of property rights does not correct the market failure arising from dispersed
shareholdings. For instance, a small shareholder can neglect the consequences of his or her
selling and holding decision on the outcome of a takeover, and, if the bid is expected to
succeed, will prefer to hold in order to take part in the profit gains accruing from the
change in control. If enough shareholders behave in this way, the takeover will fail. Singh
(1975) conducted extensive empirical research to find the relationship between company
performance and takeover, and found evidence that the threat of involuntary takeover is not
strongly related to a given management's relative profit performance.
In summary, private enterprises may be subject to a variety of capital market pressures not
faced by public counterparts, and these pressures will, in turn, be dependent on the nature
of the financial institutions in the economy. The privatisation of industrial enterprises
might mean very little, therefore, if the government continued to dominate the economy's
financial system (Jasinski and Yarrow, 1996). In countries which do not have a
sophisticated stock market and banking system, one of the objectives of privatisation may
be to strengthen private capital market institutions. What is crucial, on the other hand, is a
case-by-case approach to the incentive problem that allows for some quantification of the
various factors that are relevant to the principal-agent relationships.
4.6.2 Public Ownership and Incentives
According to the argument of Stiglitz (1988), the main difference between public and
private enterprises is concerned with incentives, both organisational and individual. In
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terms of the organisational incentives, public enterprises differ from private enterprises in
two important ways: (i) they do not need to worry about bankruptcy, and (ii) they usually
do not have to worry about competition. In terms of individual incentives, on the other
hand, the differences come from the incentive structures facing government employees,
that is, (i) managers in public enterprises seldom have pay structures that are as closely
related to profit as managers in private ones, (ii) it is generally very difficult to fire
government employees, and this attribute of security is often cited by potential employees
as one of the more desirable features of government employment.
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) identif' the most obvious differences in the relationships
between managers and their immediate principals, by comparing public ownership with
private. The differences arise from the facts that (i) the principaLs do not typically seek to
maximise profits, (ii) there are no marketable ordinary shares in the firm, and hence no
market for company control, and (iii) there is no direct equivalent to the bankruptcy
constraint on financial performance.
The politicians and bureaucrats responsible for monitoring public enterprises can
themselves be viewed as agents of the wider public (the principals). The incentives for
politicians to act in the best interests of the public will depend on factors such as the nature
of the relevant political system, which varies over time and from place to place. More
importantly, incentives to act in the public interest can be expected to be generally weak. In
addition to the difficulty of defining the underlying objectives, there exist very severe free
rider problems in monitoring politicians and bureaucrats. Elections only occur at long
intervals, and when the opportunity to vote comes, it usually involves casting a single vote
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on a whole bundle of issues in an election where the performance of particular public
enterprises is likely to be only a minor factor. Moreover, even where more sophisticated
procedures are available to reveal public preferences, voters may have only sketchy
information on the performance of public enterprises.
Under public ownership, the agency problem may lead to political discretion (Jasinski and
Yarrow, 1996). Political decision makers will be able to introduce their own agendas into
the process. For example, bureaucrats may pursue the goal of expanding their own
departments, while politicians will be much more concerned about their political careers
and their individual and party electoral prospects. This phenomenon implies that the
objectives of political decision makers can be expected to deviate significantly from social
welfare objectives, with the extent of the deviation being influenced by certain social and
political contexts. While the mechanism of the 'invisible hand' indicates that, in the
absence of maj or externalities, competition will tend to bring profit objectives into
alignment with social objectives, there is no equivalent mechanism to bring political
objectives into a similar alignment. The divergence between political and social welfare
objectives reinforces earlier results suggesting that private enterprises can be characterised
as superior (in terms of economic efficiency) in conditions of competition where major
externalities are absent (De Alessi, 1980; Fare eta!., 1985; Jasinski and Yarrow, 1996).
In appropriate circumstances, however, hierarchical arrangements can lead to more
efficient monitoring than that of the capital markets. Government monitoring has two
potential advantages over the market one (Yarrow, 1986): (i) it does not encounter the
public goods problem associated with dispersed shareholding, and (ii) it can take
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immediate account of deviations between social and private returns in products and factor
markets. In other words, public ownership provides an instrument for correcting failures in
the markets for products, factors and corporate control. This view frequently underpins the
case for public ownership.
Figure 4. 1 A Public Sector Monitoring Hierarchy
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Vickers and Yarrow (1988, p. 152)
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) point to four developments in public policy which have
provided a means for enhancing the performance of the public sector. These include (i) the
introduction of greater competitive pressure on public enterprises that have enjoyed
protected market positions, (ii) the creation of specialised regulatory agencies entrusted by
government with duties in respect of price controls and the promotion of competition
similar to, but stronger than, those afforded to the regulatory bodies that were later
established as part of the privatisation programme, (iii) the creation of a specialised agency
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for the sole purpose of conducting efficiency audits on the nationalised industries and
responsible directly to parliament rather than to the government, and (iv) the more
widespread use of performance-related incentive schemes for the managements of public
enterprises. Figure 4.1 illustrates the type of monitoring hierarchy which might result from
these changes.
4.7 COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE
UNDER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
4.7.1 Performance Indicators	 -
Despite the widespread adoption of privatisation measures in recent years, knowledge on
the impact of privatisation is rather limited. To some extent, this reflects a failure on the
part of policy makers to specif' clearly the objectives of privatisation before
implementation. It also reflects a paucity of performance indicators which can be applied
systematically across enterprises and industries to allow a comparative analysis of
performance to be undertaken. It is essential, therefore, to have a system of impact
evaluation which is widely applied and to provide a systematic and practical analytical
framework to assess the results of privatisation.
The analysis of the effects of privatisation encounters several methodological constraints.
The basic question is simple enough: 'is the economy better or worse off after
privatisation?' A comprehensive answer to this question, however, requires answers to the
following sub-questions: (i) what variables should be used to assess the impact of
privatisation on the economy?, (ii) what changes occur as a result of privatisation? and (iii)
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how are different changes to be ranked and valued? Each of these questions raises serious
methodological difficulties (UNCTAD, 1995).
In general, performance can be defined in terms of success in achieving stated objectives.
The case where the multiple objectives are set for privatisation requires a range of
performance indicators for assessment. IJNCTAD (1995, pp. 262-264) suggests that these
indicators can be grouped into two broad categories, covering macro and micro level
performance. Macro indicators measure impacts on the economy-level variables, while
micro ones measure the input and output results at the enterprise level. The impact of
privatisation on the macro economy can be measured, amongst other things, by the
following:
• an increased share of the private sector in the economy,
or alternatively, a decline in the government's share;
• a reduction in fiscal imbalance through increased revenue
and the reduction of the government's budget deficit;
• the development of domestic capital markets;
• improvement in the external trade balance; and
• changes in the level of employment.
These impacts can be measured and their relative importance depend mainly on the
primary objectives of the privatisation programme set by the government concerned.
Moreover, there are methodological difficulties in distinguishing the effects of privatisation
from other factors influencing the variables.
In the case of micro performance indicators, there are four types to be categorised:
• productive efficiency;
• cost efficiency;
• financial profitability; and
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• real prices
Productive Efficiency is concerned with efficiency in input use. Two approaches have been
used to compute productive efficiency. The first approach estimates a production function
for the 'best practice' firm, and then this estimation is used to calculate a productive
efficiency index which compares the efficiency of each firm to that of the best practice firm
(a more detailed discussion of production functions follows in Chapter 6). The other
approach makes use of productivity ratios, including total factor productivity, which is the
ratio of total output to total factor input, as well as partial productivity ratios for the
measurement of output as a ratio of a single factor input. Whichever approach is used, the
assessment of the impact of privatisation will require the comparison of productive
efficiency pre- and post-privatisation.
Cost Efficiency also has two main methods for its measurement. The first method estimates
a cost function for the firm in the industry, then attempts to determine whether there is a
difference in cost efficiency after privatisation. The second calculates cost per unit of
output directly, then compares cost per unit of output under public and private ownership.
The main limitation of cost efficiency measures is that differences in cost will reflect
differences in input prices, as well as differences in efficiency. Differences in cost may also
reflect the influence of changes in the scale of activity, if ratios to scale are not constant.
Financial Profitability is a commonly used measure of performance. Despite its wide use,
it is important to note that profitability does not necessarily imply efficiency. If it has
market power or if it benefits from preferential arrangements such as subsidised inputs or
exemptions from duties on imported inputs it is possible for an inefficient firm to be
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profitable. On the other hand, efficient firms may exhibit low profitability due to controls
on the prices of their outputs. Another problem is that differences in profitability can arise
from differences in accounting conventions, particularly the treatment of items such as
depreciation, inflation and subsidies, which are all subject to variation.
Real Prices charged for the output of the privatised enterprises can be compared pre- and
post-privatisation as a micro performance indicator of the impact on consumers.
Any attempt to judge privatisation programmes is confronted by the methodological
problem of determining how much of any change is attributable to the programme and how
much to exogenous changes in market conditions and institutions. These problems are
compounded by the problems of data availability and measurement.
4.7.2 The Central Hypothesis
Hartley et al. (1991) and Parker (1994) attempt to set up a framework for testing the
importance of ownership under the central hypothesis, illustrated in Figure 4.2.'
Point A represents the position of a firm which is directly controlled by a government
department. It is politically controlled and there are no tradable shares, hence we would
expect from the public choice and property rights theories that efficiency will be low. Point
B represents an activity undertaken by a government agency which has some, if limited,
autonomy from the political process. Public corporations can be placed at point C. They
have more autonomy than quasi-governmental agencies.
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Figure 4. 2 A Conceptual Mapping of Efficiency Improvements
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Source: Parker (1994, P. 153)
Points D, E and F correspond to forms of ownership in the private sector. Point D includes
those private sector firms which are close to the public sector because of government
funding or a reliance on government contracts. This might diminish incentives to be
efficient. Point E is a joint stock company, while point F represents private ownership
where property rights are least attenuated, particularly the owner-manager company.
With regard to the vertical axis, movement upwards corresponds to a shift away from
monopoly towards competition and, thus, greater product market pressure to be efficient.
Figure 4.3, therefore, provides a mapping of the expected relationship between ownership
and performance, drawn from the theories of public choice and property rights, and
competition and performance. The schema implies the following:
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• Changes in ownership involving movement away from political control towards private
ownership, but with no change in competition, will be associated with improved
efficiency due to a change in the capital market (X to Y).
. Increased competition in the absence of a change in ownership will be associated with
improved efficiency due to a change in the product market (X to Z).
• Changes in ownership involving a movement away from private ownership towards
public ownership will be associated with reduced efficiency due to a change in the
capital market (Y to X).
• Less competition, even where there is no change in ownership, will lead to a reduction
in efficiency (Z to X).
The largest efficiency gains are likely to be associated with movements from X to W; that
is, towards private ownership and more competition. A movement from W to X, involving
greater political control and less competition, is likely to lead to a significant deterioration
in efficiency. Movements either way between Z and Y imply an ambiguous result caused
by the conflict between changes in the product and capital market coistraints on
managerial behaviour. From this discussion the central hypothesis of Parker (1994) can be
derived that changes in ownership away from political control and towards private
ownership, especially when also associated with increased competition, will lead to an
appreciable improvement in efficiency.
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4.7.3 Empirical Evidence
To test the hypothesis that ownership affects economic performance, Parker (1994) selects
twelve relevant ownership status to analyse. After testing 12 organisations by using several
performance indicators, Parker (1994) produces Table 4.3 with the conclusion as follows:
"It is always dangerous to draw firm conclusions from what was
clearly a small sample. However, the results do not contradict the
view that privatisation improves performance and they provide some
support for the argument that political intervention in an
organisation' s operations damages efficiency"
Table 4. 3 Ownership Status and Performance
(Did performance improve after changes in ownership?)
Organisations	 Types of Change	 Date	 LP	 TFP	 EF	 FR
British Airways	 Public corporation to	 1980-87	 0	 0	 0	 0
__________________ public limited company ___________ _______ ________ _______ ______
London Transport	 Local government to	 June 1984	 0	 0	 0	 0
(1984)	 public corporation	 __________ _______ ________ _______ ______
National Freight	 Public corporation to	 Feb 1982	 0	 0	 0	 0
__________________ public limited company	 __________ _______ ________ _______ ______
Royal Mint	 Government department 	 April 1975	 0	 0	 0	 NA
__________________ to trading fund
	 __________ _______ ________ _______ ______
British Aerospace	 Public corporation to	 Feb 1981	 0	 0?	 0?	 0?
(privatisation)	 public limited company 	 ___________ ________ ________ ________ ______
HMSO	 Government department 	 April 1980	 0	 X	 0	 0?
to trading fund
	 ___________
Post Office	 Government department 	 April 1969	 0	 Unclear	 0?	 0?
Telecommunicationsto public corporation 	 ___________ _______ ________ _______ ______
Post Office	 Government department 	 April 1969	 0	 Unclear	 X	 0
Postalto public corporation	 ___________ ________ ________ ________ ______
British Aerospace	 Public limited company	 Feb 1981	 0	 Unclear	 0?	 X
(nationalisation)	 to public ownership	 ___________ _______ ________ _______ ______
Royal Ordnance	 Government department	 July 1974	 X	 X?	 X	 0
Factories	 to trading fund	 ___________
London Transport	 Public corporation to
	
Jan 1970	 X	 0	 X	 X
(1970)	 (local) government	 ___________ ________ ________ ________ ______
Rolls-Royce	 Public limited company	 Feb 1971	 X	 X	 X	 X
topublic ownership	 ___________ _______ ________ _______ ______
Notes: (1) Lt'-Labour Iroc1uctivity; J11-'-iotai tactor I-'rocluctivity; LI-mp1oyment Function; iJ-Financiat
Ratios; (2) 0 means 'improved' while X 'reduced', and NA no data available; (3) A question mark
after the result indicates that the result was not entirely clear.
Source: Derived from Parker (1994, pp. 155 and 165)
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Moreover, Pryke (1982) concludes that, whatever the reason may be, the record of the
activities being investigated suggests that public ownership leads to performance which is
relatively poor by the standards of private enterprises. In contrast, Hutchinson (1991), by
applying regression analysis to the labour productivity and profitability of the aerospace
and electronics and electrical industries, reveals that the empirical evidence gives mixed
results as to the effects of ownership on the performance of firms in the UK. That is, public
ownership was found to correspond with higher levels of growth in labour productivity,
while private ownership gave rise to higher levels of profits. This result suggests that the
privatisation of public enterprises is likely to have a positive effect on the profitability
performance of the affected firm, and a negative impact on the firm's labour productivity.
By surveying the empirical literature up to around 1980, Miliward (1982) concludes that
there appear to be no general grounds for believing that managerial (or productive)
efficiency was lower in public firms. Vickers and Yarrow (1988), after a close examination
of the material on which Millward (1982) based his article, suggest the slightly different
conclusion that privately owned firms tend, on average, to be the more internally (or
productively) efficient when competition in product markets is effective. Miliward and
Parker (1983), after testing several industries in several countries, draw the conclusion that
there is no systematic evidence that public enterprises are less cost effective than private
firms. The poorer performance in this respect, exhibited in the studies of refuse collection
and water supply, has to be balanced against the absence of any significant difference in
Canadian railways and Australian airlines and the superior performance in US electric
power. With respect to electricity supply, in fact, several economists (e.g. Meyer, 1975;
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Fare et al., 1985) have concluded that publicly owned utilities typically have lower unit
costs than privately owned ones.
Table 4.4 provides a summary of the empirical evidence on the relative performance of
different ownership types. Although the table suggests an 'edge' for the private sector, the
results vary considerably across the sectors.
Table 4. 4 Results on Relative Efficiency of Public and Private Enterprises
Sectors	 Public Company	 No Difference or 	 Private Company
__________________________	 More Efficient 	 Ambiguous Results	 More Efficient
Electric Utilities	 3	 5	 6
Refuse Collection 	 1	 3	 5
Water Supply	 2	 1	 4
Health-related Services 	 -	 1	 11
Airlines	 -	 3	 2
Railroads	 -	 2	 -
Financial Institutions	 -	 1	 1
Fire Services	 -	 -	 1
Nonrail Transit	 -	 -	 3
Total No.	 6	 16	 33
Note: Figures in cells indicate the number of empirical results available in each inaustry sectol!.
Source: Derived from Boardman arid Vining (1989, p. 6)
From the above discussion, the evidence does not establish a clear-cut superiority of
private ownership over its public counterpart. A large number of studies, e.g., Yarrow
(1986), Vickers and Yarrow (1988, 1991), Bishop and Kay (1988, 1989), Bishop and
Thompson (1992), Rowthorn and Chang (1993), Parker (1994), and Jackson and Price
(1994), conclude that competitive environment, regulatory policy and organisational
reforms can be more important determinants of economic performance than ownership per
Se.
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With regard to this matter, it might be worth quoting the following two comments:
"Competition, which is conceptually distinct from ownership, can
greatly improve monitoring possibilities, and hence incentives for
productive efficiency.....But product market competition, or even
the threat of it, does not always exist.....Regulation for
competition may then be a desirable complement to privatisation."
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1991)
"Economists are now generally agreed that simply changing the
ownership of assets is not sufficient, and indeed is not even
necessary, to improve efficiency. What is important is the threat of
competition and, therefore, market conditions and perhaps the
regulatory regime." (Bishop and Thompson, 1992)
In summary, privatisation is a controversial policy. Its supporters and critics base their
cases on a mixture of ideological, political and economic arguments. The highly political
nature of privatisation makes it difficult to assess the truth of many claims made for and
against it. Political bargaining in the process of privatisation, to some extent, seems to
work against the results we expect to achieve: efficiency improvement (Antal-Mokos,
1998). As Liu (1995) points out, the problem of determining the relative efficiencies of
alternative forms of ownership is, therefore, solved through empirical analysis.
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CHAPTER FIVE
PORT PRIVATISATION IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, a number of countries have undertaken or considered institutional
reform in the port industry in an effort to improve efficiency and performance and to
reduce the government's financial and administrative responsibility for the industry.
Institutional restructuring in the port sector can consist of various methods, but it should
have a single overall objective: i.e., to make the port responsive to the market and thus
satisf' client needs (UNCTAD, 1995). Organisational changes have been introduced
through measures such as commercialisation, deregulation and privatisation so that the role
of government and the public sector has been significantly reduced. At the same time, the
private sector has been encouraged to take part in port activities more actively than ever
before.
The participation of the private sector in port management and operation has, become the
norm rather than the exception (Fairplay, 1996). The expansion of the private sector's role
in the ownership, management and operation of ports is one of the major issues in today's
port industry. A report by Port Development International (1993) surveys 31 countries
where some form of port privatisation has taken place. Those countries which still have a
state controlled port sector are facing a new wave in port administration and operation.
This new wave can be considered a revolution in port operations and a development
yielding the benefits to a national economy.
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Following the review of privatisation theory contained in the previous chapter and, in this
context, this chapter critically analyses the privatisation principles applicable to, and
practices taking place in, the port industry. The context of port privatisation is evaluated
following on the motivation and rationale for port privatisation, current patterns of port
administration and ownership are addressed, and the arguments presented for and against
port privatisation in principle and practice. The discussion shall move on to the several
functions of ports and models of port administration, which are represented in a 'port
function matrix'. The role of the port authority in this era of privatisation is assessed and is
then followed by an analysis of the privatisation methods applicable to the port industry.
Finally, this chapter contains a review of how such privatisation programmes have worked
in practice, placing particular attention on the UK experience.
5.2 THE PORT PRIVATISATION CONTEXT
Before going into the main theme of port privatisation any further, it might be helpful to
understand the basic functions of a port. In general, a port can be regarded as acting as a
gateway through which goods and passengers are transferred between ships and the shore
(Goss, 1 990a). In other words, a port exists to provide terminal facilities and services for
ships, and transfer facilities and services for water-borne goods and passengers. Flere
(1967, p. 9) describes the fundamental characteristics of a port as follows:
"It [a port] should be able to accommodate ships on the one hand and
inland transport vehicles on the other. That is why every port is
equipped to look two ways - outwards over the sea or the waterway and
inwards over its economic hinterland."
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From the above note, it can be said that the most important function of a port is to ensure
the transfer of goods from inland transport to maritime transport and vice versa. Jansson
and Shneerson (1982, pp. 9-10) provide a schematic of the entire process in a port
subdivided into seven major partial processes as follows:
• passage of ship through approach channel up to quay;
• discharge of cargo from ship's hold to quay;
• moving cargo from quay to transit storage;
• transit storage;
• moving cargo from transit storage to the loading platform;
• loading cargo on to inland transport vehicle; and
• departure of land vehicle from port area
From the above processes, as Suykens (1983) suggests, the traditional economic functions
of a port can be classified into three types: the commercial function which is increasingly
developing into a storage and physical distribution function, the cargo-handling function
which can be seen as the very basic function of a port, and the industrial function which
has mainly influenced the Continental European ports.
Ports constitute a critical link in the overall trading chain. Thus, their level of efficiency
and performance determines, to a large extent, a country's competitiveness. To achieve and
maintain a competitive edge in the international markets, however, the country needs to
understand, above all, the underlying factors influencing port competitiveness and
continually assess the performance of its own port sector in comparison to other ports in
the world. Tongzon (1995) identifies the various determinants of port performance and
efficiency by using multiple linear regression of a sample of 23 international ports. His
research supports the argument that port performance is influenced by several factors, some
of which are beyond the control of port authorities, such as the level of economic activity
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and geographical location. There are, however, two variables which ports are able to
control: port charges and terminal efficiency. Finally, he concludes that the single most
significant contributor to port performance is terminal efficiency. This finding supports the
view that port and terminal efficiency has a considerable bearing on the success of a
country's imports and exports, and that higher port efficiency might result in lower prices,
and should certainly help to ensure a nation's products are more competitive in
international markets.
As a means of improving port and terminal efficiency and hence increasing overall
performance, a number of countries worldwide have implemented and considered, amongst
other measures, the policy of port privatisation.
5.2.1 Port Administration, Ownership and Privatisation
The administration of a port, its form and structure are obviously of importance to all
aspects of organisation. The selection of an appropriate form of port administration is a
matter of port policy. The basic system of port administration, whether it is to be an
autonomous or a centrally controlled administration, should be determined by the public or
national port authority (UNCTAD, 1985). There are, however, some organisational
elements of the port administration responsible to the local port authority, as listed in Table
5.1.
The main duty of port administration is to organise in a proper and efficient way the
complicated and diversified flow of traffic through the port (Nagorski, 1972). There are a
number of alternative forms of port administration and ownership. Stehli (1978) and Goss
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(1986) note that although most of the physical methods used within ports (e.g. loading and
discharging) vary little between ports, the systems of administration and ownership vary
considerably. Some countries have port systems which are managed and operated under the
control of their central governments; others have a more decentralised system such as those
under the control of regional governments and municipal bodies. Still others have mixed
systems with no clear pattern.
Table 5. 1 Check List of Organisational Elements for a Port Administration
I. Organ isational structure;
2. Administrative procedures;
3. Cost analysis and control;
4. Traffic structure;
5. Consignment documentation and customs procedures;
6. Electronic data processing and telecommunications systems;
7. Data collection, analysis and dissemination procedures;
8. Staffing and manning policies;
9. Staffing selection procedures;
10.Training programmes; and
11.Marketing and public relations (including the education of potential users of a proposed new
facility)	 ________
Source: UNCTAD (1985, p. 17)
It can be said, therefore, that there is no standard model for the best possible form of
ownership and organisational structure, and ports adopt a variety of different administrative
systems, management and operational styles. Diversity, rather than similarity, prevails in
terms of port administration and ownership.
Another difference which can be observed among port administrative systems is the extent
to which port authorities responsible for controlling ports are actually directly involved in
port management and operations. The management and operation of most ports in the
world, as Thomas (1976) points out, is vested in a port authority. Focusing on the UK,
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Douglas and Geen (1993) describe several different types of port or harbour authorities',
highlighting the main difference between their functions. Generally speaking, in the UK, in
addition to national (or publicly owned and operated) ports, there are three main types of
port ownership (Thomas, 1994a). These are trust ports administered by self-governing
statutory bodies, municipal ports owned by local authorities, and company ports which are
effectively privately owned statutory companies.
This diversity in the form of ownership and administration is largely due to the fact that
ports have been developed in different ways in which social, political, cultural,
geographical, commercial and military influences have played a significant part (Thomas,
1 994b). This variation in the styles of port administration and ownership, therefore, is not
surprising. Regarding different ownership styles and administration in ports, the following
comment by Suykens (1985, p. 181) is salient:
"Every administrative system which favours the prosperity of a port and
the expansion of traffic is good, provided that its administration is also
efficient. This means in fact that the application of principles is more
important than the principles themselves since very efficient ports have
been found to have many different systems of administration."
This argument implies that there is no single optimum category for the management,
operation or administration of ports, and that ports should be able to seek ways to improve
their efficiency in given circumstances in order to contribute to the national economy
through the efficient transportation of imports and exports goods.
(1) The words 'port' and 'harbour' seem to be synonymous for most purposes in that a port or harbour is a
place where a vessel can lie in a position of more or less shelter from the elements, with a view to the
loading and discharge of cargo (Douglas and Geen, 1993, p. 1).
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Whatever form ownership takes, as Cass (1996) notes, a port is ultimately in either public
or private ownership unless it is in some form of joint ownership between the two basic
forms. This ownership structure, however, does not establish which activities are
undertaken by the private or public sector within ports. With reference to this issue, it
might be useful to review the way in which ports have been organised by examining the
types of ports.
Prior to any discussion of port types, however, an examination of the various activities in
ports should be carried out. The list of facilities and services provided by ports for ships
and cargo is shown in Table 5.2. According to which entity (private, public or joint) owns
and provides the facilities and services listed in Table 5.2, ports can be categorised into two
distinct types: the comprehensive and the landlord port'.
Table 5. 2 List of Port Facilities and Services
Approach channel, Breakwater, Locks, and Berths
Surfacing, Storage (transit sheds, silos, warehouses), Workshops, Offices
Fixed (ship-to-shore crane, conveyor belts, etc.)
Mobile (straddle carriers, forklifts, tractors, etc.)
Harbour Masters office (radio, VTS ', etc.), Navigational aids, Pilotage, Towage,
Berthing/unberthing, Supplies, Waste reception and disposal, Security
Services to	 Storage,	 Cargo processing, Security
Note: (*) Vessel Traffic System
Source: UNCTAD (1995, p. 27)
(1) Some maritime economists, e.g., Baudelaire (1997), Liu (1995a) and Baird (1995a, 1995b), divide ports
into three different types with a different terminology such as service ports, tool ports and landlord
ports. In general, however, ports are grouped into two types as suggested by the majority of maritime
economists such as Goss (1986, 1990b), Thomas (1994b), Heaver (1995) and Dc Monie (1996). In
definition, service ports have the same functions as comprehensive ports. Tool ports exist somewhere
between comprehensive and landlord ports, and can be regarded as a variant of the landlord ports.
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In the comprehensive port, the public port authority provides all facilities and services
within the port, thus having direct responsibility for the management and operation of port
services and facilities. Independent (private) operators are prohibited from undertaking any
port activity. This kind of port, therefore, can be said to be the 'totally integrated port'. On
the other hand, in the landlord port , the activities of the port authority are limited simply to
providing and maintaining the basic infrastructure and essential services (e.g. fire service,
security etc.), while all the other facilities and services such as the superstructure and
stevedoring labour are provided by independent private (or public) companies. This port
can be called the 'purely regulatory port'.
Cass (1996) describes more specific characteristics of each port along with ownership
structures. The comprehensive port is publicly owned and open to all, but infrastructure,
superstructure and equipment are financed by the port entity, sometimes with government
involvement in investment and loans. Facilities and operations are placed under the direct
control of the port authority, which employs dock labour, owns cranes, superstructure and
infrastructure, and for which the private sector is, at most, simply a, client. The
comprehensive port generally prohibits intra-port competition and is a monopolistic port.
The landlord port is also publicly owned and open to all. The port authority may or may
not be the ultimate owner of land on which the port is established. Part or all of the
superstructure is financed and operated by independent private companies, which employ
dock labour or by a franchised government-owned corporation under a monopoly. There
are also specialised terminals financed by private operators (e.g. dedicated terminals).
146
ChapterS	 Port Privatisation in Principle and Practice
Although it is not difficult to find examples of the above extreme positions, most ports lie
somewhere between comprehensive and landlord ports and operate within a wide range of
different types of port organisation which vary from country to country and sometimes
even within the same country (Goss, 1990b). Although the port applying the landlord
concept is the most common type, it is not possible to identif r one extreme as better than
the other. For example, both the port of Hong Kong, which can be considered
representative of landlord ports, and the port of Singapore, which can be considered a
comprehensive port, are well known for their efficient management and operation.
In simple terms, port ownership can be defined in terms of who provides the port facilities
and services, and port privatisation can be defined as the actual transfer of ownership of
port properties from the public to the private sector or the actual application of private
capital to fund investment in port development and maintenance as well as port activities.
With respect to port ownership and privatisation, Cass (1996, p. 36) notes:
"If privatisation means the transfer of ownership of state assets to the
private sector, then clearly, in the many instances where port
ownership still remains with the state, a new definition of port
privatisation is required. The different forms of port ownership,
between and within countries, particularly public but also private,
does lead to some confusion. But, ultimately, a port will either be in
public or private sector ownership, unless of course it is jointly
owned by both."
5.2.2 Reasons for and Objectives of Port Privatisation
During the last decade, there has been a worldwide trend of institutional restructuring of
the public sector. In the past, political decisions transferred economic activities to the
public sector. Now, however, markets are increasingly acting as a driving force for the
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national and international economy. This trend requires some institutional changes: i.e.,
movement away from economies where the public sector plays a pivotal role. In line with
this changing environment, institutional and organisational reforms in ports are taking
place in a number of countries.
In addition, there is another factor requiring changes. The economic characteristics of the
port industry itself have recently altered. Heaver (1995) points out changes in technologies
as the main factor influencing the structure and competitiveness of the port industry today.
On one hand, the industry has moved away from the state where public capital was
predominantly used to provide common user facilities to the state where more private
funds have been involved in the development and maintenance of ports and terminals
which are designed to serve the logistics requirements of more narrowly defined groups of
shippers. On the other hand, the efficiency of port cargo handling and of ocean and inland
transport services has increased. The development of more specialised facilities has had the
direct result of increasing the effectiveness of competition in the industry.
The technological developments in ports and in the transport industries have had an impact
on the market power of ports as well. Heaver (1995, p. 126) lists the following major
trends as a consequence:
• ships and terminals have become more specialised;
• the efficiency of inland transport systems has increased;
• terminals have been effective in the development of more efficient
throughput capacity;
• terminals are more likely to serve one or a few logistics systems;
• terminals are becoming more capital intensive; and
• private investment in terminals is increasing
148
Chapter 5
	 Port Privatisation in Principle and Practice
Of these developments, the private sector has actively and increasingly been involved in
supplementing and replacing their public counterparts. Frankel (1992, p. 201) notes:
"Port privatisation is not a new concept. Increasing capital intensity in
shipping and related port facility requirements, greater integration of
shipping, port and inland feeder transport, and a higher degree of
concentration in the international transport industry, has caused many
ship or transport operations or cargo owners to get involved in port and
terminal ownership and operations."
Several studies, e.g., Nagorski (1972), Heggie (1974) and Eyre (1990), argue that ports
operated directly by governments or public agencies and owned by the public sector are
more expensive and less efficient, thus leading to less satisfactory results. In general,
public ports appear to set rates on a basis which fails to cover full costs, thus subsidies are
common (Wilder and Pender, 1979).
To overcome such drawbacks of publicly owned and operated ports together with the
recent trends in the port industry, the policy of port privatisation has been implemented and
taken into consideration. Haarymeyer and Yorke (1993) regard 'private sector
participation' as a solution to the many problems faced by US public ports such as the lack
of exposure to full commercial competitive pressures, inefficient operation and working
under undue political interference. Eyre (1990, p. 113) argues that privatisation of a port is
a philosophical cousin to the concepts of deregulation, free trade, laissez-faire and user
pays.
A variety of forces can influence decisions to privatise public ports. Sherman (1995),
UNCTAD (1995) and Frankel (1992) note the principal objectives for port reforms
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including privatisation. Some of these are (i) to enhance the efficiency of port services, (ii)
to find new financial resources for development and maintenance, (iii) to strengthen
entrepreneurial and managerial capacity, (iv) to relieve government's financial and
administrative burden, and (v) to eliminate and/or minimise bureaucratic and political
influence over port management and operation. In addition, economic benefits can be
obtained from introducing more competition into port operations. Based on these
objectives, the most obvious motivations can be categorised into two forces: improvement
in port efficiency and reduction in public expenditure and responsibility.
5.2.3 Arguments For and Against Port Privatisation
While many argue for the benefits and advantages of privatisation mentioned in the
previous section, it is equally obvious that there is a strong argument for giving careful
consideration to whether to privatise or not.
Bassett (1993) and Baird (1995a) suggest various reasons in support of port privatisation.
Since public ports could not pledge their assets to raise capital, they were consequently
constrained in terms of expansion. Privatising the ports could enable them to broaden their
capital base, allowing them to seek and obtain capital from the most appropriate source,
and to invest in new facilities. In addition to this benefit, losing the public status of ports
could allow them to diversif' their activities and increase the level of competition in the
industry.
In contrast, there are a number of drawbacks related to port privatisation programmes. De
Monie (1996) points out four serious deficiencies which such a policy could cause. These
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are: (i) privatisation greatly increases the risk of a port administration disregarding to
statutory 'public service' functions that have been entrusted to it. Private investors and/or
operators tend to favour profit maximisation and cost minimisation. As a result, they may
be inclined to abandon facilities and services which, although socially or environmentally
essential, are less rewarding or that incur expenditure rather than earn revenues, (ii) where
no or only a limited degree of competition exists (e.g. because of the narrow traffic base,
the limited scale of the operations, the port's geographical location, or the lack of an
adequate inland transport network), there is a strong probability that a public monopoly
will be turned into a private one, (iii) a division of responsibilities between a public port
authority and private sector operators may well result in poor co-ordination of investments,
services and operations and lead to reduced efficiency of operations at sea-to-land and
land-to-land interfaces, and (iv) as their priority, private operators may favour the business
interests of their beneficial owners; thus privatisation could lead to discriminatory
treatment of the port's clientele and cormnon users could find themselves in a weaker
negotiating position than those users who are controlled by, associated with or part of the
beneficial owners of the private operating company.
Of these four shortcomings, the first relates to debates on whether services provided by
ports are public or private. Public goods (and services) are defined as those unlikely to be
provided sufficiently, satisfactorily or even at all, by competitive industries; in other words,
that there is a market failure (Goss, 1990c). Evans (1969) argues that it is in the common
interest that a port, as a public utility, is economically protected because of its importance
to the economy. In general, it is difficult to find a private company which provides public
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goods (e.g. national defence) if they cannot be allowed to earn financial revenues from
them.
There are, however, some arguments against the above discussion: i.e., a port can be partly
a public service and partly a commercial activity. Hershman (1988) mentions that ports are
'public' in that the government owns them, statutes set them up and dictates their
objectives, and public subsidies are often provided. Ports, in contrast, are 'private' in that
their management often operates independently, money can be raised from private sources,
revenues can be retained and reinvested, and often there is no dependence on tax revenues.
The private character of public ports derives from the competitive marketplace within
which they operate.
Although port productivity has dramatically improved in UK ports over recent years, this
cannot be attributed directly to privatisation itself. Thomas (1 994a), for instance, has found
that after privatisation any increase in profits was mainly due to property developments
rather than port operations. Iheduru (1993) supports the findings that the 'advocates of
privatisation policies have failed to make a distinction between ownership and
management, and that they also equate private ownership with efficiency. Again, Thomas
(1994b) argues that changing the management culture of a port authority can be achieved
by modif'ing the organisation within the existing institutional framework and the key to
reform lies in changing people's beliefs and values and ensuring that these are compatible
and in harmony with the corporation's objectives. From this argument, a conclusion can be
drawn that port privatisation should be considered and implemented only against the whole
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background of the country, culture, economic and political situation concerned, and that its
constitution and general way of doing things should also be considered.
5.3 PORT FRI VATISATION OPTIONS
Although ports are fundamentally owned and operated by either the public or the private
sector or even as a joint venture by both sectors, and can be classified as being either
comprehensive or landlord ports, as mentioned by several maritime economists (e.g. Goss,
1981; De Monie, 1996), there are few completely privatised ports or even fully public
ones. Furthermore, there is great variation in the jurisdictional forms between the two
different types of ports. This makes it difficult to identify the extent of involvement of both
the public and private sectors in any port. This situation does, however, make it necessary
to distinguish between the alternative approaches to port privatisation.
5.3.1 Three Key Functions of Ports
Baird (1995b, 1997) proposes a framework called a port function matrix, as a model for
port administration. The starting point of this framework is that, regardless of whether a
port in question is in private or public hands, within the port area there will generally be
three essential functions the port must fulfil and provide:
• a regulatory function
• a landowner function
• an operator function
Firstly, the regulatory function of a port can involve substantial powers being given to the
port's management which is public or private, the majority of which will be of a statutory
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nature. This function, in general, may be regarded as the primary role of a port authority.
These powers and responsibilities will be likely to include:
• to maintain the conservancy function;
• to provide vessel traffic management;
• to enforce applicable laws and regulations;
• to license port works; and
• to safeguard port users' interests against the risk of monopoly
formation, and to control natural monopolies
Secondly, in the landowner function, ports control significant land areas. Irrespective of
whether the land area of a port is large or small, however, the essential tasks a port
landowner will be required to undertake include the following:
• to manage and develop the port estate;
• to implement port policies and development strategies;
• to supervise major civil engineering works;
• to co-ordinate port marketing and promotion activities;
• to provide and maintain channels, fairways, breakwaters etc.;
• to provide and maintain locks, turning basins, berths, piers
and wharves; and
• to provide or arrange road and rail access to the port facilities
Thirdly, the operator function is concerned with the physical transfer of goods and
passengers between sea and land. In a comprehensive port, for example, the cargo-handling
activity will be controlled by state-owned organisations, in a landlord port, private
companies will undertake this activity, while a mix of private and public companies may
be involved as well.
According to which of these three functions are the responsibility of public or private
organisations, the matrix, presented in Table 5.3, makes it possible to ascertain the extent
of the influence public and private sectors have within a given port. The matrix presented
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in Table 5.3 also suggests the four main patterns in terms of port administration,
ownership, management and operation, in which a government is able to organise its port
industry.
Table 5.3 Port Function Matrix
Port Models	 Port Functions ________________________
_____________________	 Regulator	 Landowner	 Operator
PUBLIC	 Public	 Public	 Public
PUBLIC/private	 Public	 Public	 Private
PRIVATE/public 	 Public	 Private	 Private
PRIVATE	 Private	 Private	 Private
Source: Baird (1995b, 1997)
5.3.2 Port Administration Models
The models are divided into four types of port administration: the PUBLIC port, the
PUBLIC/private port with the public sector dominant, the PRIVATE/public port with the
private sector dominant, and the FRI VA TE port.
Firstly, a P UBLIC port, which can be also referred to as a comprehensive port, is a port in
which all three functions are controlled by the government or public authority. While the
PUBLIC port model is perhaps the most inefficient of the four alternatives as claimed by
advocates for port privatisation, it has also paradoxically proved to be one of the most
efficient approaches as can be seen in the case of the port of Singapore. In fact, while still
preferred by some countries, the PUBLIC port seems no longer to be regarded as a realistic
option for most governments, particularly where major new capital investment projects are
under consideration. As a vivid illustration of this, the organisational restructuring, or
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corporatisation, of the port of Singapore is currently being considered and is expected to be
realised at the end of 1997 (Port Development International, 1997)'.
Secondly, in the PUBLIC/private port, the operator function is controlled by the private
sector, with both the regulatory and landowner functions remaining in the hands of the
government. This type of port, therefore, can be called a variant of the landlord port and is
common in Continental Europe and North America. The port of Rotterdam is a typical
example, where terminals are leased out to private terminal operators. Similarly, Pusan's
Shinsundae container terminal falls into this type of port administration structure. The
popularity of PUBLIC/private ports or the landlord ports is likely to continue increasIng
because of their ability to allow the benefits of private sector management in the efficient
handling of cargo to be combined with public and common user interests (Saundry and
Tumbull, 1997). In Far East Asia, several private companies (e.g., International Container
Terminal Services Inc., which manages and operates the Manila international container
terminal under a 25-year contract) have obtained concessions for terminal operations
(Fairplay, 1996). This arrangement means that the port in question is still in public
ownership, but individual terminals are leased to independent private companies.
Thirdly, in the PRIVATE/public port, both the landowner and operator functions are in
private hands, while the regulatory function remains in the public sector. A classic example
of this type is the port of Hong Kong, where private companies build their own terminals
(I) The Port of Singapore Authority is no longer the statutory body in charge of controlling the port; on I
October 1997, the Singapore government established the PSA Corporation Ltd., which is a wholly
owned subsidiary of state-owned Temasek Holdings (Lloyd's List, 1998; SingaPort '98, 1998). This
reform of port administration can be seen as the first step towards privatisation.
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but the government retains responsibility for vessel traffic management and other
regulatory policies, as well as the planning of new port and terminal development.
Finally, in the PRIVATE port, all three essential functions are controlled by the private
sector. There are currently many PRIVATE ports in the UK, including all 23 ports owned
by Associated British Ports, and the ports of Liverpool, Manchester and Felixstowe.
In the second and third models (i.e. the PUBLIC/private and FRI VA TE/public ports), a port
can be viewed as a public enterprise (Olson, 1988). The public enterprise generally
represents a mix of government agencies and private enterprises. The public character
involves three primary features such as its creation by the government, the statutory
assignment of powers, and ownership by the public. The enterprise character provides its
market orientation and includes the four features of expectations of market efficiencies in
operations, commercially defined performance goals, reliance upon user fees for operating
revenue and capital markets for construction funds rather than general government
appropriations, and the absence of partisan intervention in its operations. Each of these
characteristics necessitates structural independence and autonomy from government.
From the discussion until now, it can be said that the role of the private sector in the port
industry has consistently increased. There are still many instances, however, in which the
significant role of the public sector is required. Of the four models mentioned in this
section, the second alternative (the PUBLIC/private port or the landlord port) is
extensively preferred throughout the countries of North America, Europe and Asia (see
Appendix 3). This type of port also seems to be popularly pursued by countries such as
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those in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Although still preferred by certain countries,
the PUBLIC port is unlikely to continue as a realistic policy option and the UK ports
present a number of examples of the PRIVATE port model.
Baird (1997) concludes that the UK approach toward port privatisation could be considered
as real privatisation while other options such as PUBLIC/private ports merely as private
sector participation in the industry. Everett and Robinson (1998) note that the privatisation
of ports is viewed not simply in terms of transfer of ownership but the transition of port
authorities from statutory bodies providing the public services to corporations being in
quest of competitiveness in unconstrained competitive markets.
5.4 THE ROLE OF THE PORT AUTHORITY
As several changes, economic and technological, have affected the characteristics of the
port industry, today's port authorities find themselves less and less in control of their
destinies. With respect to port authorities' decreasing power, Slack (1993, p. 580) notes:
"Clients of long standing are demonstrating little loyalty in
maintaining their business activities in the port. Ports are becoming
pawns in an game of commerce that is global in scale, and on a board
where the maj or players are private corporations whose interests rarely
coincide with the local concerns of the port administrations."
In addition, as privatisation gains worldwide impetus, questions of whether public port
authorities are still necessary in this changing environment are seriously raised. In fact,
different opinions are voiced as to whether there remains a need for port authorities in a
situation where the private sector is increasingly taking over the previously publicly-run
activities of port operations.
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At one end of the spectrum, some private sector entities argue that public organisations,
such as port authorities, constitute an additional layer of port management and operation,
hence causing problems of bureaucracy, and, ultimately, inefficiency. This argument
suggests that port authorities should be replaced by landlord companies, driven by the
profit motive and coupled with limited liability status.
At the other end of the spectrum, others support the comprehensive role of a port authority
even in conditions where the actual operational activities such as cargo and ship handling,
towage and mooring have been entrusted to private hands. In general, management and
operations in respect of port development still require a certain role for commanding as
well as controlling, along with a long term plan, which is said to be a widely recognised
advantage of a public port authority. An increasing involvement in ports by the private
sector, therefore, does not mean the redundancy of port authorities.
Goss (1990c) argues conceptually on the issues of whether or not port authorities are
necessary, with suggestions for and against having public port authorities. As discussed in
Chapter 4, property rights, the need for planning, the significance of public goods, dealing
with externalities and promoting efficiency are claimed as pros. In contrast, bureaucratic
systems, absence of response to market forces and other problems in general public
organisations are regarded as cons. Finally, Goss (1990c, p. 269) concludes:
"There are likely to be many instances of market failure in seaports,
e.g., in the processes of planning, controlling externalities and
promoting competition if these were left wholly to the private
sector; but there are also many opportunities for governmentfailure,
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whether in port authorities or in other official bodies, including
government departments supervising the port authorities."
As Sherman (1995) recommends, when making a decision on privatising port activities,
determination must be made as to what, if any, role should be retained by the public sector
or public port authority, what restrictions or limits should be placed on private operators,
and what safeguards are needed to prevent abuses.
According to Agerschou et a!. (1983, p. 257) and Douglas and Geen (1993, p. 11), the
main functions of a port authority may, in general terms, include:
• providing and maintaining port facilities such z
channels, quays, wharves, and anchorage etc.;
• conservancy functions, including lighting and buoying the port, the
removal of wrecks and other obstructions and maintenance dredging;
• regulating the activities of other persons or organisations at the port,
including the movement and berthing of ships;
• the provision of a pilotage service;
• carrying out port operations such as cargo handling activities, shore
handling and storage of cargo; and
• providing bunker fuel, water and other supplies for ships
The port authority itself my manage and operate all of these functions, although it may be
practical to let other organisations, private or public, handle some. Traditionally, the port
authority provides the facilities required to undertake the first three functions, which
involve heavy investment expenditure. Other functions can be handled by one or more
specialised companies under relatively long term contracts.
Fundamentally, however, port privatisation alters several missions and functions of the
traditional port authority. Instead of acting as a body responsible for everything but
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ineffective in most of its efforts, a modem port authority is required to take a role in which
it is required to act in close co-operation with private sectors and to efficiently concentrate
its efforts on the performance of a number of fundamental functions as seen in the
following (De Monie, 1994):
• the landlord and performance monitoring function;
• the policy-making, planning and development function;
• the traffic control, regulatory and surveillance function;
• the marketing, public relations and promotion function; and
• the human resources development function
Irrespective of whether a port acts in a landlord or a comprehensive role, of these newly
demanded missions for port authorities, the most important would seem to be the second
function: i.e., policy-making, planning and development. In addition to this function, the
port authority is required to ensure that efficiency is enhanced through competition and fair
play. This can be referred to as a monitoring function, aimed at smoothing the operations
of ports since the port is a significant contributor to the national economy.
Juhel (1998) refers to these functions that are required to be undertaken by public
authorities or bodies: (i) the catalyst mission - financing facilities which it is unlikely to
gain access to private or alternative sources of funds and the completion of which appears
on the critical path of national or regional development programmes, (ii) the statutory
mission - dealing with navigational safety, environmental protection and fostering common
development policies between ports and adjacent cities, and (iii) the facilitator mission -
strengthening public governance (improving institutional ability to monitor new public and
private partnerships and oversee operations without interfering in commercial activities)
and spearheading initiatives conducive to trade integration (assisting design and
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implementation of development initiatives to induce value added activities to settle in port
areas).
5.5 METHODS OF PORT PR! VATISATION
The port function matrix discussed in section 5.3 gives an idea of the balance, extent and
mixture of public and private options according to the way in which port activities are
controlled and operated. It is now necessary to examine the various methods by which
private sector participation in port activities can be brought about. In addition to the
methods mentioned in Chapter 4, which are applicable to broader industries, this section
will be focusing on the methods typically applicable and adaptable to the port industry,
taking into account some of the characteristics of the industry.
A variety of alternative methods for port privatisation have been suggested and
implemented and certain variations on them exist. To put it simply, one or more of the
following forms are chosen when port privatisation takes place (Frankel, 1992, p. 205):
• private management of port facilities, individual terminals or
operations without ownership transfer in any form;
• private management of ports in total or part with temporary transfer
of ownership control by leasing of facilities, equipment, etc.;
• private management of ports in total or part with partial or total
transfer of assets; and
• complete divestiture of ownership and management of the port
De Monie (1996, pp. 277-278) specifically divides the privatisation of port facilities and
services into the following three types:
• the management of the port in accordance with the landlord
concept;
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• the total transfer of ownership of both the infra- and superstructures
and of the equipment; and
• the concept of the division of port activities
Although they provide some insight into port privatisation, these 'methods' are so abstract
that they cannot be used in practice. More practical and applicable methods are suggested
by several maritime economists, e.g., Iheduru (1993), Baird (1995a), UNCTAD (1995) and
Cass (1996). The following methods are those which can be comprehensively and
universally applied to and implemented in the port industry.
• Commercialisation (or Pseudo Privatisation)
The process of commercialisation involves dividing the principal activities of port
authorities into separate operating units, each of which functions as an independent and
commercial company. Each company is allowed to procure services from any other
company according to market needs and at market rates, while paying a rent to the port
authority for the premises it occupies. This method requires ports to follow economic
objectives and to adapt the port organisation and management in line with commercial
requirements and market reeds.
• Corporatisation (or Incremental Privatisation)
Corporatisation is a half-way arrangement, which attempts to gain most of the benefits
from private sector involvement and privatisation while retaining a public interest. These
objectives can be achieved by establishing a public sector landlord, e.g., a port corporation,
while simultaneously providing more freedom in port operations through giving full
autonomy to the port in question, with some powers being retained by ministers. In other
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words, corporatisation refers to the conversion of public sector activities to corporate
companies, with a board and managers who are given commercial objectives and the
powers to raise funds on private capital markets. Proprietorship, however, would reside
with the government. Iheduru (1993) points out that the method of corporatisation is the
most appropriate alternative for revitalising the maritime sector in the developing
countries, such as in certain African nations.
. Joint Ventures
In general, the main reason behind the launch of a joint venture is that neither party alone
has at its disposal all the elements necessary to realise the objectives of the venture. Each
party, therefore, relies upon the other to supply the missing elements. The joint venture
generally involves being set up by two or more organisations and is undertaken for mutual
interest, e.g., one side may gain technological expertise while the other gains access to
different markets, or when a project is so expensive that a number of companies decide to
pool their resources to share the risks.
. Concessions (or Build-Operate-Transfer)
This method could be said to be the most unique to be found in the port industry. A
concession could be defined as the granting of specific privileges by government. It can be
interpreted as the equivalent of a lease but, strictly speaking, it is a kind of contract by
which the grantor (e.g. the public port authority or government) grants to the grantee (e.g.
the independent private company) the right to finance, build and operate facilities or
equipment for private and/or public use, for a limited period of time after which the
equipment will be transferred free of charge to the grantor. The concession is, therefore,
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obviously not a form of privatisation, but just a legal technique for creating, delivering and
operating a public service.
In general, concessions or build-operate-transfer (BOT) schemes have been successful in
the port industry. The main advantage is that they relieve the finances of the grantor. Either
the grantee pre-finances the whole operation, operates, ensures and maintains the facilities
and recovers their investment through tariffs or, alternatively, sets aside all reserves
necessary for the replacement of facilities and equipment included in the concession. A
second advantage is that they establish a strong legal relation between the grantor and the
grantee. Candidates for concessions are carefu%y screenett ric pit ttt& 'Vt	 tcc
the contract and its public character gives it special importance and prevents, within certain
limits, shady operations. A further benefit is that the granting of a concession permits a
country or a port authority to attract capital, especially from overseas, without losing long
term control over its vital port facilities.
Concessions, however, also have drawbacks and have not always been popularly
implemented. This is because of the dominant position of the grantor. This condition
results in complaints that concessions lack transparency. The grantee is often subjected to
pressure to employ staff designated by the government or the port authority, thus creating a
breeding ground for corruption and patronage as well as easy means of securing full
employment.
Although both concessions and BOT schemes have much in common, each method has its
own unique characteristics. The concession involves the port authority giving certain rights
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over specified port land for a certain period of years, usually in return for an agreed fee.
This may involve a single terminal or an entire port. In the BOT scheme, however, the
private sector builds and operates the new port or terminal for an agreed period, for
example 20 years, with ownership transferring to the government thereafter. Little change,
therefore, exists in the regulatory functions and responsibilities of a port authority in
respect to the BOT schemes, only a shift in emphasis from owner and operator to trade
facilities and port marketer.
In addition to these, several other methods are available as discussed in Chapter 4. These
include the sale of assets such as infrastructure, superstructure and equipment through
various methods, and the management contract.
5.6 PORT PRIVATISATION IN PRACTICE: THE UK EXPERIENCE
Port privatisation programmes have been, or are currently being, undertaken throughout the
world, but privatisation models and methods applicable to the port industry have varied
widely from country to country. This phenomenon undoubtedly springs from the different
environment of each country in which the port is operated, such as their economic,
political, geographic and cultural features. This variety has been reported in several studies,
e.g., Newman (1980), Transport (1991), Port Development International (1993), Abbott
(1995) and De Monie (1995). This section will be devoted to a brief discussion of what has
happened in the UK port privatisation scene. The UK, in fact, initiated the policy of port
privatisation and its effects are more advanced there than anywhere else in the world.
Hence, it provides a great richness of port industry ownership structures (including private
ports) which are hardly found anywhere else in the world.
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5.6.1 Port Administration and Ownership in the UK
Due to geographic characteristics, such as an extensive coastline and several navigable
rivers and waterways, the UK has a large number of ports, playing a crucial role in the
national economy, especially in foreign trade. The UK, as an island country, provides a
variety of types of port administration and operations. In the mid-1970s it had over 250
port authorities or public operators and approximately 1400 other entities engaged in
various activities such as stevedoring, towage and warehousing (HMSO, 1974).
In the UK, there have been two contrasting approaches towards port administration and
ownership (Liu, 1992). One is the 'intervention approach', which has been historically
influential, and points to the deficiencies of port markets and insists on some form of
public ownership with a certain degree of central control over port development. The other
is the 'market approach', which was until recently very much the central theme of the
Conservative government, and maintains that the efficient provision of port facilities and
services should rely on the market mechanism.
The National Ports Council (1973) and Thomas (1994a) present four different main types
of UK port ownership, although the importance of each type has changed significantly in
recent years. These include (i) public or nationalised ports, (ii) trust ports, (iii) municipal
ports and (iv) company ports1.
(1) Adams (1973) adds one more type: ports that are subsidiaries of other companies [parent companies]
and that are run privately for the purpose of dealing with the specialised cargoes of a particular
company or group, though occasionally dealing with the cargoes of others.
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• Public or Nationalised Ports
Public or nationalised bodies played a predominant role in the management and operations
of UK ports from 1948 to the early 1980s, accounting for about a third of its ports. Until
1962 when it was abolished, these ports were controlled by the British Transport
Commission (BTC). The Transport Act of 1962 distributed the assets of the BTC to a
number of newly organised national agencies such as the British Transport Docks Board
(BTDB), the British Waterways Board and the British Railways Board. The BTDB then
owned many of the largest ports at the time. This is a model that has been adopted by a
number of developing countries, especially at the early stage of development of their
national ports.
• Trust Ports
A trust port is a self-governing statutory body, which is sometimes referred to as a Board,
Trust, Authority or Commission. Trust ports are established under individual Acts of
Parliament. These trust ports were created mainly in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
in order to take over private dock companies which were unable to develop and maintain
their port facilities. The main advantage of this port system has been considered to be its
ability to provide independent administration, free from political interference, with
jurisdiction over an area that may cross local authority boundaries and with a constitution
tailored to local conditions. Wild et a!. (1995) argue that this type of port administration
can best serve the needs of the local commercial interests using a port without any one
interest being able to secure an advantage over another.
i 68
Chapter 5
	
Port Privatisation in Principle and Practice
• Municipal Ports
Some ports are owned and controlled by municipal authorities, generally a large city.
These ports are administered under relevant local legislation and are ultimately responsible
to taxpayers through their local councillors.
• Company Ports
Company ports are those having share capital and whose shareholders participate in the
appointment of their board members (Douglas and Geen, 1993). Relatively few ports were
administered in this ownership style prior to 1979. Examples are the ports of Liverpool and
Manchester, set up under local Acts of Parliament and the port of Felixstowe, incorporated
as far as back as 1875 as a private enterprise (Thomas, 1 994a).
Table 5. 4 Main Features of Port Administration and Ownership in the UK
_____________	 Company Port	 Trust Port	 Municipal Port
Ownership	 Shareholders	 Public trusts	 Local authorities
Management Elected by shareholders 	 Appointed by the	 Appointed by local authorities
______________ ______________________ Ministry 	 ____________________________
Objectives	 Profit making	 Public interests	 Local interests
Managerial	 Shareholders, take overs Managerial changes
	
Managerial changes and
Constraints	 and bankruptcy	 intervention by local
_______________ _________________________ 	 authorities
Pricing	 No restriction	 No restriction	 No restriction
Financing	 Share issuing and	 Fixed-interest loans'
	 Fixed-interest loans2
______________ borrowing from markets
Activity Area Free to diversifj 	 Legislatively restricted to	 Legislatively restricted to port
______________ ______________________ port activit? 	 activity
Taxation	 National and regional tax National and regional tax National and regional tax4
Notes: (1) There is a borrowing limit imposed by the government; (2) There is a borrowing limit imposed by
local authorities, which is tighter than the borrowing limit imposed on trust ports; (3) Recently the
restriction on the trust ports' diversification has been removed; and (4) Except the corporation tax.
Source: Derived from Liu (1992, pp. 20-21)
Table 5.4 compares the main characteristics of alternative forms of port administration and
ownership in the UK. Liu (1992) points out one striking characteristic in the British port
administration; unlike their counterparts in the rest of the world, 'public ports' are
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financially independent and are required to cover costs with no financial assistance or
subsidies from the government. UK public ports, therefore, are free to set their own
operational objectives such as port charges, subject only to the right of appeal of port
customers. Thus, they operate as commercial undertakings in the same way as private
company ports.
5.6.2 Two Phases of Port Privatisation
Poor financial performance was the main motivation for implementing a policy of port
privatisation in the UK. In the early 1980s, when intermodalism and specialisation were
developed in shipping and port industries, the problems the UK ports were facing were
likely to become worse. This situation stimulated the government to force on its port
industry the discipline of market forces by withdrawing from any control over port
development and operations and by cutting off financial support to the industry. The port
privatisation programme in the UK was carried out in two different phases.
The first phase commenced in 1982 under the Transport Act 1981, which established the
framework for the privatisation of the BTDB. Under the Transport Act 1981, Associated
British Ports (ABP) was set up as a holding company for the 19 ports in the group. ABP
was controlled by a company, formed by the government and registered under the
Companies Act 1985 in substantially the same way as if they were a wholly owned
subsidiary of that company (Douglas and Geen, 1993). This company is known as
Associated British Ports PLC and in 1983 the government offered 49 % of its shares for
sale to investors. A year later the rest of its shares were sold to become a public company
floated on the stock market. In particular, the directors of ABP are appointed by Associated
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British Ports PLC for such a period as that company may determine. The directors have to
pay Associated British Ports PLC such a sum that the directors deem to be justified
according to the profits made by ABP. This mechanism corresponds to the dividends
which a subsidiary pays its holding company. Associated British Ports PLC, however, has
no power to give directions to the directors of ABP with respect to the exercising of their
statutory powers and duties as a port authority.
A further step was taken to increase competition in the port industry in 1989 when the
National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS) was abolished. Initially designed to end the use of
casual labour on the docks, the NDLS dated back to 1947 under the Dockworkers Act
1946. Port employers had long campaigned for its abolition claiming that it was an
unsatisfactory arrangement that failed to allow the efficient use of labour.or to foster viable
industrial relations.
Early reports of the effects of abolition of the NDLS have pointed to a combination of job
losses, increasing labour market flexibility, rapid restructuring of working practices, and
increased productivity and profits (Tumbull, 1991). ABP is reported to have largely
withdrawn from its stevedoring role, trimming a fully unionised workforce of 9,000 in
1989 down to 2,000 in 1993, with no union recognition (Fairplay, 1993). In spite of such
public enthusiasm by port owners and managers, however, as Bassett (1993) points out, it
is not yet clear whether these changes will solve the more fundamental problems of over-
capacity and lack of competitiveness compared with the ports of other countries,
particularly in respect of investment and service quality.
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The second phase of port privatisation was initiated under the Ports Act 1991, which
provides for the transfer of trust ports to companies limited by shares and registered under
the Companies Act 1985 (1-IMSO, 1991). There were over 100 trust ports in 1991,
administered and controlled by various constitutions. A trust port is described as an ad hoc
body created by, or operated under, a statute for the purpose of managing a port and not
having share capital (Douglas and Geen, 1993). They had no equity but were subject to
public borrowing limits. This unusual position meant that they were neither strictly public
nor private bodies and were not clearly accountable to either central government or the
local community.
The trust ports do not trade for profit (Adams, 1973) and have no shareholders claiming
payment of dividends from profits. As they are partly financed by public subscription
bonds, however, they have a duty to pay interest to the people or organisations who have
lent them money. A large proportion of their total debt is in fact owed to the government.
Baird (1995a) notes two main functions of the trust ports, both as publicly owned ports and
as navigation authorities. In the former, ports provide cargo and passenger handling
facilities within designated port areas, and constitute the maritime regulatory body for a
large area within and around their ports. In the latter, the ports hold responsibility for
estuarial safety, pilotage and conservancy and are in overall control of defined areas of
jurisdiction.
The Ports Act 1991 was not a compulsory measure for most trust ports. If a port had a
turnover of more than £5 million per annum at 1991 prices, the government could require
the port trust to come forward with a plan for privatisation within two years. This affected
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14 ports. Other ports could bring forward privatisation proposals voluntarily if they so
wished. Section 5(3) of the Act stated that any sale should pay particular regard to the
desirability of encouraging the disposal of the equity to managers and staff on the whole, or
a substantial part of it. The Act, therefore, provided for the privatisation of trust ports, and
applied to the majority of port authorities. Port authorities were given the power to form a
limited company which could assume all property rights, liabilities and functions
previously held by the recognised authority (Comptroller and Auditor General, 1993).
Appendix 4 illustrates the current ownership structure of maj or British ports.
5.6.3 Lessons from the UK Experience
In terms of improved efficiency and productivity after privatisation, the benefits are
difficult to identify and quantify, particularly in the case of the ports which have recently
been privatised and are influenced by various factors. Thomas (1 994a) notes that it is too
early to measure the commercial and operating benefits of privatisation although there is
considerable evidence to suggest that the programme is proving successful. These benefits
have occurred not directly from privatisation, however, but from other measures such as
the abolition of the NDLS in 1989. Furthermore, John (1995) asserts that port productivity
pre- and post-privatisation has not been as significant as the changes that took place after
the abolition of the NDLS. The overall evidence points, however, to a significant
improvement in the performance of the UK ports in recent years and to a tumround in the
industry's fortunes (Thomas, 1994a).
On the other hand, in terms of the turnover of major British ports from 1980 to 1990,
Bassett (1993) highlights substantial growth in the ports mainly located on the east and
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south coasts, thanks to increasing trade with Continental Europe. Liu (1995a, 1995b)
argues that, after measuring the productive efficiency of major ports during 1985-1990,
port efficiency can be explained by locational differences rather than diversity in the forms
of port ownership. Suitable geographical and economic conditions favour the development
of trade and ports at particular sites. Saundry and Turnbull (1997) proclaim that the
financial and economic performance of UK private ports has failed to achieve what was
expected: higher efficiency relative to public ports.
From the above discussion, it is possible to draw a conclusion that, in the case of British
ports, ownership cannot be considered as a significant factor, although it does indirectly
affect and influence improvements in port performance and efficiency. Instead, other
factors, such as geographical location, seem to have a major impact .on efficiency. As
previously mentioned in Chapter 4, the matter of whether privatisation improves efficiency
or not is still not clear in the case of British ports.
In summary, privatisation is only a partial cure for what ails the port industry, and cannot
alone provide the panacea for the industry. When privatising, possible risks should be
completely understood and controlled in order to avoid unnecessary wasting of economic
resources. What is needed here is further consideration of the variations in port
administration and ownership forms taken against the whole background of the country
including its cultural, constitutional and historical circumstances, as well as the
peculiarities of outside pressures. Taking into consideration the special characteristics of
ports, as Goss (1998) points out, a specifically tailored port privatisation policy should be
implemented, rather than merely employing policies directly that have been applied in at
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other industries. Finally, more important than ownership, as Nagorski (1972) mentions, is
the fact that a port is a vital instrument of national economic policy. Close co-operation of
the port with the national economic planning department is essential and the entire port
system should be flexible enough so as to permit modification in accordance with the
changing business environment.
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CHAPTER SIX
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter sets up a framework for measuring productive efficiency and establishes the
frontier production function model as the basic analytical tool for underlying the empirical
research. To do so requires an in-depth analysis and review of the model, and the basic
concepts related to production functions and economic efficiency. Following this, the range
of econometric or parametric frontier models that operationalise the conceptual model
(such as the deterministic and stochastic frontier models) are analysed and several
estimation techniques applicable to the frontier model are examined. Finally, this will be
followed by the empirical application of a production function relevant for the port
industry.
6.2 THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION CONCEPT
Performance is synonymous with the degree of success in achieving stated objectives
(Devine et al., 1985). One of the main types of performance measure is the frontier
approach which is currently in widespread use (Bauer, 1990). The basic concept of the
frontier model is derived from production function theory.
Production may be regarded as a transformation from one state of the world to another.
More generally, production may be defined as any activity, the net result of which is to
increase the degree of compliance between the quantity, quality and distribution of
products and a given preference pattern. Productivity may vary, however, due to several
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differences such as (i) differences in production technology, (ii) differences in the
efficiency of the production process, and (iii) differences in the environment in which
production occurs (Lovell, 1993).
The production function is the core concept in production economics. Production processes
are, as mentioned above, viewed as means of transforming certain inputs into certain
outputs. In other words, the production function describes the relationship between changes
in the quantities of inputs and changes in outputs. It is, therefore, critical to know how
much output can be produced with certain combinations of inputs.
According to Nicholson (1995), the basic definition of a production function for a
particular product is that it shows the maximum amount of the product that can be
produced using alternative combinations of inputs such as labour, capital and land. The
concept of maximality is important. In other words, the term frontier may meaningfully be
applied in this case because the function sets a limit to the range of possible observations.
Thus, while any point below the production frontier may be observed, it is nt possible to
observe points above the frontier. The amounts by which a firm or an industry lies below
its production frontier can be regarded as inefficiency. The measurement of levels of
inefficiency has been the main motivation for the study of frontier production function
models.
Before turning to detail, it is initially useful to concentrate on the basic underlying concepts
of a production function such as production factors, aggregation problems, a typical form
of production function, i.e., the Cobb-Douglas case, and returns to scale.
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6.2.1 Production Factors
A traditional production function expresses the output (Y) of a firm as a function of two
typical inputs: capital (K) and labour (L) like this:
Y=f(KL)	 (6.1)
The labour input (L) represents human effort and intelligence in bringing about a better
state of the world. Labour, however, is not a free commodity and, hence, it is necessary to
recompense those who forego leisure in a certain way. This payment, or reward, is called a
wage. On the other hand, the capital input (K) is a factor which has provoked, and
continues to provoke, a great deal of controversy (Intriligator et a!., 1996). According to
the concept used by Thomas (1993), capital is the flow of services provided by the existing
capital stock rather than the capital stock itself, thus depending not only on the size of the
capital stock but also on the extent of its utilisation. Capital receives two different types of
payment or reward: (i) interest, which goes to those who abstain from immediate
consumption and (ii) profit, which goes to those who bear the risk (Heathfield and Wibe,
1987).
These arguments for reward payments require certain assumptions to hold such as (i)
people prefer enjoying leisure to working, (ii) people do not like waiting, but may be
willing to defer instant satisfaction and (iii) people wish to avoid taking a risk (i.e. people
are innately risk-averse). Although none of these assumptions are always correct, they do
hold for economically rational individuals. In other words, most people dislike working,
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want immediate rewards and are risk averse. Thus, each of these characteristics requires
financial compensation for their mitigation. These compensation payments take the form of
wages, interest and profit.
6.2.2 The Aggregation Problem
For simplicity, labour and capital are generally expressed as one kind of labour and one
kind of capital. This simplification clearly causes several problems. From the perspective
of productive output and, therefore, compensatory payments or rewards to factors, one hour
of an unskilled labourer is not the same thing as one hour of a skilled or trained employee.
Referring to this issue, Heathfield and Wibe (1987, p. 5) note:
"Once the possibility of disaggregation is opened up it is difficult to
see where it can logically end. The degree and nature of the
disaggregation we choose to specif r is once again a matter of
judgement. Too much disaggregation leads to an infinitely long list
of separate inputs and outputs. Too little masks significant
differences between input."
To understand a given production process, therefore, some aggregated factors are required
in certain broad categories. The different kinds of labour (e.g. wages paid, hours spent and
number of labourers employed) have to be aggregated into one or two broader categories.
The different kinds of assets or machines have to be aggregated into one or two capital
input factors.
On the output side of production, the aggregation problem also exists. Generally, most
production units are firms which produce not just one but several goods possessing a range
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of quality characteristics. Again, with regard to the problem of input and output
aggregation, Heathfield and Wibe (1987, p. 5) mention the following:
"Suffice it to say that there is no clear principle as to how to
disaggregate each factor of production into its relevant subsets. It is
simply a matter of common sense with classification depending on
the purposes of the study and the data available."
6.2.3 Types of Production Function
A production function can be expressed as an attempt at mathematically specifying the
range of technical possibilities available to producers. In other words, it specifies the set of
maximum output from given levels of input; it is the set of possible efficient relations
between inputs and outputs in a given state of technology.
The Cobb-Douglas production function is the most frequently used and best known
specification for the production function in theoretical as well as empirical studies. This
function was first presented by Cobb and Douglas (1928) and afterwards widely adopted
for empirical tests. The general form of the Cobb-Douglas production function is expressed
as:
Y = AKcXLP
	
(6.2)
whereA is apositive constant, 0< a< 1,0 <fi< 1, and Kand L are the amount of
capital and labour, respectively, used to produce output Y.
Equation (6.2) has a number of convenient properties. The parameters, a and /3, measure
the elasticities of output with reference to capital and labour respectively. The parameter,
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A, may be considered as an efficiency parameter (Schotter, 1997) since for fixed inputs K
and L, the larger the value of A, the greater is the maximum output obtained from such
inputs. In other words, without any impact on returns to scale, higher values of A imply
that larger amounts are produced with the same input combination.
A generalised form of the Cobb-Douglas case is the translog production function, which is
short for 'transcendental logarithmic' function and first noted by Christensen et al. (1973).
Since it has a flexible and convenient form, the translog function has been adopted for
widespread use in empirical tests. For a two-input case the function takes the form:
lnY=a+ alnK+filnL+ ylnKlnL+ S(lnK)2 + (lnL)2
	(6.3)
where a = in A (^ 0) and r' Sand e are parameters with values between zero and unity.
Equation (6.3) reduces to the Cobb-Douglas function if the parameters ç Sand e are zero.
More generally, for the n-input case, the translog function is defined by:
1nY=ao+a,1nxj +>y,j lnxj inx	 (6.4)
iI	 1=1 j=1
where x, is the ith input and yj = j for all values of i orj. The function is quite flexible
in approximating arbitrary production technologies in terms of substitution possibilities,
thus providing a local approximation to any production frontier (Intriligator et a!., 1996).
In principle, a logarithmic function can be derived from any normal or algebraic production
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function since any point in (xe, Xj) space can be mapped onto a point in (in x, in xj) space.
For any algebraic function, therefore, there must exist a logarithmic version.
6.2.4 Returns to Scale
The returns to scale of a production function indicate what happens to output when all units
are increased proportionately. Nicholson (1995) provides a simple definition of returns to
scale. If all inputs are multiplied by the same positive constant 2.. (where X is greater than
unity and, hence, input factors of production are increased), the returns to scale of the
production function can be classified as shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6. 1 Returns to Scale from Factor Increases
Effect on Output
(i) f(XK, XL) = Xf(K. L) =
(ii) f(XK, XL) <Xf(K, L) =
(iii) f(XK, XL)> Xf(K, L) =
Source: Nicholson (1995, p. 322)
If, in the function of Y =f(K, L), a proportionate increase in inputs (K and L) increases the
output (Y) by the same proportion, the production function exhibits constant returns to
scale. If output increases less than proportionately, the function exhibits decreasing returns
to scale. Finally, if output increases more than proportionately, there are increasing returns
to scale.
For the Cobb-Douglas production function, returns to scale are simply equal to (a + fi).
The Cobb-Douglas production function is homogeneous of degree (a + /7). For example,
suppose that K is changed to K and L to AL, then the new output will be:
187
Chapter 6
	
A Theoretical Framework for Efficiency Measurement
= ,ta+p.AICaL/J = ,%a+13y	 (6.5)
If a + fi> 1, then the production function has increasing returns to scale, and if a + fi < 1,
then it has decreasing returns to scale. When a + = 1, the production function has
constant returns to scale, which is often called 'linearly homogeneous'. Further, when the
production function has constant returns to scale, equation (6.2) can be expressed as:
Y =AKaLIz
	 (6.6)
6.3 ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
The matter of economic efficiency has been of interest since Adam Smith's pin factory. An
analytical approach to efficiency measurement in production was, however, initiated by
Debreu (1951) and later utilised by Farrell (1957). In the Farrell framework, overall
efficiency consists of two different components: allocative efficiency and productive
efficiency'.
6.3.1 Allocative and Productive Efficiency
"Inputs are of course everywhere. It is my observation that for some
reason there are far more inputs than there are outputs, which means
that a large number of inputs are disappearing somewhere in the
process. God knows where they will turn up." (Newman, 1975)
(1) As a matter of terminology, Farrell (1957) names this efficiency 'technical efficiency'. Some
economists (e.g. Vickers and Yarrow, 1988), however, refer to this concept as 'internal efficiency' or
'managerial efficiency'; Leibenstein (1966) labels it 'X-efficiency'. In the frontier literature, 'technical
efficiency' has been popularly used after Farrell (1957). Throughout this study and in common with
Nicholson (1995), the term 'productive efficiency' will be used as being synonymous with the other
terms. For reference, see Kalirajan (1990), Lovell (1993) and Ferrantino and Ferrier (1995).
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In economic theory, costs can exceed their minimum feasible level for one of two reasons
(Barrow and Wagstaff, 1989). One is that inputs are being used in the wrong proportions,
given their prices and marginal productivity. This phenomenon is known as allocative
inefficiency. The other reason is that there is a failure to produce the maximum amount of
output from a set of given inputs. This is known as productive inefficiency. Both sources of
inefficiency can exist simultaneously or in isolation. These sources of inefficiency can be
easily explained by using the concept of a production function. Figure 6.1 provides an
example of a production function where two inputs, x1 and x2, are employed to produce a
single output, Y.
Figure 6. 1 Allocative Efficiency and Productive Efficiency
The isoquant A indicates all the possible combinations of x 1 and x2 that give rise to the
same level of output, Y. Clearly, given a fixed amount of input x 2, using more of x1 will
result in an increase in output. The slope of the isoquant is, therefore, negative because in
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order to maintain the same output A' x2 must be reduced to compensate for the increase in
x1 . The amount by which x2 has to be reduced to compensate for a one unit increase in x1 is
the slope of the isoquant and is known as the 'marginal rate of technical substitution'
(MRTS) between x 1 and x2. In fact, this is equal to the ratio of the marginal products of the
two inputs: i.e.,
MRTS - MPx,
MPx1
where MPx, denotes the marginal product of input x,.
C 1 is an isocost line, indicating the combinations of x 1 and x2 giving rise to the same level
of expenditure, C 1 . The slope of the isocost line is equal to the ratio of the two input prices,
(-) P;/Px,, where Px, denotes the price of each input Xj. The allocative efficient input mix
at any level of output will be the mix that minimises the cost of producing the level of
output in question or, equivalently, the mix that maximises the level of output obtained
from a fixed money outlay. In Figure 6.1, this occurs at point C, where the slopes of the
isocost line and the isoquant are the same, so that allocative efficiency requires that:
MPx2 - Px
MPx1 Px,
Thus, if the unit cost of x 1 is twice that of x2, then x1 must be twice as productive as x2.
Productive efficiency can also be illustrated by using the isoquant shown in Figure 6.1,
which assumes that there is one isoquant associated with each level of output determined
only by technology. Some firms, however, may be more efficient at transforming inputs
(6.7)
(6.8)
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into outputs than others. The isoquants A and YB are both associated with the same level
of output, but the isoquant of the less efficient firm (YB) lies further away from the origin
than that of the relatively efficient firm (YA). The less efficient firm (B) ends up using more
of both inputs to produce the same level of output as the more efficient firm (A).
Productive inefficiency thus involves excessive usage of all inputs.
6.3.2 Measuring Efficiency
Suppose that a firm's frontier production function, as depicted in Figure 6.2, is Y f(xj,
x2), where two inputs (xi and x2) are used to produce one output (Y) and that the function
is characterised by constant returns to scale. The isoquants A and YB indicate all possible
combinations of xj and x2 which give rise to the same level of output.
Figure 6. 2 Frontier Production Function
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Assume that the firm's efficiency is observed at point A, rather than C. This position is
neither allocatively nor productively efficient. Its level of productive efficiency is defined
as the ratio of OB/OA. Therefore, productive inefficiency is defined as 1-(OB/OA) and can
be interpreted as the proportion by which the cost of producing the level of output could be
reduced given the assumption that the input ratio (xJ/x2) is held constant. Under the
assumption of constant returns to scale, productive inefficiency can also be interpreted as
the proportion by which output could be increased by becoming 100 % productively
efficient. The level of allocative efficiency is measured as OD/OB (or C 1/C2). Thus
allocative inefficiency is defined as 1 -(OD/OB) and measures the proportional increase in
costs due to allocative inefficiency.
Consider position B. At this point, the firm is allocatively inefficient since it can maintain
output at YA but reduce total costs by changing the input mix to that which exists at point
C. At point B, however, the firm is productively efficient since it cannot increase output
with this input combination of xj and x2 but, given a suboptimal input mix (i.e. allocative
inefficiency), the firm has minimised the cost of producing this level of output.
6.4 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MODELLING
FRONTIER PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
Over the last decade a number of methods for measuring efficiency have been proposed, all
of which have in common the concept of the frontier: efficient units are those operating on
the cost or production frontier, while inefficient ones operate either below the frontier (in
the case of the production frontier) or above the frontier (in the case of the cost frontier).
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There is one difference to be noted concerning the interpretation of the term 'frontier'.
Some methods aim to uncover the absolute frontier, indicating what could be achieved if
the available technology were used to full advantage; others aim to uncover the best-
practice frontier, reflecting the achievements of the firm or industry in the sample (Barrow
and Wagstaff, 1989). As Forsund et al. (1980) noted, however, the distinction is unlikely to
be of much significance in practice, since the two different concepts of the frontier
converge as sample size tends to infinity.
Bauer (1990, p. 39) pointed out the following reasons why the use of frontier models is
becoming increasingly widespread:
• the notion of a frontier is consistent with the underlying economic
theory of optimising behaviour;
• deviations from a frontier have a natural interpretation as a
measure of the efficiency with which economic units pursue their
technical or behavioural objectives; and
• information about the structure of the frontier and about the
relative efficiency of economic units has many policy
applications.
The literature on frontier production function models begins with Farrell (1957), who
suggested a useful framework for analysing economic efficiency in terms of realised
deviations from an idealised frontier isoquant. These and other frontier models are
motivated in part by an interest in the structure of efficient production technology, in part
by an interest in the divergence between observed and frontier operation and also in
economic efficiency.
A distinction exists between the methods employed to derive the specification of the
frontier model: either statistical or non-statistical methods may be used. The former
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technique makes assumptions about the stochastic properties of the data, while the latter
does not. Another difference concerns whether the chosen method is parametric or non-
parametric. While the former imposes a particular functional form, the latter approach does
not. In a survey of empirically derived production frontiers and their relationship to
efficiency measurement, Forsund et al. (1980, pp. 7-8) classif' studies using the frontier
approach according to the way the frontier is specified and estimated as follows:
• the frontier may or may not be specified as a parametric function
of inputs;
• an explicit statistical model of the relationship between observed
output and the frontier may or may not be specified; and
• the frontier itself may be specified to be either deterministic or
stochastic.
According to this basis for classification, frontier models may be divided into non-
parametric and parametric approaches. Again, the parametric approach can be divided into
deterministic and stochastic frontier models. Both mathematical programming (or non-
parametric) and econometric (or parametric) approaches were proposed by Farrell (1957)
and have been developed separately in terms of how to construct frontiers. While the non-
parametric approach revolves around mathematical (or linear) programming techniques,
the parametric approach employs econometric techniques where efficiency is measured
relative to a frontier production function which is statistically estimated.
6.4.1 The Programming Approach
Farell's non-parametric approach specifies linear programming techniques. Following this,
many contributions have aimed to construct a less restrictive linear technology in order to
enhance and promulgate non-parametric approaches. Work using linear programming
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techniques involve the application of a technique known as Data Envelopment Analysis
(Fare et a!., 1994; Mansson, 1996). This form of analysis, initially developed by Charnes et
a!. (1978), revolves around an axiomatic formulation from which a series of efficiency
measures relative to piece-wise linear technologies are constructed. Such applications are
more often found in the literature of Operations Research and Management Science.
6.4.2 The Econometric Approach
This approach is founded on the econometric concept that a process can be adequately
described by examining its inputs and its outputs. It is not necessary to know anything
about the technologies involved in the production process; all that is needed is a set of
reliable observations of what goes in and what comes out (Tleathfield and Wibe, 1987).
The parameter values are then statistically inferred from these observations.
Thus, this approach involves the specification of a parametric representation of technology
which itself can be divided into two different models; either deterministic or stochastic
frontiers may be specified according to whether or not certain assumptions are made
concerning the underlying data.
• The Deterministic Frontier Model
Aigner and Chu (1968) suggest a homogeneous Cobb-Douglas frontier production function
which requires that all observations are on or beneath the frontier. Their model can be
expressed as:
Yf(X;/3)-u,	 (6.9)
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where Y denotes the output, X a vector of inputs, /1 the input coefficients and u (^ 0) is
a one-sided error term which ensures that Y ^j(X; fl
. 
Although Aigner and Chu (1968) did
not do so, the productive efficiency of each observation can be computed directly from the
vector of residuals, since u represents 'productive inefficiency'. It is labelled as
'deterministic' because, according to Greene (1993), the stochastic component of the
model is contained entirely in the inefficiency term, u.
The main advantage of this approach as compared to the programming approach is its
ability to characterise frontier technology in a simple mathematical form. As pointed out in
both Forsund et al. (1980) and in Bauer (1990), however, the disadvantages of the frontier
model represented in equation (6.9) are (i) the mathematical form may be too simple, (ii)
the model imposes structure on the frontier that may not be guaranteed, (iii) the approach
often imposes a limitation on the number of possible efficient observations, (iv) the
estimated frontier is supported by a subset of the data and is thus extremely sensitive to
outliers, and (v) the estimated results have no statistical properties; since no statistical
assumptions are made about the disturbance term u in the model represented in (6.9),
inferences cannot be reliably obtained from the results.
Since no efficiency differences between economic units are assumed to be generated by an
explicit efficiency distribution, as Aigner and Chu (1968) admit, the estimation potential of
the deterministic model (6.9) is reduced to some extent by this lack of available statistical
procedures for the drawing of inferences. In an attempt to overcome this major drawback,
namely no statistical basis, Afriat (1972) amended the frontier model to facilitate statistical
analysis by making some assumptions about it. The equation in (6.9) can be rewritten as:
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Y =f(X; fi) exp(-u),	 (6.10)
or
1nY=1nf(X;/-u	 (6.11)
where u ^ 0 (and thus 0 ^ exp(-u) ^ 1), and where lnj(X; fi) is linear in the Cobb-
Douglas case exhibited in (6.9). The question that has to be asked is what to assume about
X and u. One possible answer that has been most frequently used is to assume that
observations on u are identically and independently distributed (iia), and that X is
exogenous and thus independent of u. Any number of distributions (e.g. normal, half-
normal and exponential distributions) for u or exp(-u) could be specified.
The early parametric frontier models are deterministic in the sense that all economic units
share a common fixed class of frontier. This is, of course, unreasonable and ignores the real
possibility that the observed performance of the economic unit may be affected by
exogenous (i.e. random shock) as well as endogenous (i.e. inefficiency) factors. This
argument is reinforced if one considers also the statistical noise that every empirical
reLationship contains. In addition to random shocks, statistical noise may be interpreted as
having two sources: measurement error and misspecification of functional form. Both
sources are as relevant for the production function as for any other model. To allocate all
these influences, whether favourable and unfavourable or whether under or beyond the
control of the economic unit, into a single disturbance term and to label the mixture as
inefficiency is clearly a doubtful and inexact generalisation. In fact, to distinguish
statistical noise from inefficiency, and to assume that the noise is one-sided, therefore, are
both questionable assumptions to make. As a result, the parametric approach is highly
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sensitive to extreme outliers, thus causing an over- or under-estimation of the true extent of
inefficiency. Rather than overcoming these problems through the extension and further
development of deterministic frontiers, an alternative model based on the concept of a
stochastic frontier model can be utilised.
• The Stochastic Frontier Model
The stochastic frontier model (also often named the 'composed disturbance model') is
motivated by the idea that deviations from the production frontier might not be entirely
under the control of the economic unit being studied (Greene, 1993). Both Aigner et al.
(1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) independently constructed a more
reasonable error structure than a purely one-sided one. They considered a linear model for
the frontier production function as follows:
Y 1 =f(X1t; /3) exp(ejf),	 i = 1,2,. . , N; t = 1,2,. . , T	 (6.12)
where i indexes firms and t time periods. Their disturbance term ej1 is defined as the
following:
= Vj1 - Uj	 (6.13)
The component v t represents a symmetric disturbance term permitting random variation of
the production function across economic units due not only to the effects of measurement
and specification error, but also to those of exogenous shock beyond the control of the
economic unit (e.g. luck, weather conditions, geography or machine performance). The
other component Ujf ( ^ 0) is a one-sided disturbance term and represents 'productive
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inefficiency' relative to the stochastic production function. The non-negative disturbance
Ult reflects the fact that output lies on or below its frontier. The deviation of an observation
from the deterministic kernel of the above stochastic production function arises from two
sources: (i) symmetric random variation of the deterministic kernel f (j; /3) across
observations captured by the component	 and (ii) asymmetric variation or productive
inefficiency captured by the component ut. The term Ujt measures productive inefficiency
in the sense that it measures the shortfall of output Y, from that implied by its maximum
frontier given byf(X 11; /3) exp(vj).
The measure of an economic unit's efficiency should be defined, therefore, by:
Yl,
f(Xii; /3) exp(vi:)
relative to the stochastic frontierf(X; /3) exp(v), rather than by the ratio
Yji
f(Xi,;fl)
(6.14)
(6.15)
relative to the deterministic kernel of the stochastic frontierf(X; /3) . Thus, the frontierf
(X; /3) exp(v) is stochastic since v consists of random factors which are beyond the control
of the production unit.
Nevertheless, any estimate of a firm's efficiency level is not consistent, as it contains
statistical noise as well as productive inefficiency. In addition, stochastic frontier models
suffer from two other difficulties. One is the requirement of specific assumptions about the
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distributions underlying productive inefficiency (e.g. half-normal and exponential) and
statistical noise (e.g. normal). The other is the required assumption that the regressors (the
input variables X) and productive inefficiency are independent. This may well be an
unrealistic assumption since, if a firm knows its level of inefficiency, this should affect its
input choices.
6.4.3 Choice of Approach
By virtue of its practical convenience, analytical tractability and theoretical superiority, the
econometric (parametric) approach has been adopted as the appropriate analytical tool to
apply in this research. Another justification for this choice is that econometric approaches
have a strong policy orientation, especially in the assessment of alternative industrial
organisations and in the evaluation of efficiency in government and other public agencies.
Mathematical programming approaches, on the other hand, have a managerial decision-
making orientation (Aigner and Schmidt, 1980; Fare et aL, 1994; Lovell, 1995). This
property of the econometric approaches more closely supports the purpose of the research,
especially since they have a grounding in economic theory (Forsund et al., 1980; Pitt and
Lee, 1981; Bauer, 1990).
In addition, several studies (e.g. Gong and Sickles, 1992; Oum and Waters, 1996) have
compared the performance of alternative methods for measuring efficiency: the
econometric method (in particular, the stochastic frontier model) and the mathematical
programming method. The results show that the econometric approach generally produces
better estimates than the latter approach, especially for measuring firm-specific efficiency
when panel data are available. Greene (1993) notes that the main advantage of the
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econometric method lies in its ability to shift the harmful effect of measurement error away
from estimates of efficiency.
6.4.4 The Use of Panel Data in Frontier Modelling
A further development in the modelling of frontiers lies with the use of estimation
techniques which involve panel data. Initially, the stochastic frontier model (6.12) was
developed for cross-sectional data. According to Intriligator et a!. (1996), panel data are a
special type of pooled cross-section and/or time-series data in which the same individual
units of observation are sampled over time and are generally microdata pertaining to
individual economic agents, such as families and firms. Baltagi (1995, pp. 3-6) lists several
benefits from using panel data, some of which are as follows:
• controlling for individual heterogeneity since panel data suggest
that individuals, firms, states or countries are heterogeneous;
• giving more informative data, more variability, less collinearity
among the variables, more degree of freedom and more efficiency;
• being better able to identif' and measure effects that are simply
not detectable in pure cross-sectional or pure time-series data;
• allowing the construction and testing of more complicated
behavioural models than purely cross-sectional or time-series data,
and also fewer restrictions being imposed in panels on a
distributed lag model than in a purely time-series study; and
• gathering usually micro units, like individuals, firms and
households, and biases resulting from aggregation over firms or
individuals being eliminated.
In addition, a number of attractive features of panel data are suggested by Ilausman and
Taylor (1981) and Blundell (1996). Among them are (i) that panel data are able to control
individual effects which may be correlated with other variables included in the
specification of an economic relationship, thus making analysis on single cross-sections
difficult, and (ii) that panel data allow an analyst to exploit the large variation in the
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circumstances of different individuals in any cross-section while still capturing temporal
effects in behaviour.
With respect to the frontier production function, consistent estimates of the productive
efficiency of an economic unit can be obtained as the number of time periods tends to
infinity. This is true because adding more observations on the same unit yields information
not attainable by adding more units. Secondly, unlike the techniques for cross-sectional
analysis which draw evidence of inefficiency from skewness (e.g. Waidman, 1982), the
technique of panel data analysis draws evidence of inefficiency in constancy over time. As
a consequence, strong distributional assumptions are not necessary when panel data are
available. Finally, the parameters and the economic unit's level of efficiency can be
estimated without assuming that the input variables are uncorrelated with productive
inefficiency. Therefore, as Schmidt and Sickles (1984) note, a variety of different estimates
will be considered, depending on what one is willing to assume about the distribution of
productive inefficiency and its potential correlation with the regressors.
The models in section 6.4.2 involved the estimation of the parameters of the stochastic
frontier production function and the mean productive inefficiency for firms in the industry.
Initially, it was claimed that productive efficiencies for individual firms could not be
estimated and predicted. In an effort to explore this unsolved problem with the previous
models along with the benefits from the aforementioned advantages of panel data, Pitt and
Lee (1981) were the first to develop techniques using panel data to estimate the frontier
production function. Their approach failed, however, to utilise the qualitative advantages of
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panel data and required strong assumptions, exactly as was the case for models using the
cross-sectional data.
Jondrow et a!. (1982) presented two estimators (i.e. for half-normal and exponential cases)
for the firm-specific effect for an individual firm under the assumption that the parameters
of the frontier production function were known and cross-sectional data were available for
given sample firms. Schmidt and Sickles (1984) suggested three different estimators for
individual firm effects and productive efficiencies for panel data. A major breakthrough in
the area of panel data models was achieved by Battese and Coelli (1988), who presented a
generalisation of the results of Jondrow et a!. (1982) on the assumption of a more general
distribution for firm effects to be applied to the stochastic frontier model. Ferrantino and
Ferrier (1995) adopted the methods developed by Pitt and Lee (1981) and Battese and
Coelli (1988) to derive firm-specific efficiency estimates based on available panel data for
Indian vacuum-pan sugar producers.
Suppose that the frontier production function is of the following form:
Y1z =f(X t;f3 ) exp(vìt- u,),	 1=1,2,.. ,N;t= 1,2,.. ,T	 (6.16)
where Y11 denotes the appropriate form of output for the ith firm at time t, X is a
vector of inputs associated with the ith firm at time t and fi is a vector of input coefficients
for the associated independent variable in the production function. The main difference
between models (6.12) and (6.16) is the absence of the subscript t associated with u in the
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latter, thus u captures firm-specific time invariant variables omitted from the previous
production function.
The symmetric terms v 1 are assumed to be identically and independently normally
distributed with mean zero and variance Q,2, i.e., vt N(0, o 2). The one-sided terms u (^
0) are assumed to be identically and independently distributed non-negative random
variables, which captures afirm effect but no time effect (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984). In
addition, the error terms vt and Uj are assumed to be independently distributed of the input
variables as well as of one another.
The most frequently defined distribution for the u iS the half-normal (often termed the
absolute normal distribution), i.e., u jN(0, o2)I . Other distributional assumptions for the
terms Uj have been proposed by several researchers. For example, the exponential (Aigner
et a!., 1977), the truncated normal (Stevenson, 1980) and the gamma (Greene, 1980).
As far as the productive efficiency of a firm is concerned, Battese and Coelli (1988) define
it as the ratio of the firm's mean production (given its realised firm-specific effect) to the
corresponding mean production with the firm effect being equivalent to zero. The
productive efficiency of the ith firm (PEr) is defined, therefore, as:
E(Y,,*I UI, Xi1)
PE,=	 (6.17)
E(Y,,Iui = 0,X1:)
where Yj ' represents the output of production for the ith firm at time t, and the value of
the PE1 lies between zero and one (0 ^ PE 1 ^ 1). If a firm's productive efficiency is
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calculated as 0.65, for example, then this implies that, on average, the firm realises 65 % of
the production possible for a fully efficient firm having comparable input values. From the
perspective of efficiency measurement, the definition contained in equation (6.17) has a
thread of connection with that of equation (6.14).
If the model (6.16) is transformed to a logarithm of the production function, such as:
in	 = inf X t; fl + v - u	 (6.18)
then the measure of productive efficiency for the ith firm is defined by:
PE1 = exp(-uj)	 (6.19)
The measure shown in equation (6.19) does not depend on the level of the input variables
for the firm, while the definition provided by equation (6.17) for calculating the productive
efficiency of a firm clearly shows that its estimation depends significantly on inferences
concerning the distribution function of the unobservable firm effect Uj, given the sample
observations.
In the early stages of its use, one problem with the stochastic frontier model was that the
model provides estimates of productive efficiency only in terms of a sample mean, rather
than of each observation. This is because v and u are unobservable. In order to solve this
drawback, Jondrow et a!. (1982) described a method for extracting estimates of productive
efficiency for each observation in the sample, by decomposing the frontier residual (VIt - UI)
into its components: statistical noise (vet) and productive inefficiency (ui). This
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decomposition can be conducted by finding the expected value of u under the conditional
distribution of u given (vIt - u).
This method provides unbiased, but inconsistent, estimation of u (Greene, 1993). Battese
and Coelli (1988) refined the method of Jondrow et al. (1982) for the case of panel data.
The elaborated technique by Battese and Coelli (1988) and Battese et a!. (1989) was,
however, for the case where productive efficiency is time-invariant. With regard to this
time-invariant model for firm-level efficiency, Schmidt (1985, p. 313) states the following:
"Unchanging inefficiency over time is not a particularly attractive
assumption.......An important line of future research, in my
opinion, is to allow inefficiency to change over time"
Battese and Coelli (1988, P. 393) admitted the shortcoming of their method by noting:
"Given the model (6.16), in which firm effects (and productive
efficiencies) are time-invariant, the consistency of estimators for
individual productive efficiencies requires that the number of time
periods increases indefinitely. However, such a situation is unlikely
to be realistic, because it is obvious that firm effects and productive
efficiencies change, given a sufficiently long period of time."
With the assumption that productive efficiency does vary over time, an alternative
approach has been adopted by econometricians such as Cornwell et al. (1990) and
Kumbhakar (1990). None of these studies succeed, however, in completely separating
inefficiency from individual firm effects (Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson, 1993) and, in any
case, the proposed method is too complicated for empirical application (Ferrantino and
Ferrier, 1995).
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In summary, in spite of the fact that the panel data model enables a researcher to relax
certain assumptions, since the techniques of panel data analysis are focused on cross-
sectional variation, this approach requires the additional assumption that individual firm
inefficiency is invariant with time. At the same time, the problem remains that a restrictive
functional form for technology is imposed on the model. Finally, the following remarks of
Bauer (1990, p. 41) are worthy of note:
"Stronger assumptions generate stronger results, but they strain one's
conscience more.....The appropriate structure to impose can only
be determined by a careful consideration of the data and the
characteristics of the industry under study."
6.5 ESTIMATION ISSUES
In general, econometric analysis involves certain generic steps which include model
specification, data development, estimation of the model and the use of the estimated
model for research purposes such as forecasting and policy evaluation (lntriligator et a!.,
1996). In contrast to the programming approach to efficiency measurement, the
econometric approach uses statistical techniques for the estimation of a parametric
representation of technology and of efficiency relative to that technology. The estimation
stage can be implemented using certain techniques associated with each of the
deterministic, stochastic, and panel data models. The estimation techniques may be
differently or individually applied, depending on functional forms specified and
assumptions made on the model components.
The commencement of estimation is based on the use of ordinary least squares (OLS),
which treats the frontier residual (i.e. u for the deterministic case and (v - u) for the
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stochastic case) as the inefficiency term. As previously discussed, however, this treatment
is theoretically incorrect and in order to cope with this weakness, alternatives have been
suggested as follows:
'Corrected' ordinary least squares (COLS) was initially proposed by Winsten (1957).
This method does not make any assumption about the functional form of the efficiency
component u. It estimates the parameters of the frontier model by OLS, and then corrects
for the downward bias in the estimated OLS intercept by shifting it up until all corrected
residuals are nonpositive and at least one is zero. The corrected residuals are then used to
calculate the productive efficiency (PE) which, by construction, satisf' the requirement that
0 ^ PE ^ 1. In other words, COLS provides exactly the same model as OLS, except for
the constant term.
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) was initially proposed by Afriat (1972) and
further developed by Greene (1980) and Stevenson (1980). Since their pioneering work, it
has been in widespread use. MLE is conducted by assuming a functionaL form for the
efficiency component u, and involves the estimation of all the technology parameters and
the parameter(s) of the distribution of u at the same time. Unlike the case of a deterministic
frontier, in that of a stochastic frontier, the resulting residuals obtained from MLE contain
both statistical noise and inefficiency, which should be decomposed using the method
suggested by Jondrow et al. (1982) and Battese and Coelli (1988). Since the inclusion of
statistical noise allows the stochastic frontier to cover all observations, the estimates of u
are inserted in the relevant equation for efficiency measurement, such as equations (6.14)
208
Chapter 6
	
A Theoretical Framework for Efficiency Measurement
and (6.19), to obtain estimates of productive efficiency (PE) which satisfy the condition
that 0 <PE ^ 1.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the OLS, COLS and MLE estimations of the deterministic frontier
model. All these estimators are questionable since they make no accommodation for
statistical noise and thus attribute all deviation from the frontier production function to
productive inefficiency. In particular, COLS has one further disadvantage in that it adjusts
only the OLS estimate of the intercept, leaving the remaining elements of the input
coefficients fi unchanged from its OLS estimates. As a consequence, the structure of an
efficient frontier technology is the same as that of a less efficient frontier, thus assigning
the same efficiency ranking as OLS does. MLE allows for a structural dissimilarity
between OLS and the efficient frontier technology. Many studies (e.g. Greene, 1980),
however, reveal that both OLS and MLE show significant differences in the structure of
two technologies.
Figure 6. 3 COLS and MLE for Deterministic Frontiers
ln(input)
Source: Lovell (1993, p. 22)
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For the firm-effect efficiency of a panel sample, Schmidt and Sickles (1984) propose three
estimators: the 'Within' estimator, the generalised least squares (GLS), and the MLE,
the choice of which depends on whether or not one is willing to assume that the individual
firm-specific efficiency is uncorrelated with the input variables and on whether or not one
is willing to make certain distributional assumptions for the disturbance terms. For
instance, the normal distribution is assumed for the symmetric disturbance term Vjt, and the
half-normal for the one-sided disturbance term u1 (capturing inefficiency)..
The 'Within' estimator makes no distributional assumption on the one-sided disturbance
terms u,, and makes no assumption of independence between u and the input variables.
The GLS makes no distributional assumption on u,, but assumes that the error terms u are
uncorrelated with the input variables in order to allow for the inclusion of time-invariant
regressors in the frontier model. The MLE makes both distributional and independence
assumptions. In the case of the 'Within' and GLS estimators, the estimated finn-effect
efficiencies u are normalised so that the most efficient observation has PE 1 1. The
strongest case for the GLS is when the number of sample observations (N) is large and the
time period (T) is small, whilethe GLS is useless when T is large and N is small. In the
case where N and T are both large, the 'Within' estimator is more efficient than the GLS
(Lovell, 1993).
In respect of efficiency, Schmidt and Sickles (1984) conclude that the MLE is generally
more efficient (asymptotically) than the other estimators as it exploits distributional
information which the others do not and distributional assumptions may be useful in
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estimating the parameters of frontiers. The MLE also has one major advantage: it is
applicable to a wide variety of situations (Kleinbaum eta!., 1988).
In summary, many of the estimators are concerned with either how to make use of the
consistent least squares estimates or how to modif' the estimation techniques to account
for the special nature of the disturbances. COLS can be employed for the deterministic
frontier, MLE for all three models, and the 'Within' estimation and GLS are limited to
panel data models.
6.6 PORT PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
Measures of port efficiency (or port performance indicators) use a certain form of output
relative to input which quantifies various aspects of port operation. UNCTAD (1975) lists
several benefits associated with a properly used set of port performance indicators. These
include improving the utilisation of port resources, highlighting the cause of congestion as
well as providing information for port planning and a justification for capital development.
To measure, however, port performance and to compare it between ports is a very delicate
matter (Suykens, 1983), as there are great differences in their geographical location and
this sometimes influences their technical structures. The various sizes of ports, the
variability of the ships calling at them and goods passing through them impose more
difficulties in defining and measuring such performance. De Monie (1987, p. 1) points out
the difficulties as follows:
• the sheer number of parameters involved;
• the lack of up-to-date, factual and reliable data, collected in an
accepted manner and available for publication;
• the absence of generally agreed and acceptable definitions;
• the profound influence of local factors on the data obtained; and
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• the divergent interpretations given by various interests to identical
results.
In addition to the awkwardness caused by factors such as these, another thing which greatly
complicates measurement is the fact that the operational performance of a port or terminal
is normally judged by measurements that are heavily dependent on factors over which the
port or terminal has limited or no control (Dowd and Leschine, 1990). The limiting factors
are either physical (e.g. geographical location of the part and the type of vessels visiting
the port) or institutional factors (e.g. union work rules, customs regulations, and
requirements imposed on the port operator by carriers) or a combination of both.
Traditionally, the performance of ports has been evaluated either by calculating cargo-
handling productivity (e.g. Bendall and Stent, 1987) or by measuring a single factor
productivity (e.g. labour as in the case of De Monie, 1987), or by comparing its actual
throughput (i.e. tonnage or number of containers handled) with its optimum throughput for
a specific period of time (e.g. Talley, 1988). The crucial aspect in the latter approach is
how to determine the optimum throughput of a port, since port performance is a relative
measure which depends on this measured optimum throughput. For its determination, a
number of measurements have been undertaken using either an engineering approach or an
economic approach. A definition of the two optimum tbroughputs is provided by Talley
(1988, pp. 328-329):
• a port's engineering optimum throughput is the maximum
throughput that can physically be handled by the port under
certain conditions for a specified time period; and
• a port's economic optimum throughput is the throughput that
satisfies an economic objective of the port for a specified time
period
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Another argument put forward by Talley (1994) is that, in a competitive environment, ports
should consider their economic optimum throughput when comparing actual to optimum
throughput in evaluating their performance. The overall economic objective of a port may
be to maximise profits or to maximise throughput subject to several constraints. In a case
where reliable estimates of economic optimum throughput are not available, Talley (1988;
1994) suggests that performance indicators related to the port's economic objective may be
used to evaluate its overall performance. In a private port, its economic objective may be to
maximise profits while, in a public port, its objective may be to maximise throughput
subject to a zero profit (or zero deficit) constraint. Such an approach, however, suffers from
another problem, how should these indicators be selected?
In an effort to properly evaluate the efficiency or performance of a port, several methods
have been suggested, such as estimation of a port cost function (De Neufville and
Tsunokawa, 1981) or the estimation of the total factor productivity of a port (Kim and
Sachish, 1986). Tongzon (1995) attempts to establish a model of port performance and
efficiency and to quantif' the relative contribution of each variable to overall performance
and efficiency using multiple regression. In so doing, it is assumed that ports are
throughput maximisers and that the definition of port performance is measured in terms of
the number of containers moved through a port.
As noted by Braeutigam eta!. (1984), various types of ports are of different size and face a
variety of traffic mix. As such, the use of cross-sectional, time-series or even panel data
may fail to show basic differences amongst ports, thus leading to a misjudgement of each
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port's performance. It is, therefore, crucial to estimate econometrically the structure of
production in ports at the single port or terminal level using appropriate data such as the
panel data for a terminal (Kim and Sachish, 1986).
In respect to attempts to derive a port production function, Chang (1978) focused on
general cargo-handling as a measurement of port performance and assumed that port
operations follow the conventional Cobb-Douglas case as expressed by:
- Y=AKaLJ9eT(T/L) 	 (6.20)
where Y is annual gross earnings (in real term), K is the real value of net assets in the
port, L is the number of labourers per year and the average number of employees per month
each year, and e"IT/L) a proxy for technological improvement, in which (T/L) shows the
tonnage per unit of labour. Chang (1978) argued that, for the estimation of a production
function such as (6.20), the output of a port should be measured in terms of either total
tonnage handled at the port or its gross earnings. This was to be preferred to port services,
since the production function of an organisation involves its internal operation. Bendall and
Stent (1987) improve the model (6.20) to aid policy makers in assessing the merits of
different ship types.
A more elaborate method of estimating the production function of a port was conducted by
Liu (1995) who, under certain assumptions, econometrically estimated the production
function of UK ports by employing frontier models such as those specified in equations
(6.12) and (6.16). In the model adopted by Liu (1995), the output was measured by
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turnover, which consists of the amount receivable (except for sales of property) in respect
of the port services provided to third parties. The labour input was measured by the value
of total wage payments and the capital input by the net-book value of fixed capital assets
including land, buildings, dredging, dock structures, roads, plants and equipment. Finally,
all variables included in the model are deflated using appropriate price indices.
Regarding port production, Liu (1995, p. 268) mentions the following:
"The process of port prbduction is complex, consisting of pilotage,
towage, berthing, cargo handling and warehousing. Also, modem
ports tend to diversify beyond traditional port activities into
distribution, related transport and property trading. Ideally it would
be best to concentrate on one particular production process, for
example, cargo handling. But this is impossible with the [reliable]
data available."
As for a container terminal, its productivity is primarily concerned with the efficient use of
labour, equipment and land (Dowd and Leschine, 1990). Terminal productivity
measurement, therefore, is a means of quantifying the efficiency in utilising these three
resources. Bernard (1991) questions whether total tonnage handled at a port s as a measure
of the output of port production, should be applied to container terminals; since the basic
unit of measurement is a container and since the facility inputs required for the movement
of a container is more or less the same irrespective of size and weight, the use of total
tonnage handled seems illogical. Some adjustments, therefore, are required to account for
size change. Modern technology has, however, reduced the impact of the alteration. One
possible solution of representing the output of a container terminal may be provided by
measuring the throughput in terms of container movements across the quayside (i.e.
TEUs).
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CHAPTER SEVEN
PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY OF THE CONTAINER TERMINALS:
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Following the theoretical models discussed and developed in the previous chapter, this
chapter aims to empirically estimate the productive efficiency of a sample set of container
terminals in Korea and the UK. Based on the econometric frontier model developed in the
previous chapter, the efficiency of the terminal operating companies based on both cross-
sectional data and panel data is estimated. For the purpose of the research, prior to
conducting the empirical investigation, the theoretical model is appropriately
operationalised so that it can be converted into a working model. Finally, the empirical
results derived are interpreted and assessed.
7.2 OPERATIONALISING THE MODEL
A conceptual or theoretical model is required to be transformed into a more realistic model
for the purpose of empirical analysis. This procedure is defined by Simon and Burstein
(1985) as the operationalisation of the theoretical concepts or models, a task which induces
finding appropriate empirical proxies for the theoretical variables. The procedure of
operational isation, therefore, involves the final step of preparing and processing the data
needed to undertake the empirical analysis together with the final specification of the
model and the assumptions upon which it is based.
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7.2.1 Data Sources
The data used in this research has been extracted from the annual reports and financial
accounts published by each container terminal. For an international comparison with a
country where port privatisation policies have had more time to work, the main container
terminals in the UK have been included in the analysis. The UK terminals selected for
inclusion account for a significant proportion of total UK container traffic and have
different ownership attributes not only amongst themselves but, most importantly, as
compared to their Korean counterparts.
The cross-sectional and panel observations on output and inputs for each terminal are
established in terms of various terminal attributes. BCTOC (the operating company of the
Jasungdae terminal) represents a purely public organisation, while PECT (the operator of
the Shinsundae terminal) is a private company. These two operating companies carry out
their activities within a Korean business environment in which the government is heavily
involved'. The UK side includes the Tilbury Container Services Company which was
formerly part of a trust port but which is now a private company, the, Southampton
Container Terminals Company which forms part of Associated British Ports PLC, and
the purely private Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company operating the Trinity and
Landguard terminals 2. A summary description of the overall data set appears in Table 7.1.
(1) Since UTC, the operating company of the Uam terminal had only partially commenced its operation in
1996, the available data was judged insufficient for its inclusion in the analysis.
(2) Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company consists of five divisions including Dooley Terminal, Rail, and
Warehouse and Dock Basin Divisions. Only the data associated with the operations of the two container
terminal divisions have been used for this analysis.
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Table 7. 1 Summary of Data Set
Container Terminal Operators	 Years	 Observations
Busan Container Terminal Operation Corporation	 1978 - 1996	 19
Pusan East Container Terminal Company 	 1991 - 1996	 6
Tilbury Container Services Company 	 1979 - 1996	 18
Southampton Container Terminals Company 	 1987 - 1996	 10
Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company	 1985 - 1996	 12
TOTAL	 65
7.2.2 Description of the Variables
Dowd and Leschine (1990) argue that the productivity of a container terminal depends on
the efficient use of labour, land and equipment. It seems logical, therefore, to take labour
and capital (including land, buildings and equipment) as the input variables for a terminal
production function. An analysis of the average expenditure pattern of a port or a terminal
over time in accordance with this conventional categorisation of inputs is shown in Figure
7.1.
Figure 7. 1 A Normal Port/Terminal Expenditure Pattern
other
equiprTEnt .
	 5%
15%
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• Source: Derived from Sachish (1996, p. 347)
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As a proxy for the capital input variable, the combined values of buildings and equipment
(mainly cargo-handling equipment) accounts for an average of 42 % of total expenditure.
Thus, the labour and capital costs of a port or terminal together comprise 95 % of the total
cost structure of port or terminal operations. It seems reasonable enough to assume that this
can be taken as sufficient, therefore, to describe the whole cost account.
Labour input can customarily be defined as an aggregate of the number of employees in a
terminal operation. This will likely relate to two complementary, but fundamentally
different groups of labourers: those hired directly by the terminal company and the
stevedores employed by stevedoring companies who work on a sub-contract basis. With
regard to the level of skill of labourers, the total wage bill (payments made for labour)
which is quoted in value terms rather than in physical terms (the number of employees)
may, to some extent, be a preferable input variable.
In practice, however, an accounting system adopted by one company may be different to
that of others, a fact that puts a certain limitation on the collection of data necessary for the
analysis. This problem is made worse by the fact that the required data is internationally
dispersed. Under these circumstances, a possible solution is to collect only data which are
consistently accounted for in financial statements in all areas of the world.
For this reason, the current research defines labour input as two different aggregates; one is
the total remuneration of directors or executives for their managerial services (L 1) and the
other, the total wages and salaries paid to employees (L 2). The input capital variable is also
divided into two aggregates. One is the net book value of fixed equipment, buildings and
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land utilised for the purpose of terminal operations (K 1) and the other is the net book value
of mobile and cargo handling equipment including container cranes, yard tractors and fork
lifts (K2).
As far as the output of a container terminal is concerned, there are two alternatives: a proxy
either in value terms or in physical units. Financial output may be measured by annual
'turnover', while physical units such as 'TEU throughput' may also be used over a given
time period'. This research defines, as terminal output, the turnover derived from container
terminal services (Y), which excludes property sales. Finally, where relevant, the data for
all variables collected are deflated by appropriate price indices to incorporate real values
into the analysis and ensuing model estimation. A summary of the major properties of the
variables is presented in Table 7.2 (Full data set is shown in Appendix 5).
Table 7. 2 Statistical Properties of the Variables
(Unit: £ 000s)
Variables	 Mean	 Median	 Minimum	 Maximum	 Standard Deviation
Output(Y)	 21929.75	 14035.25	 594.72	 70771.91	 20171.98
Labour(L 1 )	 208.00	 146.40	 0.00	 1163.20	 244.85
Labour(L2)	 9585.35	 3049.91	 15.14	 40056.41	 12400.42
Capital (K 1 )	 17287.38	 536.13	 14.90	 110484.29	 32046.35
Capital (K2)	 5107.37	 220.88	 32.56	 34342.07	 10309.40
(1) The unit of container TEU is regarded as a homogeneous product which is a very realistic assumption.
The output of a terminal can, therefore, be measured in TEU throughput over a given time period. The
present research, however, found the output 'turnover' more explicable of terminal production, in part
due to the financial nature of the inputs into the model.
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7.2.3 Model Specification and Assumptions
The estimation of relative terminal operator efficiency is conducted by assuming the
appropriateness of the log-linear Cobb-Douglas case'. Therefore, the logarithmic stochastic
frontier model specified for the container terminal operating sector in the cross-sectional
case is defmed by:
In Y t = lnf(L, 1, L211, K, t, K21; /1) + V:1 - U:t,	 I = 1,2, . . , 5; t = 1,2, . . , T	 (7.1)
where Y11 represents the output of the Ith container terminal operator at time t, L1 it L211,
K, 11
 and '2f( denote labour and capital input variables, associated with the ith terminal
operator at time t, and ft is a vector of input coefficients for the associated independent
variables in the model and is the object of estimation. The disturbance term v 1 represents
the symmetric (statistical noise) component and Ujt ( ^ 0 ) the one-sided (inefficiency)
component.
Concerning the sample data for the cross-sectional frontier model, the pooled data set is
used and treated as if it were generated from the cross-sectional terminal operators in a
single period.
For the application of the panel data, the model (7.1) is transformed into:
ln Y11 = lnf(L, 11, L211, K, 11, K21; ,.8) + v 1 - uj,	 i = 1,2, . . , 5; t = 1,2, . . , T	 (7.2)
(1) A number of other linear functions (e.g. the transtog) are available, but the focus of this research is
efficiency measurement, rather than the intricacies of selecting the function itself.
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In the model (7.2), the one-sided disturbance term Uj ( ^ 0 ) represents the 'terminal
operator-specific time invariant inefficiency'.
For the purpose of the empirical analysis, some assumptions also have to be made. The
overall objective of terminal operators is assumed to be the maximisation of their profits
stemming from operational activities. In other words, a terminal operating company is
regarded as a profit-maximiser. The terminal operators are also assumed to be price takers
in their input markets. Hence, input prices may be treated as exogenous. Another
assumption necessary for operationalising the models given in (7.1) and (7.2) is that they
represent a single-output production function. This is justified on the basis that the main
operational function of container terminals and the main issue of policy interest is
container handling. Thus, earnings from sources such as the sales of terminal property are
not classified as output and do not affect the production function frontier.
Finally, the concept of the average terminal frontier is applied as the definition of the
frontier. Estimation of terminal efficiency is conducted using an econometric software
package LIMDEP 7.01 (Greene, 1995).
7.2.4 Parameters and Likelihood Functions
The estimation commences with an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation procedure
which provides the starting values for ensuring the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).
(1) LIMDEP 7.0 has several options concerning assumptions made on the disturbance distribution: the
normal distribution is employed for v and the half-normal, exponential and truncated normal cases are
available for u in the case of the cross-sectional model and the half-normal distribution for u in the
panel data model. Moreover, the panel model can be estimated with balanced or unbalanced panels. The
cross-sectional and panel models are estimated using OLS and MLE.
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The skewness of OLS residuals is checked, however, prior to the implementation of the
MLE. If the OLS residuals are positively skewed (skewed to the right), then the MLE for
the frontier model is simply the OLS estimates for the coefficients, and Oy2 and cru2 0. In
theory, for the MLE estimation of the stochastic frontier model, the distribution of the OLS
residuals must be skewed to the left (Waidman, 1982). The estimation procedure will
therefore be ceased if the residuals are not negatively skewed; a situation that may arise
due to an inappropriately specified model or to inconsistent data (Greene, 1993). In
addition, Waldman (1982) suggests that the sign of the third moment of the OLS residuals
be checked. The fact that the third moment is positive indicates the OLS residuals are
inappropriately skewed for the continued application of the estimation procedure. Thus, the
skewness of the sample residuals is informative about the extent of inefficiency (Greene,
1997).
MLE for the container terminal frontier is conducted by the David-Fletcher-Powell
algorithm (Fletcher, 1980; Greene, 1997) which is an iterative and effective procedure. The
MLE technique requires distributional assumptions on the symmetric component v and the
one-sided component u. In models (7.1) and (7.2), the statistical noise v is identically and
independently distributed as N(0, av2) and two error components v and u are independent of
one another and of the input variables. Based on these assumptions, three alternative
formulations and specifications are taken into consideration for the inefficiency term u 1 for
the cross-sectional model (7.1).
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. For the half-normal case (Aigner et al., 1977):
r	 \21
	2 	 I	 1tuI
f(u) =	 expI
	 I I
	Vir	 [20u)j
ciq5(0)	 IiE(u)=	 =0. I-
a(o)	 u%Iii.
where a = f(o + o) and, q5( .) and t(.) are, respectively, the probability density
function (pdf) and the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the standard normal
distribution. A special note on the variance of u is necessary for the half-normal
assumption; while the variance of v is oj, the variance of u is not o 2, but rather:
Var(u) = (i_Jo	 (7.5)
Therefore, the estimation parameters may mislead as to the relative influence of u on the
total variation in the disturbances (Greene, 1993).
. For the exponential case (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977):
f(u) = Oexp (-Ou)
E(u)=!
• For the truncated normal case (Stevenson, 1980):
f(u)
-	 [ a,, ]
-
.cr)
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=p+o-,,%,,	 (7.9)
0-i,
For accomplishing the MLE, the specification of a likelihood function is necessary
(Kleinbaum et a!., 1988). The following log-likelihood functions for the cross-sectional
model (7.1) are employed:
. For the half-normally distributed term u1:
in L (a, /1, c 2) = - Nm a-- constant + [i(_sii2) _!(l2]
IL	 0-	 2'o)
(7.10)
where N the number of observations, .jg = (v t - u t), and 2 = o /cr (a useful indicator
of the relative variability of the two disturbance terms, and hence is non-negative). One
additional point to be noted is that the variance ratio (cr 2/cr2) shows the influence of the
inefficiency component in the overall variance.
For the exponentially distributed term ut:
inL(a,/3, a-v, 9) N [ln9+!(9c )21 +2	 ]	 [	 a-v -
	
+ Oeii] (7.11)
. For the truncated normally distributed term ut:
inL (a,fl, a-,2,p)= _Ilna-+!in2+!(!-'
2	 2
p 11.+lncJf)1
t.	 L °-	 (a-2)JJ
(7.12)
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u ______
where - - )tcr
For the log-likelihood function of the panel data model (7.2) where the composed error
term 6j = (Vu - ui), the half-normally distributed disturbance term zq is utilised (Pitt and
Lee, 1981; Battese and Coelli, 1988):
lnL	 {_.[21n2_1n2 + 7'lna +ln(l+ 27)_2ln4J]}
+	
[()]2}]
+ 1n	
J 
-L[ 1, 
—
p)+ 7(1_)]}	 (7.13)
where T1 = the number of observations on the ith firm (terminal operator) and X =
G/cY.
For statistical inference from MLE models, the likelihood ratio statistic is 'applied to test
whether or not model coefficients are significantly different from zero. Since the maximum
likelihood method is a large-sample estimation procedure (Maddala, 1992), it is required
that an asymptotic test statistic be used; the likelihood ratio test is one of the general large-
sample tests based on the MLE, which has a %2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal
to the number of restrictions imposed. Under general conditions, the likelihood ratio test
statistic (LR) can be expressed as follows (Engle, 1984):
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LR=-2 1ni'--	 (7.14)
where LR denotes 'restricted' likelihood function and L 'unrestricted' likelihood
function.
7.2.5 Efficiency Estimation
The main theme of the frontier model as a technique of efficiency measurement is
concerning the specification and estimation of u. The inefficiency term u, however, must
be observed indirectly because the procedure estimates the residual s, not u (Greene, 1993).
In the case of a cross-sectional model such as (7.1), Jondrow et a!. (1982) suggest the
conditional expectation of ut, conditioned on the realised value of the error term 611= (vet -
as an estimator of u. In other words, E{u,, Is,,] is the 'mean productive inefficiency'
for the ith terminal operator in the industry at sample time t. This estimate enables us to
measure the inefficiency for each observation in the cross-sectional framework.
• For the half-normal model:
•	 1()	 1
____I	 o-) 611 2 1
	
E{u,, k11 1= (1+ ,%2) J (_ .!•:'i - -:-,	
(7.15)
L	 cr)	 j
• For the exponential model:
_eo)1
E[u,,Iei,]=(,, -o)+	
y	 j (7.16)
cI{
(si, 
-eo)1
0•,,	 J
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. For the truncated normal model: the inefficiency term is obtained by replacing
(e,, ..%) / o in equation (7.15) with
cT	 cT2
	 (7.17)
These provide unbiased, but not consistent, estimates of the inefficiency component u.
Greene (1993) argues that, regardless of the number of observations, the inconsistency
stems from the fact that the variance of the estimate remains nonzero, not from the fact that
the estimates converge to some other quantity. Again, Greene (1993) notes that,
unfortunately, no improvement might be expected on this measure for the cross-sectional
framework in the near future.
By generalising the cross-sectional results in Jondrow et a!. (1982) to panel models,
Battese and Coelli (1988) propose the estimation of the 'time-invariant terminal operator-
specific inefficiency' u under the half-normal assumption:
( *\ -i
[_
\o•*,) I= p, + a,,	
,.	
(7.18)
a.,)]
1	 1(_
	where ', =r11u+(i_r,)(,), TI 
=(	 and a.,I 1+-I
	
'..	 7)
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Equations (7.15) to (7.18) as applied to the measurement of inefficiency require the
calculation of the probability density and cumulative distribution functions of the standard
normal distribution'.
7.3 THE HYPOTHESIS FOR INVESTIGATION
The selected five terminal companies can be described by borrowing the concepts
discussed in section 4.7.2 of Chapter 4 for testing the importance of container terminal
ownership. Referring to the horizontal axis of Figure 4.3 in Chapter 4 and as illustrated in
Figure 7.2, BCTOC may be located between B and C, PECT between D and E, Tilbury and
Southampton between E and F, and Felixstowe at F. The panel observations on output and
inputs for each terminal are established in terms of various terminal attributes according to
Figure 7.2.
Figure 7. 2 Terminal Ownership Attributes
LEffic Gain
o
o
Public Sector	 Private Sector
(1) LJMDEP 7.0 provides these estimated inefficiencies for the cross-sectional and the panel cases as
regression options along with a few matrix commands.
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Based on the ownership characteristics of terminal operators illustrated in Figure 7.2, the
research hypothesis is established for investigation as follows:
"The productive efficiency of terminal operators improves as ownership
moves along the continuum towards greater private sector participation (i.e.
the movement away from A and towards F)"
7.4 THE PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY OF THE TERMINAL OPERATORS:
THE CROSS-SECTIONAL MODEL
The first step in the estimation procedure is checking the sign of the third moment and the
skewness of the OLS residuals associated with the sample data. The third moment for the
terminal frontier model is -0.762, implying by its negative sign that the residuals are
correctly (i.e. negatively) skewed. The histogram of the residuals shown in Figure 7.3 has a
longer tail on the left side (or negative skewness), also implying that the residuals of the
sample data is correctly shaped for the next step in the MLE procedure.
Figure 7. 3 Skewness of the OLS Residuals
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Based on the cross-sectional data, the OLS estimates and the MLEs for each of the three
assumed distributions of the inefficiency terms in the terminal frontier model (7.1) are
presented in Table 7.3. Although the OLS coefficients only have a limited usefulness, they
do, however, provide a starting value for the MLE process. The goodness of fit of the
estimated regression equation evaluated by R 2 for the OLS method looks reasonably high
at 0.785, revealing that the four inputs to the model do satisfactorily explain the model
output. In addition, the F-statistic of 54.70 shows that a significant relationship is present
between exogenous and endogenous variables at the 1 % significance level and that all
variables, except the first labour input (L 1 ), are statistically significant at the 5 % level.
Table 7. 3 Frontier Production Function of Container Terminals
Variables/	 OLS	 ______________	 MLE	 _____________
Parameters	 half-normal	 Exponential	 Truncated normal
Constant	 10.418	 11.609	 11.801	 11.774
(17.192)	 (17.685)	 (22.346)	 (20.936)
In L 1	 0.043"	 0.055	 0.048	 0.048
(1.306)	 (2.193)	 (2.634)	 (2.269)
In L2	 0.123	 0.056'	 0.049"	 0.053"
(2.267)	 (1.348)	 (1.278)	 (1.318)
InK1
	0.149	 0.171	 0.159	 0.162
(3.9 17)	 (3.786)	 (4.465)	 (4.225)
InK2
	0.129	 0.120	 0.120	 0.119
(2.981)	 (2.576)	 (3.086)	 (2.721)
-	 4.078	 2.026	 5.811
a 2	
-	 0.027	 0.038	 0.039
a 2	
-	 0.449	 0.156	 1.317
0	 -	
-	 2.529	 -
-	 -	
-	 1.798
Log-likelihood	 -	 -33.799	 -31.019	 -31.734
Notes: (1) * Not signiticant at the 1% level;	 Not signiticant at the 5% level.
(2) Figures in parentheses indicate t-ratios.
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The MLEs under the three alternative cases yield parameters that are close to each other.
An interesting point to be addressed here is that, except the second labour input (L 2), the
MLEs differ only marginally from the OLS estimates. This is to be expected since both
methods are consistent. Concerning statistical inference, the likelihood ratio test statistic
(LR = 99.852)' is significant at the 1 % level, thus allowing the rejection of the null
hypothesis that the coefficients in the model are equal to zero.
7.4.1 Mean Inefficiency and Disturbance Variation
The mean of the inefficiency component u by the specification (7.4) is E(u) = 0.53 5 under
the half-normal assumption. This means that the average shortfall of output is 53.5 %
below its maximum possible frontier, equivalent to 58.6 % efficiency2. For the exponential
case, the inefficiency mean by equation (7.7) is E(u) = 0.395, implying an efficiency level
of 67.4 %. The mean of inefficiency component under the truncated normal assumption is
E(u) = 0.42 by equation (7.9), yielding an average efficiency of 65.7 %. These figures
show us that the half-normal estimates of the mean of inefficiency u are slightly higher
than under the other two assumptions. The overall productive inefficiency levels of
terminal operators under the three assumptions over the sample period are illustrated in
Figure 7.4, which shows graphically that the inefficiency trends are remarkably parallel
over the period. In fact, the worst correlation over time between different inefficiency
estimates for any operator is impressively high at 0.987.
(1) According to (7.14), LR = -2 (-90.2997 + 40.3409) = 99.8516. The critical value at 5 degrees of
freedom is 15.0863.
(2) The average efficiency is estimated by exp(-u) as the counterpart of average inefficiency.
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Figure 7. 4 Overall Productive Inefficiency Levels under the Three Assumptions
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The parameter 2 (= Ou /cr) gives an insight into the relative variance of the two composite
errors in the total variation in the overall structural disturbance. The two variances of the
error components, along with 2, indicate that the inefficiency component u varies more
widely than the uncontrolled exogenous component v. This means that the productive
inefficiency u plays a more important part in total error variability in the cross-sectional
frontier model. Under the half-normal assumption, as mentioned earlier, the variance of u
is 0.714 by formulation (7.5), not a 2 = 0.449. The ratio of cr,2 to 2 (again, Var(u) in the
case of the half-normal distribution) provides the information of how much the efficiency
component u influences the overall variation of disturbances. The ratios are 96.4 % in the
half-normal case, 80.4 % in the exponential case, and 97.1 % under the truncated normal
assumption. These figures indicate that the component u has a great effect on total error
variation. In contrast, uncontrollable shocks, represented by the estimated variance of v
were a less important source of variability. This may be due to the fact that
uncontrolled shocks such as weather conditions do not seem to affect the business (outputs)
of container terminals.
7.4.2 Efficiency Level of Terminal Operators
With respect to the productive efficiency of each terminal operator for each time period,
equations (7.15) to (7.17) are employed. Prior to analysing the efficiency level of each
sampled terminal operator, it is useful to see the average efficiency level as shown in Table
7 .4.
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Table 7. 4 Average Productive Efficiency of Terminal Operators
(Unit:
Container Terminal Operators 	 Half-Normal	 Exponential	 Truncated
Normal
Busan Container Terminal Operation Corporation 	 52.0	 57.7	 56.7
Pusan East Container Terminal Company 	 78.9	 83.4	 82.3
Tilbury Container Services Company	 59.3	 65.1	 63.6
0.5	 I	 71.0	 I	 68.6
Felixstowe Dock and Rail Company	 64.8	 I	 77.8	 I	 75.2
Note: Figures are computed by converting the inefficiency estimates using exp(-u).
Throughout all three assumptions, the efficiency level of PECT is consistently highest
followed by Felixstowe, Southampton, Tilbury and finally BCTOC. An intriguing result is
that PECT (a quasi-private terminal operator in the context of Korean business
circumstances) performs more efficiently than its UK counterparts which actually enjoy
more freedom over the management of their terminal operations. The efficiency of the
other four terminal operators ranks as expected according to the underlying privatisation
theory. The estimated productive inefficiency of the five container terminal operators for
the duration of the sample period is comprehensively shown in Appendix 6.
If the efficiency levels of BCTOC are examined before and after 1990, the year when
PECT was established, we can discover whether or not the newly introduced competition
has encouraged BCTOC to operate more efficiently. As can be seen in Figure 7.5, the
average efficiency level of I3CTOC from 1979 to 1990' is 52.5 %, while the average
efficiency from 1991 to 1996 is 70.9 %.
(1) The starting year 1978 has been treated as an outlier and has been excluded from the calculation due to
the extraordinarily high level of inefficiency found to exist.
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Figure 7. 5 Productive Efficiency of BCTOC (1979-1996)
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On average, therefore, the efficiency level improves significantly between the two periods.
A significant improvement in the productive efficiency of BCTOC occurred, however, a
few years before competition was introduced in the Korean port industry. This
phenomenon probably verifies the assertion of contestable markets theory (Baumol et a!.,
1982; Baumol, 1982), that merely the threat or anticipation of competition, rather than
competition itself, is sufficient to stimulate a market response in the form of efforts to
achieve greater efficiency. On the other hand, the efficiency improvement at BCTOC may
merely be a coincidental and natural corollary of the increased availability and/or lower
cost of advanced technology or simply the result of the ongoing more general liberalisation
of the business environment in Korea.
Moving to the UK side, the efficiency of the three terminals is ranked as expected. In
general, as illustrated in Figure 7.6, except for 1990 and 1991 when the highest efficiency
CC,
U
Ui
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level was achieved by Southampton, the purely private operator Felixstowe was the most
efficient operator over the research period, followed by Southampton and Tilbury.
Figure 7. 6 The Productive Efficiency of the Three UK Terminal Operators
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7.5 TERMINAL OPERATOR-SPECIFIC EFFICIENCY: THE PANEL MODEL
The log-likelihood function in (7.13) for the panel model was again estimated by the
David-Fletcher-Powell method under the assumptions that the two disturbances are
independent of each other and v 1 - N(O, o) and U - N(O, o). Based on the panel data,
some of whose benefits for analysis are explained in section 6.4.4, the MLEs of the
terminal frontier model (7.2) are presented in Table 7.5. As in the cross-sectional model,
with a ratio of o)/c? calculated at 93.7 %, the inefficiency disturbance u is more important
to the total variation of the error components, indicating that uncontrolled shocks (denoted
by o) do not significantly influence the overall variation.
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Table 7. 5 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Panel Frontier Model
Coefficients	 Asymptotic Standard Error
Constant	 11.604	 0.52570E+08
in L 1	0.039	 0.19265E+07
in L2	0.100	 0.19445E+07
inK1
	0.111	 0.30466E+07
InK2	0.159	 0.13818E+07
A.	 14.901
o,2
	0.182
2.712
Log-likelihood	 -48.089
Note: A. = ; 2 /c
Given the parameters in Table 7.5, we are now able t measttre the 'tnze invarizzt tez7nina)
operator-level efficiency' of each operator according to the formula in (7.18). Figure 7.7
shows the specific efficiency for the five sample container terminal operators.
Figure 7. 7 Terminal Operator-Specific Time Invariant Efficiency
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As was the case in the cross-sectional model, PECT is ranked highest in terms of firm-
specific efficiency at 75.7 %, followed by 55.5 % for Southampton, 55.1 % for Felixstowe,
51.9 % for Tilbury and finally 41.1 % for BCTOC. The difference between this result and
that of the cross-sectional model is that the ranking among the UK terminal operators has
changed with the efficiency level of Southampton now higher under the panel model than
that of Felixstowe.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
DISCUSSION, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
8.1 INTERPRETATION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As the basis of the empirical investigation conducted within this study, it is hypothesised
that the alteration of port ownership from public to private sector results in efficiency
improvement. In other words, that a private terminal operator performs more efficiently
than a public one. The findings drawn from an empirical analysis based on the use of the
stochastic frontier model reveal, however, that ownership does not seem to be categorically
related to efficiency in port operations. The overall results of the terminal frontier analysis
have not provided clear-cut and indisputable evidence that the terminal operators who
enjoy more freedom in carrying out their business perform more efficiently than the
operators who implement their activities in an environment placing greater regulation upon
them.
Under the more regulated business environment imposed by the Korean gQvernment, the
private terminal operator PECT was found to have the highest level of efficiency during the
sample period in both the cross-sectional and panel models. In contrast, the efficiency of all
the private sector UK operators that carry on their activities in what is basically a
deregulated environment showed lower levels of efficiency than PECT their counterpart in
Korea. The efficiency of this group was, however, higher than that of the public sector
operator BCTOC, which yielded the lowest estimate of productive efficiency in both
models for the sample period covered by the research. With respect to the relative
efficiency of PECT as compared to UK operators, the results contradict the research
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hypothesis. The results achieved from the analysis of both the cross-sectional and panel
models reveal that PECT outperforms its UK counterparts.
The most convincing and consistent result stemming from the empirical analysis is that
PECT, the Korean private sector organisation, operates a great deal more efficiently than
its public rival BCTOC. PECT has the highest degree of productive efficiency whilst
BCTOC operates with the lowest degree of productive efficiency in both cross-sectional
and panel models. As far as the UK container terminal operators are concerned, the ranking
of productive efficiency in the cross-sectional model concurs with the underlying theory of
privatisation, whereas that in the panel model produces results which contradict the theory.
Unlike the claim made by privatisation theory (i.e. the theory of property rights and public
choice), movement towards greater private sector participation does not seem to be a
crucial factor in influencing efficiency levels, at least within Korean and UK container
ports. Hence, it can be concluded that, according to the results derived from the terminal
frontier analysis, merely changing the ownership of port assets is not sufficient to improve
productive efficiency. Those interested and involved in port reforms and reorganisation,
therefore, should recognise that port privatisation cannot provide the panacea that yields
efficiency enhancement in port operations.
Vickers and Yarrow (1991) and Bishop and Thompson (1992), for example, suggest that to
be a successful policy, privatisation must be planned and implemented, giving due
consideration to the level of market regulation so that effective competition in the market is
promoted. In addition, this view is supported by the Contention that, in order to achieve
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what is expected from the conversion of property rights; that is, efficiency improvement,
port privatisation should be considered and implemented against the whole background of
the country concerned, its political and economic conditions and social culture (Goss,
1990; Thomas, 1994). This argument is highlighted in what follows.
8.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FORMULATION
OF PORT PRIVATISATION POLICY
Guislain (1997) notes that the main objectives driving an overall economic programme
should be defined as the first step towards privatisation policy. This is because most
industrial privatisation programmes within industrial sectors are an integral part of more
comprehensive economic reform. In some sense, the development of a privatisation
strategy involves (i) identifying government's overall objectives, (ii) analysing existing
and/or possible constraints in implementing the programme, and (iii) deciding on an
approach to accomplish the defined targets whilst taking the impediments into
consideration. As part of establishing the port privatisation strategy, therefore, the
characteristics of a country concerned and its port industry should be recognised. Figure
8.1 shows two sets of characteristics, relating to country and industry, which significantly
impact upon port privatisation policy.
First, privatisation strategies need to be realistically geared to the specific circumstances
and characteristics of the country; the political, institutional, economic and social setting
must be carefully analysed. Second, privatisation programmes are also influenced by the
existing structure of the industry such as the current nature of ownership, the financial
situation and any applicable environmental obligations and restrictions.
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Figure 8. 1 Development of Port Privatisation Strategy
Country Characteristics
Political, Institutional, Economic and Social Setting
Characteristics of Port Industry
Industry Structure and Environmental Restrictions
Port Privatisation
Strategy
According to this framework, the next sections examine the country characteristics of
Korea; a nation that has launched ambitious general economic privatisation and
deregulation programmes under which some form of port restructuring, such as
privatisation, has been considered and implemented.
8.2.1 Country Characteristics
Since privatisation is, above all, a political process which is likely to radically disrupt the
conditions of various stakeholders (Antal-Mokos, 1998), political decision-makers should
attempt to predict possible obstacles to the programme. A variety of reluctance or
resistance within, as well as outside, the government and the industry and/or company
concerned can hinder the privatisation process or limit its success and/or scope. Guislain
(1997) lists several reasons for such opposition including, among others, (i) the desire to
retain national control over certain activities or interests perceived to be strategic, (ii) the
sense that state ownership is needed to safeguard the public interest, (iii) a distrust of the
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private sector that is willing to become involved in the programme, and (iv) the protection
of bureaucratic or other vested interests.
Turning to the Korean situation, all of the above reasons are likely obstacles to the
implementation of any privatisation programme. In order to catch up with the industrialised
countries within a short period of time, the Korean government maintained responsibility
for overall industrial policies. As the nation's president in the 1960s and 1970s, Park
(1970) asserted that, wherever necessary, the state has controlled production under the
name of stimulating national development and that this authoritarian system, he believed,
has protected the interests of the people. This command economy ideology does still exert
considerable influence over the country's industries and has caused the present notorious
bureaucracy which is characterised by a lack of enthusiasm, corruption and an inefficient
and inflexible administrative system (Financial Times, 1998). The excessive domination of
industry by government is regarded as a necessary evil and, in the past, has been accepted
as a natural pre-condition to the nation's economic development. On the other hand, it now
poses a serious barrier to further development at a time when more open and market-driven
ideas predominate in international business.
As the 21st century approaches, by removing redundant traditions, the role of government
and public authorities should be enhanced in terms of its quality of administration. Lodge
(1987) suggested, for example, that tension mounts as business freedom to innovate and
grow becomes increasingly essential to Korea's ability to develop still further. This
suggestion sits alongside his assertion that the Korean society has been, and continues to
be, dominated by authoritarian statists. These views are supported by Jun (1996) who
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suggests that the government should not directly control business activities and impose
more regulations on the private sector, and that political and administrative institutions be
transformed in order to remove constraints on individual growth as well as to further
develop business activity, especially of privately managed companies. Again, Jun (1996)
warns policy-makers and government bureaucrats that, to initiate an active and responsible
society in the newly-emerged global environment, they should critically perceive the ever
changing world and take actions to create challenging opportunities.
Another crucial factor influencing the structural reform of a country is its economic
condition. Currently, Korea is in economic plight, the first important sign of' which was the
sharp depreciation of the nation's currency against the US dollar in late 1997. In attempting
to deal with the sort of crisis that Korea has never experienced before, the winds of
economic reform and restructuring are sweeping through all sectors of the domestic
economy. Not surprisingly, public or state enterprises are emerging as the final bastion of
vested interests; public corporations often called 'chaebols' (huge business conglomerates)
without owners (Sohn, 1998a) have increasingly become the target of criticism for their
loose and inefficient management. Present efforts toward economic reform will amount to
nothing if the government or public authorities fail to restructure these public enterprises
which contribute a large proportion of the nation's wealth (Economist, 1998).
Sohn (1998a) points out that the current crisis facing public sector companies can be
attributed to two fundamental factors: inefficient management style and weakening
competitiveness. Both factors derive from governmental intervention into their business
activities and their monopolistic position. As far as fundamental reforms are concerned, the
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privatisation option is being actively and positively considered as a means of solving these
problems (Chon, 1998).
8.2.2 Industry Characteristics
Characteristics specific to an industry can also dictate the measures that need to be taken to
prepare for and implement a privatisation policy. In terms of the three types of port
privatisation categorised by De Monie (1996) in section 5.5, the Korean port industry can
be described as a mixture of the first and third options: that is, a mixture of port
management according to the landlord concept and a division of port activities based on the
creation of mixed public and private enterprises where there is joint investment,
management and operation of a port or a terminal. The overall approach to port
privatisation pursued by the Korean government through its public port authority (i.e. the
MMAF) can, therefore, be characterised as 'public ownership and private operation'; the
MMAF retains all national ports and terminals under its ownership, while private
companies operate them either under a concession or in a joint venture. This approach
coincides closely with the classification of the PUBLIC/private port in whic1 the operation
function is the responsibility of the private sector while the regulatory and landowner
functions are held by the public authority (Baird, 1995; 1997). This conceptualisation is
further supported by the recent proclamation that the government will continue to strive to
ease regulations which may adversely affect the free market system, combined with
making every effort to strengthen environmental and safety regulations to ensure cleaner
and safer seas (Sohn, 1998b).
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As for the administrative structures of the container terminal sector in Korea is concerned,
there exists an important feature worth focusing upon. On behalf of the MMAF as the
public port authority, the KCTA has direct responsibility for the control and supervision of
all container terminals in Korea. This hierarchical system can be seen as atypical since, in
contrast to the vast majority of the world's other PUBLIC/private port ownership
structures, the existence of KCTA adds another layer to the overall port administrative
system. The initial objective for establishing the KCTA in 1990 was to diversify financial
sources, thus enabling efficient and effective development and maintenance of the
container terminal facilities. Almost a decade afler its establishment, there is now
increasing participation from private and foreign sectors, which already have a significant
involvement in terminal development and operations. The main remaining function the
KCTA may be required to undertake is the co-ordination of such involvement, a task that
can easily be fulfilled by a mere department of the MMAF. The Port Construction Bureau
under the supervision of the Assistant Minister for shipping and ports (see Appendix 1) is
one possible department within the MMAF which may be capable of assuming this role.
Since a port can be considered as a facilitator of trade and, therefore, of great importance to
the trade-oriented Korean economy, it is recommended that the overall principle of public
ownership and private operation in the form of a modified landlord port (PUBLIC/private
port) be maintained and reinforced.
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8.2.3 Defining Approaches
Once the objectives and characteristics have been identified, the next step is to ascertain
what approaches need to be undertaken to attain the defined objectives. Measures crucial to
the success of the privatisation process should be established.
The empirical research carried out in the previous chapter consistently suggests that even
within the context of the Korean business environment and compared to the UK container
terminals, the private terminal company PECT performs most efficiently over the sample
period. Logically, therefore, the most efficient policy for the most inefficient container
terminal in the sample (i.e. the BCTOC, a Korean public entity) is for its administration
and management structure to be transformed into one which is similar to that of PECT.
As pointed out by UNCTAD (1995) and Guislain (1997), a simultaneous and sustained
effort on the part of the public authority to develop a consensus on the objectives of the
privatisation process and attempts to explain the reasons for selecting specific approaches
can be extremely beneficial in terms of establishing good public relations, especially with
prospective port users (e.g. cargo and shipowning interests).
8.3 PROMOTING AND PROTECTING COMPETITION
A widespread view in economics is that competition forces economic entities to work
harder. After analysing the effects of privatisation, a variety of literature (analysed in
Chapters 4 and 5) reaches the same conclusion that a successful privatisation policy is
relevant to the introduction, encouragement and protection of competition. Both the public
and the private sectors must pursue the target of efficiency maximisation (i.e. cost
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minimisation and profit maximisation) so that they can maintain comparable prices and
provide quality services. This objective can be best achieved through competition'. Goss
(1995, pp. 16-17) warns that:
"If they [governments] are to rely increasingly on the private
sector then they will need to remember that it is competition
which may make the private sector efficient; most of us have
seen too many examples of private sector inefficiency caused by
a lack of competition, as well as by obsolete rules and excessive
bureaucracy."
The inexorability of the link between competition and efficiency was found in several
works. For example, Hart (1983), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Horn et a!. (1994),
Graziano and Parigi (1998), all found that more competition increases economic efficiency.
The definition of 'more competition', however, has to be clarified. Stigler (1987) defines
competition as a rivalry between individuals (or groups or nations) which arises whenever
two or more parties strive for something which all cannot obtain. Vickers (1995) adopts a
general working definition with the identification of two components concerning 'more
competition': more firms and markets closer to perfect competition. In other words, these
components can be distinguished as follows: (i) an increase in the number orivals, (ii) the
greater freedom of rivals, such as the freedom to enter an industry following the removal of
legal monopoly rights or barriers to business, and (iii) a move away from collusion towards
more independent behaviour between rivals. All three perceptions are closely interlinked.
For example, freedom of entry may result in a greater number of firms that may lead to a
(1) This is a rather controversial issue. Competition may be enhanced by privatisation, but it may also lead
to a monopoly, in particular, a natural monopoly in the port industry due to geographical location and
increasing returns to scale. If, however, characteristics of contestable markets theory (i.e. free entry and
costless exit) are in place, then even natural monopolies are forced to behave competitively by the
threat of entry (Baumol, 1982; Shepherd, 1984). This view has recently been criticised on the grounds
that even if there are very slight entry costs, incumbent firms may be able to exercise considerable
monopoly power (Stiglitz, 1988; Martin, 1993).
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breakdown of collusion. Finally, Mookherjee (1984) asserts that competition may improve
incentives for efficiency by allowing performance comparisons, which is referred to as
'competition-by-comparison'.
With this context in mind, the port authority MMAF has to establish and maintain some
sort of intra-port competition, thus motivating all parties in port administration and
operations to carry on their work more efficiently. Ultimately, this will contribute to the
nation's further development.
8.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR KOREAN PORTS POLICY
The analysis and discussion up to this point leads to the following overall recommendation
on the approaches and measures the Korean port authority should adopt:
. to sustain the principle of 'public ownership and private operation';
to strengthen the monitoring function, especially a regular-based monitoring over all
parties involved in port activities through 'competition-by-comparison';
. to continue to reduce regulation that inevitably unfavourably affects market-driven
activities;
. to transform the administrative and management structure of BCTOC into one which is
similar to that of PECT, UTC and other similar organisations;
. to abolish the KCTA and shift its responsibilities to a division of MMAF (e.g. the
Bureau of Port Construction); and
to engender good public relations, especially with port users.
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8.5 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH
The main motivation for the current research was the Korean government's comprehensive
privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation programme as applied to the whole economy,
but especially as applicable to the port industry. Subsequently, this initial motivation has
been stimulated by the current increasing and urgent demand for the rationalisation of the
nation's industry as it has entered a new era of financial crisis. The objectives for this
research were to evaluate the critical features of port privatisation together with the
economic theory relating to privatisation, to establish an analytical framework for
efficiency measurement which is applicable to the port industry, and to deduce policy
implications for the Korean government and public authority with reference to a
privatisation strategy and its implementation to the nation's ports and terminals. This
research makes an original contribution to knowledge in three respects:
. Korean port privatisation has, for the first time, been scientifically investigated on the
basis of the economic theory of privatisation;
• The industry was analysed through the application of recently developed econometric
and efficiency techniques based on the estimation of two stochastic frontier models (i.e.
the cross-sectional and panel models); and
• The research undoubtedly provides the Korean government, its port authority and other
interested parties with information and guidelines for implementing the policy of port
privatisation.
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8.6 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH AREAS
It should be recognised that any research project has limitations of various kinds. The
following limitations are recognised within the research contained herein.
First, a limitation associated with the nature of port privatisation may be considered. In the
context of port privatisation, it is difficult to dichotomously define a specific port or
terminal as either private or public sector. As mentioned in Chapter 5, 'port privatisation'
can be defmed as the actual transfer of property ownership from the public to the private
sector, or the actual application of private capital to finance investment in port
development and maintenance as well as port activities; 'port ownership' can be explained
in terms of who provides the port facilities and services. These definitions may lead to
conñision. Ultimately, however, a port or a terminal is likely to be either in public or in
private sector ownership or in joint ownership by both (i.e. placed somewhere on a
continuum of private sector participation between the two former extremes).
In addition, the main theme pursued by this research is 'privatisation' but the analysis and
discussion has, to some extent, incorporated the rather different issues of deregulation and
liberalisation. Controlling for the individual effects of these three interacting characteristics
may allow greater fine tuning in policy assessment and/or formulation. These three
concepts, however, have a feature in common; all are concerned with the introduction of
more market-oriented forces; a policy that the Korean government and public authorities
should contemplate as a solution for dealing with the nation's current difficulties.
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Second, it should be acknowledged that the small sample size for data collection within
this research does inevitably undermine the comprehensiveness of the results achieved.
Since the process of port privatisation in Korea is in its very early stages, the available data
from the private sector, such as PECT and UCT, was extremely limited. With more data,
the greater cross-sectional variation in the combinations of the variables extracted from
both the Korean and UK sides, with their great diversity in geography and political
economy, may permit the isolation of differences in their static effects. On the other hand,
time-series variation in the sample may facilitate the assessment of the dynamic impacts of
changes in policy. In addition, as the data collected are related only to container port
operations, a generalisation of the research implications may also be confined. This
restriction could be alleviated on the grounds that the container trade accounts for a major
proportion (in value terms) of current international trade.
Third, in the case of panel model, the efficiency level of each terminal operator is estimated
as 'time-invariant' over the sample period. As mentioned in Chapter 6, time-invariant
efficiency is not an attractive assumption. Given the lack of available techniques fully
capable of overcoming the implausibility of this assumption for empirical application,
however, the results based on the time-invariant terminal operator level efficiency still
provide a useful insight for those interested in port administration and management.
Fourth, another limitation of the methodology with respect to two sources of inefficiency
may be identified. This research was concerned with productive (in)efficiency only. The
production process of a container terminal operator (e.g. the cargo handling process) may
exhibit productive inefficiency, allocative inefficiency or both simultaneously. As
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discussed in Chapter 6, allocative inefficiency exists when the marginal rate of technical
substitution between any two of its inputs is not equal to the ratio of corresponding input
prices. Reasons for allocative inefficiency may include regulatory constraints and
incremental adjustment to price changes, which have lots of policy implications, none of
which are addressed within the boundaries set for this study.
Finally, a number of research areas for further investigation can be identified in light of
these research limitations. First, in order to validate and generalise the research results,
more and wider data should be collected from ports and terminals in terms of types of
cargo handled. This would also strengthen the justification for the use of the asymptotic
MLE. Second, a more sophisticated but empirically applicable model should be
investigated so that it can embrace the 'time-varying' efficiency. Third, for more precise
policy and strategy development a model which is able to assess allocative efficiency
should be developed. Finally, the application of alternative efficiency models to the
existing data set will reveal the robustness of the various alternative methodologies.
Certainly, within this study, it has been shown that within the family of stochastic frontier
models, estimates of relative container terminal efficiency have proved remarkably
consistent. It would be interesting to determine if this were also so for other families of
models such as deterministic frontier models or those based on quadratic programming
such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
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Appendix 1 Organisation Structure of the MMAF
	
I	 MINISTER 	 I
Vice Minister
; Co.ordinationJ Public Relations
	
Office	 Co-ordinalor
rnational Relations	 Contingency Plan
Co-ordinator	 Co-ordinator
General Affair
	
Auditor
Division
Assistant Minister
	
Assistant Minister
(Shipping & Pods)
	
(Fisheñes)
Mane Policy	 Spng & Vessel	 Port Policy	 Port Construction	 Fhies Proc
	
Mane Resources	 Mane Products
Office	 Bureau	 Bureau	 Bureau	 Bureau
	
Bureau	 Marketing Bureau
Note: The Maritime Police Administration is an independent government organisation under the
of the MMAF.
Source: Drawn from the Administrative Structure of the Government as of 1997
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Appendix 2 Container Terminals in the Port of Pusan
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Appendix 3 Ownership Status of the World's Top 30 Container Ports
Port	 PUBLIC	 PUBLIC/private PRIVATE/public PRIVATE
I	 I-long Kong
2	 Singapore
3 Kaohsiung
4 Rotterdam
5 Pusan
6 Hamburg
7 Long Beach
8 Yokohama	 S
9 Los Angeles
10 Antwerp
11 New Yorki1ew Jersey 	 S
12 Keelung
13 Dubai
14 Felixstowe
15 Tokyo	 S
16 SanJuan
17 Bremen	 S
18 Oakland
19 Shanghai
20	 Seattle
21 Nagoya
22 Bangkok	 S
23 Kobe	 S
24 TanjungPriok
25 Algeciras
26 Klang	 S
27 Hawaii
28 Tacoma	 S
29 Osaka
30 La Spezia	 S
44 Southampton	 S
82 Tilbury	 I
Note: Classified as defined by the Port Function Matrix due to Baird (1995b, 1997)
Source: Extracted from Cass (1996, p. 167)
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Appendix 4 Ownership Structure of Major Ports in the UK
,
D Associated British Ports 1990
c.
with turnover ol £5m or more
o	 Former Trust Ports
now Companies (Ports Act 1991)
A Other Major Company Ports
	
Aberdeen	 .
0
/
•	 c•o Major Trust Ports1991
g	 Clyde
Forth Ports
PLC .• • ..••.Troon
Ayr	
BI,	 ?!
Sndeand
'.i-
	
Tees&	 -..
Barro.	
HarUepoolP L
in Furness
bFleetwood	 Hull\
	
Goole	 1
Liverpool	 -•	 .......
'j AManchester Immingham\
Garston
Kings Lynn
Lowestoftj
Felixsbë'
Til.PY
Source: Bassett (1993, p. 258)
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Appendix 5 Full Data Set
Terminal	 Year	 Variables (Unit: £)	 _____________
	
Operators______	 _____________ ____________	 112	 K1	 K2
	1978	 594715.85	 91102.10	 143170.48	 28776.03	 84113.51
	
1979	 3907891.46	 290024.49	 568335.66	 175050.71	 124006.54
	
1980	 2656501.48	 187684.93	 475417.62	 14901.55	 219622.38
	
1981	 3442511.11	 222501.82	 530737.86	 22021.61.	 209897.53
	
1982	 4225824.24	 248584.57	 674588.12	 30603.90	 174798.86
	
1983	 5836149.32	 243498.49	 896459.67	 56534.54	 220883.94
	
1984	 9206373.58	 312034.83	 1338214.81	 125704.49	 226390.86
	
1985	 7511103.26	 259349.98	 1100565.98	 58293.82	 547841.24
BCTOC	 1986	 10760576.87	 291100.72	 1271422.23	 80246.62	 67542.09
	
1987	 11275862.08	 240290.66	 1321415.02	 89875.54	 291791.19
	
1988	 14059197.42	 326452.34	 2295618.35	 74859.64	 363979.30
	
1989	 18442737.41	 434421.89	 3122703.17	 149672.11	 1730162.60
	
1990	 14035252.22	 358479.23	 2548689.28	 119952.02	 1501233.33
	
1991	 12489386.29	 327591.08	 2395173.70	 100366.54	 1707948.88
	
1992	 11595999.42	 426417.81	 3049909.51	 175969.34	 152917.93
	
1993	 12394464.71	 440830.55	 3079998.69	 215205.69	 113523.41
	
1994	 14800350.62	 438273.63	 3213378.59	 314846.81	 299836.65
	
1995	 17039008.55	 538766.88	 3901768.08	 412414.57	 168586.38
	
___________ 1996
	 14494531.66	 457980.50	 3772617.22	 536128.43	 237432.52
	
1991	 7743920.13	 146401.94	 2061951.64	 228349.89	 233621.76
	
1992	 23629585.36	 474377.70	 5977118.68	 1876735.79	 458597.72
PECT	 1993	 32898808.42	 703362.79	 6863020.33	 1301105.91	 322517.53
	
1994	 35872434.50	 808116.75	 7823161.18	 1103179.41	 606747.41
	
1995	 43335196.97	 1163197.75	 9877723.37	 1527466.01	 926403.47
	
___________ 1996
	
36868168.19	 1116078.05	 9643067.12	 1463880.05	 2974341.53
	
1979	 8737000.00	 17902.00	 20000.00	 145000.00	 61000.00
	
1980	 8514056.60	 20332.08	 16943.40	 192307.55	 40664.15
	
1981	 8946684.65	 20443.51	 15143.34	 177177.07	 32558.18
	
1982	 9039262.42	 21613.35	 2256155.28	 130377.33	 41135.09
	
1983	 7742918.40	 22649.85	 1816651.34	 88600.89	 33974.78
	
1984	 7170663.37	 22227.72	 1616908.06	 51441.30	 33659.12
	
1985	 7334864.00	 20354.67	 1523008.00	 40110.67	 34124.00
	
1986	 7712847.94	 10414.95	 1682592.78	 30666.24	 34716.49
Tilbury	 1987	 6722774.75	 23339.11	 1630959.16	 25561.88	 40565.59
	
1988	 6847382.53	 34987.01	 1645449.82	 32866.59	 56191.26
	
1989	 6053385.54	 36883.90	 2226803.94	 33933.19	 47703.18
	
1990	 5555926.00	 35471.00	 2121974.00	 31879.00	 61064.00
	
1991	 3863774.32	 21167.14	 2538821.53	 27559.02	 49606.23
	
1992	 5590009.11	 20037.34	 2691955.37	 1159712.20	 33531.88
	
1993	 5352160.54	 23356.05	 2228892.38	 1448075.34	 44698.65
	
1994	 6434881.01	 23962.38	 2455947.51	 1950773.40	 40461.07
	
1995	 6433626.92	 37480.41	 2339465.93	 3209164.40	 41304.94
	
____________ 1996
	 6316529.02	 42815.09	 1970611.11	 2839571.31	 41698.18
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Appendix 5 (conhinued)
Terminal	 Year	 Variables (Unit: £)	 _____________
	
Operators______	 _____________	 L,	 L2	 K,	 K2
	
1987	 22183000.00	 5449.00	 10964000.00	 2789000.00	 147000.00
	
1988	 20166936.95	 36249.17	 12491653.15	 4242106.27	 134503.48
	
1989	 17903539.82	 40707.96	 13407079.65	 7578761.06	 119469.03
	
1990	 20222204.27	 75145.44	 9705882.35	 6603102.78	 105042.02
	
Southampton 1991
	 22900198.38	 39676.48	 10027468.34	 9314054.63	 94613.15
	
1992	 21342262.12	 44153.36	 10415041.58	 13359334.76	 1504157.77
	1993	 20386956.52	 52173.91	 9491304.35	 16036956.52	 2074637.68
	
1994	 22119327.02	 55846.18	 7916725.58	 17105188.75	 1889580.09
	
1995	 25333103.92	 60564.35	 8378527.19	 20290433.59	 1710254.65
	
_____________ 1996
	 26380142.03	 63647.33	 9161865.20	 25735629.10	 1565724.24
	
1985	 46389000.00	 160000.00	 29947000.00	 61343000.00	 8509000.00
	
1986	 52408182.99	 197164.95	 33634020.62	 59182345.36	 22513530.93
	
1987	 60692450.50	 176361.39	 33785272.28	 58927908.42	 21471534.65
	
1988	 70768299.88	 107142.86	 37804604.49	 70154663.52	 19302538.37
	
1989	 70771905.81	 179901.42	 40056407.45	 73881982.48	 27654709.75
Felixstowe	 1990	 63671250.00	 157500.00	 37251000.00 102501000.00	 25417500.00
	
1991	 56208215.30	 97733.71	 32922804.53	 95221671.39	 34342067.99
	
1992	 52405737.70	 0.00	 33183060.11 110484289.62 	 31389344.26
	
1993	 54698878.92	 180269.06	 33595964.13	 87086098.65	 28976905.83
	
1994	 58884514.44	 253280.84	 33107611.55	 83898293.96	 28595144.36
	
1995	 62959114.14	 290034.07	 33856686.54	 81682921.64	 25798977.85
	
_____________ 1996
	
63088308.46	 241293.53	 33199004.98	 94363805.97	 33929104.48
Notes: Y = Turnover derived from container terminal services (excluding property sales)
L1 = Total remuneration of directors or executives for their managerial services
L2 = Total wages and salaries paid to employees (including pension and social security costs)
K, = Net book value of fixed equipment (e.g. building and land)
K2 Net book value of mobile and cargo handling equipment (e.g. crane, forklifts, tractors)
Data Incompatibilities I
As the accounting system adopted by both countries sampled is not identical, this research
compiled only the data appearing commonly in financial statements of each container
terminal company. More specifically, the financial accounts for the output and two labour
variables are broken down in a similar way, thus allowing a relatively easy comparison of
these items between the terminal companies. On the side of capital proxies, however, there
is a noticeable discrepancy between the two countries. Under the account of tangible assets,
which include the capital items associated with cargo handling and its supporting activities,
the UK companies provide a rather simply separated record; that is, the capital assets are
broadly divided into two different components - (i) fixed assets (e.g. civil works, dock
structures, buildings, land and machinery for general operations), and (ii) mobile,
especially cargo handling related, assets (e.g. cranes, fork lifts and tractors). In the Korean
counterparts, these assets are cut up into the more detailed categories; that is, without
division of fixed and mobile assets, they report the capital associated items individually,
such as machinery, dock structures, land and buildings for the purpose of operations, cargo
handling equipment (e.g. container cranes, yard tractors, yard chassis, fork lifts and transfer
cranes) and electronic facilities (e.g. network connected computers).
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To cope with these discrepancies existing in the capital variables, each account for the
capital inputs in the Korean terminal companies was accordingly divided into two
categories based on its nature of whether or not it is mobile, so as to permit a consistent
comparison with the UK counterparts. This compilation may not have any serious effects
on the findings, which is again supported by the fact that all the items in both countries are
reported in terms of net book value.
Data Sources and Contacts
• The data of 'BCTOC' and 'PECT' were extracted from the Annual Financial Reports,
which were kindly provided by the Korea Container Terminal Authority (KCTA).
• The data of 'Tilbury Container Services Company' and 'Southampton Container
Terminal Company' were collected through the Company Houses, Cardiff, U.K.
• The data of 'Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company' were compiled by the Annual
Report and Accounts, which were cordially provided by the Financial Division of the
Port of Felixstowe.
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Appendix 6 Productive Inefficiency of Container Terminal Operators
Terminal	 Year	 Estimated Productive_Inefficiency
Operators	 ___________	 Half-Normal	 Exponential	 Truncated Normal
1978	 2.5694	 2.5623	 2.5261
1979	 1.2604	 1.1402	 1.1511
1980	 1.2610	 1.1707	 1.1758
1981	 1.0888	 0.9823	 0.9938
1982	 0.9459	 0.8253	 0.8428
1983	 0.7804	 0.6422	 0.6664
1984	 0.5160	 0.3656	 0.3955
1985	 0.6646	 0.5194	 0.5459
BCTOC	 1986	 0.2007	 0.1460	 0.1620
1987	 0.2981	 0.2036	 0.2249
1988	 0.1802	 0.1332	 0.1474
1989	 0.2191	 0.1512	 0.1673
1990	 0.3708	 0.2463	 0.2708
1991	 0.4555	 0.3123	 0.3397
1992	 0.3716	 0.2431	 0.2705
1993	 0.3 154	 0.2052	 0.2296
1994	 0.3208	 0.2063	 0.2304
1995	 0.2166	 0.1453	 0.1630
_______________	 1996	 0.4034	 0.2569	 0i864
1991	 0.7618	 0.6062	 0.6366
1992	 0.2633	 0.1634	 0.1845
PECT	 1993	 0.0872	 0.0738	 0.0813
1994	 0.0826	 0.0711	 0.0781
1995	 0.0742	 0.0654	 0.0716
_______________	 1996	 0.1534	 0.1072	 0.1194
1979	 0.1555	 0.1301	 0.1407
1980	 0.1660	 0.1360	 0.1473
1981	 0.1268	 0.1113	 0.1202
1982	 0.2566	 0.1818	 0.2047
1983	 0.2995	 0.21 14	 0.2370
1984	 0.2802	 0.2022	 0.2261
1985	 0.2291	 0.1714	 0.1916
1986	 0.1594	 0.1307	 0.1458
Tilbury	 1987	 0.2585	 0.1915	 0.2136
1988	 0.3264	 0.2342	 0.2600
1989	 0.4404	 0.3199	 0.3517
1990	 0.5336	 0.4040	 0.4372
1991	 0.8185	 0.6985	 0.7276
1992	 1.0206	 0.8739	 0.9046
1993	 1.1281	 0.9856	 1.0122
1994	 0.9973	 0.8431	 0.8748
1995	 1.1008	 0.9448	 0.9738
1996	 1.0974	 0.9428	 0.9709
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Appendix 6 (continued)
Terminal	 Year	 Estimated Productive_Inefficiency
Operators	 ____________	 Half-Normal	 Exponential	 Truncated Normal
1987	 0.1405	 0.1063	 0.1208
1988	 0.3008	 0.1851	 0.2130
1989	 0.4906	 0.3086	 0.3505
1990	 0.3588	 0.2152	 0.2471
Southampton	 1991	 0.2679	 0.1642	 0.1893
1992	 0.6942	 0.4921	 0.5342
1993	 0.8072	 0.6065	 0.6458
1994	 0.7240	 0.5201	 0.5608
1995	 0.6194	 0.4136	 0.4553
_______________	 1996	 0.6167	 0.4081	 0.4504
1985	 0.5268	 0.3105	 0.3511
1986	 0.5334	 0.3145	 0.3543
1987	 0.3865	 0.2125	 0.2433
1988	 0.2571	 0.1459	 0.1674
1989	 0.3225	 0.1758	 0.2018
Felixstowe	 1990	 0.4466	 0.2469	 0.2822
1991	 0.5540	 0.3312	 0.3723
1992	 0.1404	 0.1081	 0.1250
1993	 0.5790	 0.3501	 0.3918
1994	 0.5191	 0.2993	 0.3381
1995	 0.4491	 0.2481	 0.2827
1996	 0.4902	 0.2768	 0.3 139
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Appendix 7 LIMDEP Commands for Container Terminal Frontier Analysis
0 Full data set, then discard incomplete observations
NAMELIST; PROD = ONE, LNL1, LNL2, LNK1, LNK2 $
0 For the Cross Section Model [Jondrow, et at. (1982) procedures]
• Half-Normal Model
FRONTIER; Lbs = LNY; Rhs = PROD; LIST; RES = U $
CREATE ;TTrn(1,l)$
PLOT	 ;Lhs=T;Rhs=U;FiIl$
• Exponential Model
FRONTIER; Lhs LNY; Rhs = PROD; LIST; RES = U; MODEL = E $
CREATE ; T = Tm (1,1) $
PLOT	 ;Lhs=T;Rhs=U;Fill$
• Truncated Normal Model
FRONTIER; Lbs = LNY; Rhs = PROD; LIST; RES = U; MODEL = T $
CREATE ; T Tm (1,1) S
PLOT	 ;Lhs=T;Rhs=U;FiIl$
0 For the Panel Model under the Half-Normal Case [ Battese and Coelli (1988) procedures]
FRONTIER; Lbs = LNY; Rhs = PROD; Pds = NI; LIST; Tib = O.O95 $
• Time Invariant Terminal Operator-Level Inefficiency
CREATE ; EPSILON = LNY - PROD'B $
MATRIX ; TI = Gsiz(FIRM)
; EBAR = Gxbr(EPSILON,FIRM)
; PANELU = Init(5,1,O) $
PROCEDURE
CALCULATE ; GAMMA! 11(1 + TI(i) * LMDAA2)
; S2U = LMDA A2 * S A2 / (1 + LMDAA2)
PSI = Sqr(S2U * GAMMA!)
MU! = -EBAR(i) * (1-GAMMA!)
; ESTDU = MU! + PSI * NOl (MUIJPSI)fPhi(MUIiPSI) $
MATRIX ; PANELU(i) = ESTDU $
ENDPROCEDURE
EXECUTE; 1=1,55
MATRIX ; LIST; PANELU S
(+) The command 'Tlb' was used to set the parameter convergence criterion, in order to make the panel
model feasible. The value less than 0.095 created an error message that estimated variance matrix of
estimates is singular, thus implying that an associated estimate of an asympototic covariance matrix can
not be obtained.
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Appendix 8 LIMDEP Output for Container Terminal Frontier Analysis
LIMDEP Execution Trace. This run: 23/03/98. Time now 16:21 :24.
Line Programme Instruction
1 OPEN; OUTPUT = c:\limdep7\test\test.out
 $
2 READ; FILE = c:\limdep7\test\test.wks
FORMAT = WKS
NAMES = FIRM, NI, LNY, LNLI, LNL2, LNKI, LNK2 $
Current sample	 :	 65 observs.
Total variables now:	 7
Missing values read: 0
3 EDIT
This begins 1 repetitions. The first is shown.
4 NAMELIST; PROD = ONE, LNLI, LNL2, LNK1, LNK2 $
5 FRONTIER; Lhs = LNY; Rhs = PROD; LIST; RES = U $
Results begin on page 1 in output.
Convergence by: Function
Exit status for this model command is 0.0.
6 CREATE;T=Trn(l,1)$
7 PLOT ;Lhs=T;Rhs=U;Fill$
Exit status for this model command is 0.0.
8 FRONTIER; Lhs = LNY; Rhs = PROD; LIST; RES = U; MODEL = E $
Results begin on page 5 in output.
Convergence by: Function
Exit status for this model command is 0.0.
9 CREATE;T=Tm(1,1)$
10 PLOT ;Lhs=T;Rhs=U;Fill$
Exit status for this model command is 0.0.
11 FRONTIER; Lhs = LNY; Rhs = PROD; LIST; RES = U; MODEL T $
Results begin on page 9 in output.
Convergence by: Function
Exit status for this model command is 0.0.
12 CREATE;T=Trn(1,1)$
13 PLOT ; Lhs = T; Rhs = U; Fill $
Exit status for this model command is 0.0.
14 FRONTIER; Lhs = LNY; Rhs = PROD; Pds NI; LIST; TIb = 0.095 $
Results begin on page 13 in output.
Convergence by: Parameters
Convergence by: Parameters
Exit status for this model command is 0.0.
15 CREATE ; EPSILON = LNY - PROD'B $
16 MATRIX ; TI = Gsiz(FIRM)
EBAR Gxbr(EPSILON,FIRM)
PANELU = Init(5,1,0) $
Results begin on page 18 in output.
17 PROCEDURE
18 CALCULATE ; GAMMAI = I / (1+ TI(i) * LMDAA2)
S2U = LMDAA2 * SA2 / (1 + LMDAA2)
PSI = Sqr(S2U * GAMMAI)
MUI = -EBAR(i) * (1-GAMMA!)
ESTDU = MUI + PSI * NO! (MUIIPSI)/Phi(MUIIPSI) $
19 MATRIX ; PANELU(i) ESTDU $
20 ENDPROCEDURE
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21 EXECUTE;I=1,5$
This begins 5 repetitions. The first is shown.
22 CALCULATE ; GAMMAI=1/(1+TI(I)*LMDA2)
S2ULMDA2*SI2/(1+LMDA2)
PSI=SQR(S2U*GAMMAI)
;MUIEBAR(I)*(1 -GAMMAI)
;ESTDU=MUI+PSI*NO 1 (MUIIPSI)IPHI(MUIIPSI) $
23 MATRIX;PANELU(I)=ESTDU $
Results begin on page 19 in output.
24 STOP $
Repetitions remaining I
25 MATRIX ; LIST; PANELU S
Results begin on page 24 in output.
End command entry from editor.
26 STOP
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FRONTIER
LNY
65
12
-33.79946
x(i)13
16.0186
16.5141
16. 1288
16.2055
16.2591
16.4066
16.5819
16.536 1
16.3530
16.5401
16.5832
y(i)-x(i)f3
-2.1880
-0.8008
-0.80 15
-0.6190
-0.4676
-0.2922
-0.0117
-0. 1694
0.3732
0.2329
0.4104
Appendices
Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER Regression
Ordinary Least Squares Regression 	 Weighting variable = ONE
Dependent variable is LNY	 Mean = 16.47702,	 S.D. = 0.9778
Model size: Observations = 65, Parameters = 5,	 Deg.Fr. = 60
Residuals: Sum of squares= 13.1677	 Std.Dev. = 0.46847
Fit: R-squared = 0.78480,	 Adjusted R-squared = 0.77045
Model test: F[ 4, 60) = 54.70, Prob value = 0 .00000
Diagnostic: Log-L = -40.3409, Restricted(13=o) Log-L = -90.2667
Amemiya Pr. Crt.= 0.236, Akaike Info. Crt.= 1.395
Variable Coefficient	 Standard Error	 z=b/s.e.	 P1 I Z I ^ z
	 Mean of X
Constant	 10.41763	 0.60595
LNL1	 0.4254606E-01	 0.32567E-01
LNL2	 0.1227087	 0.54124E-01
LNKI	 0.1491406	 O.38075E-0I
LNK2	 0.1286905	 0.43174E-01
	
17.192	 0.00000
	
1.306	 0.19141
	
2.267	 0.0233 8
	
3.917	 0.00009
	
2.981	 0.00288
11.39
15.07
13.79
12.98
Limited Dependent Variable Model -
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dependent variable
Number of observations
Iterations completed
Log likelihood fi.inction
Half-normal frontier model
Variance components:	 &(v) = 0.02682
&(u) 0.44923
Standard Error	 z=bfs.e.	 piIzI^zi Mean of XVariable	 Coefficient
Constant	 11.60937
LNLI	 0.5528735E-01
LNL2	 0.5571423E-Ol.
LNKI	 0.1705451
LNK2	 0.1204076
cYu/crv	 4.092798
+ cr, 0.6899588
0.65647
0.252 12E-0 1
0.41329E-01
0.45 042E-0 1
0.46741 E-0 1
2.5 119
0.61599E-0l
	
17.685	 0.00000
	
2.193	 0.02832	 11.39
	
1.348	 0.17764	 15.07
	
3.786	 0.00015	 13.79
	
2.576	 0.00999	 12.98
	
1.629	 0.10324
11.201
	
0.00000
Predicted Values • observation was not in estimating sample.
Observation	 Observed Y	 Predicted Y
	
Residual
1	 13.296	 15.484	 2.5694
2	 15.179	 15.979	 1.2604
3	 14.793	 15.594	 1.2610
4	 15.052	 15.671	 1.0888
5	 15.257	 15.724	 0.9459
6	 15.580	 15.872	 0.7804
7	 16.035	 16.047	 0.5160
8	 15.832	 16.001	 0.6646
9	 16.191	 15.818	 0.2007
10	 16.238	 16.005	 0.2981
11	 16.459	 16.048
	 0.1802
277
Appendices
Observation
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
Observed Y
16.730
16.457
16.340
16.266
16.333
16.5 10
16.651
16.489
15.862
16.978
17.309
17.395
17.584
17.423
15.983
15.957
16.007
16.0 17
15.862
15.786
15.808
15.858
15.721
15.739
15.616
15.530
15.167
15.536
15.493
15.677
15.677
15.659
16.915
16.820
16.701
16.822
16.947
16.876
16.830
16.912
17.048
17.088
17.653
17.775
17.92 1
18.075
18.075
17.969
17.845
17.775
17.8 17
17.891
17.958
17.960
Predicted Y
16.387
16.3 10
16.287
16.120
16.121
16.305
16.304
16.379
16. 135
16.700
16.624
16.687
16.827
16.956
15.521
15.5 18
15.472
15.729
15.63 1
15.530
15.48 1
15.406
15.436
15.541
15.547
15.561
15.500
16.083
16.154
16.199
16.309
16.287
16.417
16.590
16.685
16.662
16.674
17.077
17.151
17.144
17.169
17.207
17.676
17.805
17.792
17.788
17.872
17.906
17.897
17.276
17.896
17.906
17.898
17.944
Residual
0.2191
0.3708
0.4555
0.3716
0.3154
0.3208
0.2166
0.4034
0.7618
0.2633
0.0872
0.0826
0.0742
0.1534
0.1555
0.1660
0.1268
0.2566
0.2995
0.2802
0.2291
0. 1594
0.2585
0.3264
0.4404
0.5336
0.8185
1.0206
1. 128 1
0.9973
1.1008
1.0974
0.1405
0.3008
0.4906
0.3588
0.2679
0.6942
0. 8072
0.7240
0.6194
0.6167
0.5268
0.5334
0.3865
0.2571
0.3225
0.4466
0.5540
0.1404
0.5790
0.5 191
0.4491
0.4902
x(i)
16.9220
16.8452
16.8219
16.6552
16.6560
16.8399
16.83 88
16.9 139
16.6697
17.2345
17. 159 1
17.2220
17.3 6 16
17.49 11
16.056 1
16.0532
16.0065
16.2642
16.1659
16.0645
16.0155
15.9403
15.9709
16.0758
16.08 13
16.0956
16.0345
16.6 180
16.6885
16.7341
16.8435
16.8216
16.95 19
17.1247
17.2 198
17.1967
17.2093
17.6 119
17.6858
17.6792
17.7040
17.7416
18.2 105
18.3396
18.3272
18.3228
18.4068
18.44 11
18.43 15
17.8 112
18.4308
18.4408
18.4326
18.4790
y(i)-x(i)J3
0.3429
0. 1466
0.0532
0. 1458
0.2 115
0.205 1
0.3470
0.110 1
-0.2725
0.2783
0.6847
0.7083
0.7577
0.4665
0.4617
0.43 88
0.5350
0.2876
0.23 12
0.2558
0.3274
0.4529
0.2849
0.1983
0.0696
-0.0304
-0.3326
-0.5468
-0.6607
-0.5221
-0.6317
-0.6281
0.4977
0.2296
0.0155
0. 1604
0.2722
-0.2009
-0.3206
-0.2325
-0. 1216
-0.1187
-0.0232
-0.0302
0. 1289
0.2869
0.2029
0.0629
-0.0522
0.498 1
-0.0787
-0.0150
0.0601
0.0159
278
FRONTIER
LNY
65
11
-31.01938
Appendices
Limited Dependent Variable Model -
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dependent variable
Number of observations
Iterations completed
Log likelihood function
Exponential frontier model
Variance components: 	 &(v) = 0.03 848
&(u) = 0.15635
Variable	 Coefficient	 Standard Error
	 z=b/s.e.	 FE I z I ^ zJ Mean of X
Constant
LNL1
LNL2
LNK1
LNK2
0
cYV
11.80088
0.4888177E-01
0.4965416E-01
0.1599572
0. 1203270
2.529021
0.196163 1
0.52809
0.18558E-01
0.38838E-01
0.35823E-01
0.38985E-01
0.45455
0.51401E-01
22.346
2.634
1.278
4.465
3.086
5.564
3.8 16
0.00000
0.00844
0.20 108
0.00001
0.00203
0.00000
0.00014
11.39
15.07
13.79
12.98
Predicted Values • observation was not in estimating sample.
Observation	 Observed Y	 Predicted Y
	 Residual	 x(i)j3
1	 13.296	 15.560	 2.5623	 15.9554
2	 15.179	 16.021	 1.1402	 16.4160
3	 14.793	 15.665	 1.1707
	
16.0605
4	 15.052	 15.736	 0.9823
	
16.13 14
5	 15.257	 15.784	 0.8253	 16. 1793
6	 15.580	 15.923	 0.6422	 16.3 187
7	 16.035	 16.086	 0.3656	 16.48 15
8	 15.832	 16.051	 0.5194
	
16.4462
9	 16.191	 15.863	 0.1460
	
16.2583
10	 16.238	 16.050	 0.2036
	
16.4450
11	 16.459	 16.089	 0.1332
	
16.4848
12	 16.730	 16.417	 0.1512	 16.8 124
13	 16.457	 16.345	 0.2463
	
16.7405
14	 16.340	 16.325	 0.3123
	
16.7200
15	 16.266	 16.149	 0.2431
	
16.5443
16	 16.333	 16.147	 0.2052
	
16.5428
17	 16.510	 16.327	 0.2063
	
16.7223
18	 16.651	 16.321	 0.1453
	
16.7159
19	 16.489	 16.394	 0.2569
	
16.7895
20	 15.862	 16.170	 0.6062
	
16.5653
21	 16.978	 16.698	 0.1634
	
17.0937
22	 17.309	 16.623	 0.0738
	
17.0189
23	 17.395	 16.686	 0.0711
	
17.0818
24	 17.584	 16.819	 0.0654
	
17.214 1
25	 17.423	 16.949	 0.1072
	
17.3445
26	 15.983	 15.603	 0.1301
	
15.9982
27	 15.957	 15.597	 0.1360
	
15.9925
28	 16.007	 15.552	 0.1113	 15.9473
29	 16.017	 15.782	 0.1818	 16. 1776
30	 15.862	 15.689	 0.2114
	
16.0843
31	 15.786	 15.594	 0.2022	 15.9895
32	 15.808	 15.549	 0.1714
	
15.9441
33	 15.858	 15.480	 0.1307
	
15.8754
y(i)-x(i)13
-2.2642
-0.842 1
-0.8726
-0.6842
-0.5272
-0.3438
-0.0507
-0.2 189
0.3285
0.1886
0.3694
0.3 132
0.1120
0.0158
0.1173
0.1854
0.1833
0.3305
0.0952
-0.3075
0.2797
0.6855
0.7091
0.7657
0.4738
0.3803
0.3601
0.4549
0.2349
0.1734
0.1914
0.2594
0.3784
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Observation
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
Observed Y
15.721
15.739
15.6 16
15.530
15.167
15.536
15.493
15.677
15.677
15.659
16.915
16.820
16.701
16.822
16.947
16.876
16.830
16.9 12
17.048
17.088
17.653
17.775
17.92 1
18.075
18.075
17.969
17.845
17.775
17.8 17
17.89 1
17.958
17.960
Predicted Y
15.508
15.607
15.6 10
15.626
15.567
16.112
16.180
16.222
16.324
16.303
16.437
16.592
16.680
16.65 6
16.669
17.067
17.138
17. 132
17.154
17.188
17.634
17.762
17.750
17.746
17.826
17.858
17.853
17.305
17.849
17.85 8
17.849
17.895
Residual
0.1915
0.2342
0.3 199
0.4040
0.6985
0.8739
0.9856
0.843 1
0.9448
0.9428
0. 1063
0.1851
0.3086
0.2152
0. 1642
0.4921
0.6065
0.520 1
0.4 136
0.408 1
0.3 105
0.3 145
0.2125
0. 1459
0. 1758
0.2469
0.3312
0.1081
0.3501
0.2993
0.2481
0.2768
x(i)13
15.9029
16.0026
16.0056
16.02 10
15.9629
16.5077
16.5759
16.6 176
16.7192
16.6988
16.83 19
16.9874
17.0752
17.0516
17.0644
17.462 1
17.5335
17.5269
17.5490
17.5833
18.0298
18.157 1
18. 1455
18. 14 18
18.2215
18.2536
18.2486
17.7003
18.2448
18.2532
18.2442
18.2903
FRONTIER
LNY
65
15
-31.73436
y(i)-x(i)13
0.2 135
0. 1322
0.0059
-0.0952
-0.4003
-0.5758
-0.6875
-0.5450
-0.6467
-0.6447
0.4783
0.2275
0.0207
0. 1661
0.2776
-0. 1905
-0.3077
-0.2196
-0.1060
-0.0998
0.0182
0.0129
0. 1713
0.3285
0.2488
0.1110
-0.0086
0.4696
-0.0321
0.0333
0.1092
0.0652
Limited Dependent Variable Model -
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dependent variable
Number of observations
Iterations completed
Log likelihood function
Truncated normal frontier model
Variance components:	 &(v) = 0.03924
&(u) = 1.31734
Variable	 Coefficient
Constant	 11.77360
LNLI	 0.4812096E-01
LNL2	 O.5309478E-01
LNK1	 0.1615423
LNK2	 0.1187506
1uiau	 2.064202
5.793882
Jo +O 1.164726
Standard Error
	 z=b/s.e.
0.56237	 20.936
0.2 1209E-0 1
	
2.269
0.40280E-0 1
	
1.3 18
0.3 823 1E-Ol	 4.225
0.43648E-0 I	 2.72 1
4.8971	 0.422
3.5490	 1.633
0.85237	 1.366
pEIzI^zi MeanofX
0.00000
	
0.02328	 11.39
	
0.18745	 15.07
	
0.00002	 13.79
	
0.00652	 12.98
0.67338
0.10256
0. 17180
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x(i)f3
15.9587
16.4254
16.0648
16.13 66
16.1861
16.3271
16.4923
16.4539
16.2702
16.4550
16.4958
16.8230
16.7503
16.7292
16.5589
16.558 1
16.7369
16.7324
16.8058
16.5790
17.1 125
17.0378
17.0998
172326
17.3609
15.9990
15.9937
15.9484
16. 1950
16.1006
16.0046
15.9586
15.8903
15.9 166
16.0158
16.0202
16.0350
15.9778
16.5295
16.5969
16.6396
16.7414
16.7200
16.8587
17.0140
17.1030
17.0778
17.0919
17.4858
17.5566
17.5496
17.5723
17.6073
18.0559
18.1819
y(i)-x(i)13
-2.4724
-1.0564
-1.08 19
-0.8944
-0.7389
-0.5571
-0.2665
-0.43 15
0.1117
-0.0264
0. 1534
0.0977
-0.1028
-0.1984
-0.1023
-0.0349
-0.0363
0. 1091
-0. 1261
-0.5262
0.0559
0.4616
0.4861
0 .5423
0.2523
0. 1745
0. 1539
0.2488
0.0 125
-0.0479
-0.0286
0.0400
0.1585
-0.0051
-0.0860
-0.2 136
-0.3141
-0.6202
-0.8026
-0.9134
-0.7719
-0.8739
-0.8709
02466
-0.0040
-0.2120
-0.0650
0.0452
-0.4 192
-0.5358
-0.4472
-0.3342
-0.3288
-0.2129
-0.2 168
Appendices
Predicted Values • observation was not in estimating sample.
Observation	 Observed Y	 Predicted Y	 Residual
1	 13.296	 15.768	 2.5261
2	 15.179	 16.235	 1.1511
3	 14.793	 15.874	 1.1758
4	 15.052	 15.946	 0.9938
5	 15.257	 15.996	 0.8428
6	 15.580	 16.137	 0.6664
7	 16.035	 16.302	 0.3955
8	 15.832	 16.263	 0.5459
9	 16.191	 16.080	 0.1620
10	 16238	 16.265	 0.2249
11	 16.459	 16.305	 0.1474
12	 16.730	 16.633	 0.1673
13	 16.457	 16.560	 0.2708
14	 16.340	 16.539	 0.3397
15	 16.266	 16.368	 0.2705
16	 16.333	 16.368	 0.2296
17	 16.510	 16.546	 0.2304
18	 16.651	 16.542	 0.1630
19	 16.489	 16.615	 0.2864
20	 15.862	 16.389	 0.6366
21	 16.978	 16.922	 0.1845
22	 17.309	 16.847	 0.0813
23	 17.395	 16.909	 0.0781
24	 17.584	 17.042	 0.0716
25	 17.423	 17.171	 0.1194
26	 15.983	 15.809	 0.1407
27	 15.957	 15.803	 0.1473
28	 16.007	 15.758	 0.1202
29	 16.017	 16.005	 0.2047
30	 15.862	 15.910	 02370
31	 15.786	 15.814	 0.2261
32	 15.808	 15.768	 0.1916
33	 15.858	 15.700	 0.1458
34	 15.721	 15.726	 0.2136
35	 15.739	 15.825	 0.2600
36	 15.616	 .	 15.830	 0.3517
37	 15.530	 15.845	 0.4372
38	 15.167	 15.787	 0.7276
39	 15.536	 16.339	 0.9046
40	 15.493	 16.406	 1.0122
41	 15.677	 16.449	 0.8748
42	 15.677	 16.551	 0.9738
43	 15.659	 16.530	 0.9709
44	 16.915	 16.668	 0.1208
45	 16.820	 16.824	 0.2130
46	 16.701	 16.913	 0.3505
47	 16.822	 16.887	 02471
48	 16.947	 16.901	 0.1893
49	 16.876	 17.295	 0.5342
50	 16.830	 17.366	 0.6458
51	 16.912	 17.359	 0.5608
52	 17.048	 17.382	 0.4553
53	 17.088	 17.417	 0.4504
54	 17.653	 17.865	 0.3511
55	 17.775	 17.991	 0.3543
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Appendices
Observation
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
Observed Y
17.92 1
18.075
18.075
17.969
17.845
17.775
17.817
17.89 1
17.958
17.960
Predicted Y
17.980
17.977
18.057
18.089
18.083
17.544
18.079
18.087
18.079
18. 125
Residual
0.2433
0. 1674
0.2018
0.2822
0.3723
0. 1250
0.3918
0.338 1
0.2827
0.3 139
x(i)3
18. 1704
18.1679
18.2470
18.2796
18.2739
17.7348
18.2699
18.2778
18.2690
18.3150
y(i)-x(i)
-0.0586
0.0974
0.0184
-0.1199
-0.2389
0 .23 02
-0.2621
-0.1963
-0. 1206
-0. 1645
Limited Dependent Variable Model - 	 FRONTIER
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dependent variable	 LNY
Number of observations	 65
Iterations completed 	 6
Log likelihood function	 -48.08936
Frontier model estimated with PANEL data.
Variance components:	 a2(v) = 0.18202
&(u)= 2.71204
Variable
Constant
LNL1
LNL2
LNKI
LNK2
csu2IcJv2
&(v)
Coefficient
11.60381
0.3855152E-01
0.1003662
0.1107808
0.1590365
14.89937
0.1820241
Standard Error	 z=rb/s.e.
	
0.52570E+08
	
0.000
	
0.1 9265E+07	 0.000
	
0.1 9445 E+07	 0.000
	
0.30466E+07
	
0.000
	
0.13818E+07
	
0.000
	
0.10562E+09
	
0.000
	
0.95029E+06
	
0.000
P[ I Z ^ zJ
1.00000
1.00000
1.00000
1.00000
1.00000
1.00000
1.00000
Mean of X
11.39
15.07
13.79
12.98
Time Invariant Terminal Operator-Level Inefficiency
TI = GSIZ(FIRM)
Matrix TI	 has S rows and I columns.
EBAR = GXBR(EPSILON,FIRM)
Matrix EBAR has 5 rows and I columns.
PANELU = INIT(5,1,0)
Matrix PANELU has 5 rows and 1 columns.
PANELU(I)=ESTDU
PANELIJ(I)=ESTDU
PANELU(I)=ESTDU
PANELU(I)=ESTDU
PANELU(1)=ESTDU
LIST
PANELU
Matrix Result
1 0.8896
2 0.2778
3 0.6568
4 0.5892
S 0.5967
is 5 rows by 1 columns.
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